refactor(core): make boot and middleware ordering deterministic

2026-08-12 16:42:49 +00:00
parent d7f36a7aea
commit 891ef99b8e
51 changed files with 1395 additions and 504 deletions
@@ -53,4 +53,6 @@ public class GetWeatherTool extends McpTool {
 - [`tools-resources-prompts.md`](tools-resources-prompts.md) — defining tools, resources, prompts
 - [`transport.md`](transport.md) — Streamable HTTP scope, session/SSE limitations, Origin validation
 - [`security.md`](security.md) — `McpSecurity` policy, OAuth2 resolution, RFC 9728 / RFC 8707
+- [`keycloak.md`](keycloak.md) — Keycloak-specific setup cookbook: Dynamic Client Registration,
+  the RFC 8707 audience mapper gotcha, and how to verify/debug it
 - [`jackson-interop.md`](jackson-interop.md) — why this extension does not depend on `flash-ext-jackson`
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+# Keycloak cookbook
+
+`security.md` covers the OAuth2 mechanics `McpOidcIntegration` implements against any
+`flash-ext-oidc`-compatible provider. This is the Keycloak-specific setup: the exact Admin
+Console configuration for a working MCP OAuth2 flow with open Dynamic Client Registration
+(DCR) — no pre-registered clients, any MCP client self-registers on first connect.
+
+## 1. Allow Dynamic Client Registration
+
+MCP clients (Claude Desktop, Claude.ai, MCP Inspector, others) don't share one static OAuth
+client — each has its own `redirect_uri` and none know your realm in advance. They self-register
+on first connect via `POST {issuer}/clients-registrations/openid-connect` (the
+`registration_endpoint` from the AS metadata document, reached via the RFC 9728 Protected
+Resource Metadata document `McpExtension` publishes).
+
+**Clients → Client registration**: remove the **Trusted Hosts** policy — it rejects anonymous
+registration from hosts not on an explicit allowlist (`403` / `"Host not trusted"`), which
+doesn't scale to arbitrary future agents. This does not weaken end-user authentication — DCR
+only grants an app a `client_id`; every user still authenticates against Keycloak's real login
+screen regardless of which client asked. Lighter hygiene policies (**Max Clients Limit**,
+**Consent Required**) can stay, they don't interfere.
+
+## 2. RFC 8707 audience: mapper on `basic`, not a custom scope
+
+`McpOidcIntegration` rejects (403) any token whose `aud` doesn't include the MCP endpoint's
+canonical URL. Keycloak doesn't add this by default. The obvious fix — a custom client scope
+with an Audience mapper, marked Default, added to Allowed Client Scopes — **does not work**:
+clients created via the `openid-connect` DCR endpoint only ever get scopes they explicitly
+request, and most MCP clients (including MCP Inspector) don't request anything beyond what a
+server tells them to via `scopes_supported` (step 3). Default-scope auto-attachment, which is
+how a normal manually-created client would pick up a custom Default scope, doesn't apply to
+DCR-created clients at all.
+
+`basic` is the one built-in scope Keycloak attaches to every client unconditionally, regardless
+of what it registered with. Put the audience mapper there:
+
+1. **Client scopes → `basic`** → **Mappers** → **Add mapper** → **By configuration** →
+   **Audience**.
+2. **Included Custom Audience** = the exact value your server expects — check
+   `GET {parent-of-rootPath}/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource{rootPath}` on the running
+   server for the `resource` field it publishes (auto-derived from the request's
+   forwarded/`Host` headers — see `security.md`). Leave **Included Client Audience** empty (that
+   targets another Keycloak client, not a resource URL).
+3. **Add to access token** = ON.
+4. **Save.**
