feat(core): HTTP/2 Phase 1 — HTTP/1.1 hardening and protocol negotiation
Fixes the request-smuggling and resource-exhaustion debt in the existing
HTTP/1.1 parser, and adds the ALPN/h2c-preface negotiation seam so a
connection's protocol is decided once, before any request is parsed, per
flash/docs/http2/IMPLEMENTATION-PLAN.md Phase 1.
Existing-code defects fixed (EX-nn):
- EX-02: reject Content-Length + Transfer-Encoding together (RFC 9112 6.1
CL.TE/TE.CL smuggling), and conflicting duplicate Content-Length values.
- EX-03: strict, overflow-safe Content-Length parsing, replacing a parser
that silently skipped non-digit bytes ("5abc" -> 5, "-1" -> 1).
- EX-07: header-read / idle-keep-alive / body-read timeouts enforced by an
absolute deadline (dev.relism.flash.transport.BufferedByteSource), not
merely Socket#setSoTimeout, which never trips against a peer trickling
one byte per read within the window.
- EX-08: header count / name length / value length / request-line length
bounds (Http1Limits), 431 on violation.
- EX-10: ChunkedInputStream now reads through BufferedByteSource instead
of the raw unbuffered socket stream, and the header-parser's read-ahead
bytes are handed over via a zero-copy prependOnce() instead of a
SequenceInputStream/ByteArrayInputStream pair.
- EX-17: HttpStatus's status-code bound is computed from values() instead
of a hand-maintained constant that silently threw
ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException when a code above it was added; added
421, 431, 505, 507, 511 and others HTTP/2 and this hardening need.
- EX-18: bare-CR desync and obsolete line folding rejected.
- EX-30: the TLS handshake is forced explicitly, under a timeout, before
any protocol decision -- SSLSocket#getApplicationProtocol() returned
null until the handshake had run, and nothing previously forced it.
- EX-31: TLS 1.2 cipher suites on the RFC 9113 Appendix A blocklist are
filtered out of a listener's enabled set whenever it offers h2 via ALPN.
- EX-35 (found in this phase): Transfer-Encoding values listing multiple
codings ("gzip, chunked") were silently treated as not chunked at all,
corrupting the message boundary -- only the whole value was compared.
- EX-36 (found in this phase): a header line with no ':' was silently
skipped instead of rejected.
New:
- dev.relism.flash.transport.BufferedByteSource: the single buffered,
deadline-aware, peekable view over a connection's inbound bytes.
- dev.relism.flash.transport.ProtocolNegotiator/NegotiatedProtocol: ALPN
and h2c prior-knowledge detection. In this phase an H2 result is always
closed cleanly -- there is no Http2Connection to hand off to until
Phase 8. FlashConfiguration.http2Enabled gates the h2c preface peek.
- dev.relism.flash.exceptions.MalformedRequestException: a typed,
status-carrying rejection distinct from HttpException, caught at the
parse site so a malformed request never reaches the handler chain or
the user's exception handler, and the connection is always closed.
Two small plan-document corrections recorded as DEC-12 (Phase 1's Files
list omitted BufferedByteSource.java and MalformedRequestException.java;
the request-line-length check description pointed at the wrong offset).
DEC-13/DEC-14 record the deadline and exception-hierarchy designs.
277/277 tests green (flash module), run twice for stability of the new
wall-clock-based HttpServerTimeoutTest cases. Whole-repo build green.
h1 benchmark regression check is left unverified in the plan's DoD: no
JMH harness exists yet (Phase 3 deliverable).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Zakaria El Orche
co-authored by
Claude Sonnet 5
Claude Sonnet 5
parent
db6e4a4d0c
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# HTTP/1.1 Hardening (Phase 1)
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Audience: operators. This is the document to read when a `400`/`413`/`414`/`431`/`501` shows up
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in the logs and it isn't obvious why. Every rejection rule Flash's HTTP/1.1 parser enforces is
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listed here with its RFC citation and the status it produces. Contributor-level detail (why each
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check is implemented the way it is, the exact code paths) lives in the Javadoc of
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`RequestParser`, `ChunkedInputStream`, and `dev.relism.flash.exceptions.MalformedRequestException`.
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Every rejection in this document has one thing in common: **the connection is always closed
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afterwards, never kept alive.** A rejected request is exactly the situation a smuggling attack
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needs a reusable connection for, so none of these rejections offer one — see
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`MalformedRequestException`'s Javadoc.