+
+This is unconditional and works regardless of client cooperation — keep it even after step 3
+below gets other claims flowing normally, since audience binding is a hard spec requirement
+that shouldn't depend on a client bothering to request the right scope.
+
+## 3. Other claims (username, email...): `scopes_supported` + Allowed Client Scopes
+
+`OidcUser.username()`/`.email()`/`.name()` read `preferred_username`/`email`/`name` — normally
+from the `profile`/`email` client scopes, which DCR clients don't get either, same root cause.
+Unlike audience, this **is** fixable the "normal" way, because it doesn't need to survive a
+completely uncooperative client:
+
+`McpConfig.scopesSupported("openid", "profile", "email")` publishes those scopes in the PRM
+document. MCP clients that read it (confirmed for MCP Inspector) echo them back in their DCR
+registration request — `"scope": "openid profile email offline_access"` (`offline_access` is
+Inspector's own addition, for refresh tokens). For that request to actually succeed, **Allowed
+Client Scopes** needs, exactly:
+
+- **`openid` listed explicitly.** The one genuinely non-obvious step: `openid` is not covered by
+  **Allow Default Scopes** (On by default) the way other realm-Default scopes are, even though
+  every OIDC request includes it. Until it's listed here, registration fails with a generic
+  `403 insufficient_scope` / `"Not permitted to use specified clientScope"` regardless of
+  whether everything else is configured correctly.
+- **`offline_access` listed explicitly** — it's Optional, not Default, so `ALLOW_DEFAULT_SCOPES`
+  doesn't cover it either.
+- **`profile`/`email` — do not list them here.** Mark them **Default** on the **Client scopes**
+  page (Assigned Type column) instead, and leave **Allow Default Scopes** = On. Adding an
+  already-Default scope to this list explicitly gets rejected on save
+  (`"Client scopes not allowed: [...]"`) — the list is for *additional* Optional scopes only.
+
+With that, a real client's token comes back with `preferred_username`/`email` populated
+normally.
+
+### Fallback for anything else
+
+For a claim not covered by `openid profile email` (a custom attribute, a role) — or for a client
+that ignores `scopes_supported` entirely — add a **User Property** mapper to `basic` too
+(Property `username` → Token Claim Name `preferred_username`, or whatever's needed), same as the
+audience mapper in step 2. Unconditional, works regardless of client cooperation, costs one
+mapper per claim, once, at the realm level — not per tool.
+
+## Verifying without a full OAuth round-trip
+
+**Clients → (any client) → Client scopes → Evaluate**: pick a user, run it — Default scopes
+(including `basic`) apply automatically and won't appear in the "Select scope parameters"
+picker, which only lists Optional ones — and check the **Generated Access Token** preview.
+Confirms mappers work without a browser + real MCP client round-trip each time.
+
+## If a real client still gets rejected
+
+`McpOidcIntegration.audienceGuard` logs the actual mismatch at `WARN`:
+
+```
+[flash-ext-mcp] Rejecting token (RFC 8707): aud=<token's actual aud> does not include expected
+resource identifier "<what this server expects>" — ...
+```
+
+`aud=null` → the `basic` mapper produced nothing (most common cause: **Included Custom
+Audience** left blank — the mapper saves fine and silently does nothing without it). A non-null
+`aud` that still doesn't match → compare byte-for-byte — the expected side is derived from the
+request's own forwarded/`Host` headers, so scheme/host/trailing-slash mismatches show up here
+directly, as does a proxy hop that drops `X-Forwarded-Host`.
@@ -1,5 +1,10 @@
 # Security