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## Request-smuggling defenses (RFC 9112 §6.1)
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| Rule | Status | Detail |
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|---|---|---|
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| `Content-Length` and `Transfer-Encoding` both present | `400` | The canonical CL.TE/TE.CL smuggling vector. Rejected regardless of which header appears first. |
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| Multiple `Content-Length` lines with **differing** values | `400` | Identical repeated values are tolerated (RFC 9110 §8.6 permits treating them as one). |
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| `Transfer-Encoding` whose **final** coding is not `chunked` | `501` | Flash implements only `chunked`; anything else (`gzip` alone, or `chunked, gzip` — chunked must be *last*) is unsupported. |
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## Strict `Content-Length` parsing (RFC 9110 §8.6)
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| Input | Status |
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|---|---|
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| Empty value | `400` |
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| Any non-digit byte (including a leading `+` or `-`) | `400` |
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| More than 19 digits | `400` |
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| Value overflows `Long.MAX_VALUE` | `400` |
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| Value exceeds `Http1Limits.MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH` (4 GiB by default) | `413` |
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The previous parser silently skipped non-digit characters (`"5abc"` parsed as `5`; `"-1"` parsed
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as `1`) instead of rejecting them — this is the fix.
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## Header and request-line limits (`Http1Limits`)
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| Limit | Default | Status when exceeded |
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|---|---|---|
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| `MAX_HEADER_COUNT` | 100 | `431 Request Header Fields Too Large` |
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| `MAX_HEADER_NAME_LENGTH` | 256 B | `431` |
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| `MAX_HEADER_VALUE_LENGTH` | 8192 B | `431` |
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| `MAX_REQUEST_LINE_LENGTH` | 8192 B | `431` |
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| Header block exceeds `maxHeaderBufferSize` (or the connection ends before it completes) | configurable, default 64 KiB | `431` |
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## Line-terminator and header-syntax correctness (RFC 9112 §5)
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| Rule | Status |
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|---|---|
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| A `\r` not immediately followed by `\n` (bare CR) | `400` — a known desynchronization/smuggling surface |
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| A header line beginning with whitespace (obsolete line folding, RFC 9112 §5.2) | `400` |
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| A header name containing a byte outside RFC 9110 §5.6.2's `tchar` set | `400` |
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| A header line with no `:` | `400` |
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## Chunked transfer safety (RFC 9112 §7.1, `Http1Limits`)
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| Limit | Default | Status when exceeded |
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|---|---|---|
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| `MAX_CHUNK_SIZE` | 16 MiB | `413` |
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| Chunk-size line longer than 16 hex digits | — | `400` |
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| `MAX_CHUNK_EXT_LENGTH` (the optional `;name=value` after a chunk size) | 256 B | `400` |
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| `MAX_CHUNKS_PER_BODY` | 100 000 | `413` |
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| `MAX_TRAILER_COUNT` | 50 | `431` |
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| A chunk's data not followed by `\r\n`, or a malformed chunk-size/trailer terminator | — | `400` |
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Trailers are consumed (safely, within the bounds above) but discarded, not exposed to the
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handler, on HTTP/1.1 today — exposing them via `Request.trailers()` on both protocols is Phase
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12 scope.
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## Timeouts (`FlashConfiguration`)
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| Setting | Default | Covers |
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|---|---|---|
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| `idleKeepAliveTimeoutMs` | 60 000 | How long a keep-alive connection may sit idle waiting for its next request. |
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| `headerReadTimeoutMs` | 10 000 | Once the first byte of a request arrives, how long the full header block may take. |
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| `bodyReadTimeoutMs` | 30 000 | How long reading the body (by the handler, or the automatic post-response drain) may take. |
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| `shutdownDrainTimeoutMs` | 15 000 | How long graceful shutdown waits for in-flight requests before force-closing (wired up starting Phase 2). |
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These are enforced by an **absolute deadline**, not merely `Socket.setSoTimeout`. A per-read
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socket timeout alone never trips against a peer that sends one byte just often enough to keep
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each individual read alive (the classic slowloris shape) — see
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`dev.relism.flash.transport.BufferedByteSource`'s Javadoc for how the absolute deadline is
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implemented on top of the JDK's per-read-only timeout API.
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## TLS (RFC 9113 §9.2.2, applies once a listener offers `h2` over ALPN)
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- The TLS handshake is forced explicitly (not left to the JDK's lazy on-first-read trigger)
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before any protocol decision is made, and is bounded by `headerReadTimeoutMs`.
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- When a listener's `TlsConfig.applicationProtocols` includes `"h2"`, the enabled TLS 1.2 cipher
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suite list is filtered against the RFC 9113 Appendix A blocklist
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(`TlsConfig.TLS12_H2_BLOCKED_CIPHERS`, ~280 entries). TLS 1.3 is never affected — none of its
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cipher suites are on that list.
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- HTTP/2 itself is not yet served in this phase (lands in Phase 8): a connection that negotiates
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`h2` via ALPN, or that opens with the h2c prior-knowledge preface while
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`FlashConfiguration.http2Enabled` is set, is currently closed cleanly rather than served.
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