+Provider-specific setup steps (not generic OAuth2 mechanics) live in separate cookbooks —
+[`keycloak.md`](keycloak.md) for Keycloak: enabling Dynamic Client Registration, why the RFC 8707
+audience mapper needs to go on the built-in `basic` scope instead of a custom one, and the exact
+Allowed Client Scopes configuration `scopes_supported` needs to actually work.
+
 ## `McpSecurity`

 `McpConfig.security(...)` controls how the MCP endpoint reacts to `flash-ext-oidc` being
@@ -34,44 +39,120 @@ MCP-only install, no OAuth2 anywhere in the app), the first such reference throw
 fails, and only when there's something to fail. This mirrors `OidcExtension`'s own lazy bridge to
 `flash-ext-openapi` — same technique, same reason.

-## OAuth2 resolution details
+## OAuth2 resolution details — zero-config by default

-When oidc is available and `security() != NONE`:
+When oidc is available and `security() != NONE`, `McpOidcIntegration` (an isolated,
+lazily-loaded bridge — see its javadoc) derives everything an MCP OAuth2 resource server needs
+straight from the installed `OidcMiddleware`, with no additional `McpConfig` calls required:

-1. The MCP route is wrapped with `flash-ext-oidc`'s own `OidcMiddleware.protect()` — the same
-   Bearer-token/JWKS validation path used everywhere else in Flash5. No JWT parsing or JWKS
-   handling is reimplemented here.
-2. If `McpConfig.resourceIdentifier(...)` is set, an additional audience guard runs after
-   `protect()`: it reads the validated claims from `ClaimsHolder` and rejects (`403`) any token
-   whose `aud` claim does not include the configured resource identifier — **RFC 8707 Resource
-   Indicators / audience binding**. This is genuinely new behavior, not something
-   `flash-ext-oidc` does on its own: `OidcMiddleware` validates `aud` against its own
-   `clientId` for ID tokens, but deliberately does not enforce audience on access tokens (it
-   varies by provider) — the MCP extension adds that check on top, scoped to its own resource
-   identifier.
-3. If `resourceIdentifier(...)` is left unset, only standard bearer validation runs — no
-   audience binding. Fine for a first integration; RFC 8707 becomes meaningful once you have
-   more than one resource server sharing the same authorization server.
+1. The MCP route is wrapped with `flash-ext-oidc`'s own `OidcMiddleware.protect(resourceMetadataPath)`
+   — the same Bearer-token/JWKS validation path used everywhere else in Flash5, plus a
+   `resource_metadata` challenge parameter (see below). No JWT parsing or JWKS handling is
+   reimplemented here.
+2. An audience guard always runs after `protect(...)`: it reads the validated claims from
+   `ClaimsHolder` and rejects (`403`) any token whose `aud` claim does not include the resource
+   identifier — **RFC 8707 Resource Indicators / audience binding**, enforced unconditionally,
+   not opt-in. `OidcMiddleware` itself validates `aud` against its own `clientId` for ID
+   tokens, but deliberately does not enforce audience on access tokens (it varies by provider)
+   — the MCP extension adds that check on top, scoped to its own resource identifier.
+3. The resource identifier is the canonical URI of the MCP endpoint, resolved **per request** by
+   `OidcMiddleware#selfOrigin` + `rootPath` — the same scheme/host resolution `OidcExtension`
+   uses for its own redirect URIs: `X-Forwarded-Host`/`X-Forwarded-Proto` when the request came
+   through a reverse proxy, otherwise `{selfScheme()}://{Host header}`. Behind a proxy the
+   `Host` alone is the upstream address the proxy dialled, which would publish a resource
+   identifier no client can reach. `McpConfig.resourceIdentifier(...)` still overrides it
+   outright for a proxy that forwards neither header.
+4. The authorization server issuer is read from `OidcMiddleware#issuer()` unless
+   `McpConfig.authorizationServerIssuer(...)` overrides it.

 ## RFC 9728 Protected Resource Metadata

-If both `resourceIdentifier(...)` and `authorizationServerIssuer(...)` are set (and the endpoint
-ends up protected), `flash-ext-mcp` publishes a Protected Resource Metadata document at
-`/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource{rootPath}`:
+Whenever the endpoint ends up protected, `flash-ext-mcp` publishes a Protected Resource Metadata
+document at `/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource{rootPath}` — no explicit `resourceIdentifier`/
+`authorizationServerIssuer` configuration required, both are auto-derived as described above:

 ```json
 { "resource": "https://mcp.example.com/mcp", "authorization_servers": ["https://auth.example.com/realms/myrealm"] }
 ```

-This lets a spec-compliant MCP client discover which authorization server to use without
-out-of-band configuration. `authorizationServerIssuer` has to be supplied explicitly because
-`flash-ext-oidc` does not expose its resolved issuer/discovery metadata through `FlashContext` —
-only `OidcMiddleware` and `JwtValidator` are registered there. Passing it separately avoids
-reaching into `flash-ext-oidc` internals for a value the app owner already has at hand (it's the
-same issuer they configured `OidcExtension` with).
+`resource` is computed per request from the incoming request's forwarded/`Host` headers (see
+above), so the document is correct without hardcoding the server's own public URL.

-Without an issuer configured, bearer validation still works exactly the same — the client just
-needs the authorization server configured out-of-band instead of discovering it automatically.
+### `scopes_supported`
+
+Optional per RFC 9728, omitted from the document entirely unless set via
+`McpConfig.scopesSupported("openid", "profile", "email")`:
+
+```json
+{ "resource": "...", "authorization_servers": ["..."], "scopes_supported": ["openid", "profile", "email"] }
+```
+
+This is pure advertisement — token validation doesn't change based on it — but it matters in
+practice: a client that ignores it and requests no scope at all (many do — see `keycloak.md`)
+only gets back whatever the authorization server treats as always-included regardless of
+request, which for Keycloak is just its built-in `basic` scope. A client that *does* read
+`scopes_supported` and echoes it back in its authorization/token requests gets a token with the
+claims those scopes actually provide (`profile` → `preferred_username`/`name`, etc.), without
+needing every one of those claims hand-mapped onto `basic`. Set it to whatever scopes your
+`McpTool`s actually read off `ClaimsHolder`/`OidcUser` — there's no way to auto-derive this list,
+it depends entirely on what your tools do with the claims.
+
+## `WWW-Authenticate: resource_metadata` (RFC 9728 §5.1)
+
+The MCP Authorization spec **requires** a `401` to carry `resource_metadata` in
+`WWW-Authenticate`, pointing at the Protected Resource Metadata document above — this is how a
+spec-compliant client discovers the authorization server without out-of-band configuration.
+`OidcMiddleware.protect(String resourceMetadataPath)` (an overload added specifically for this)
+builds that challenge automatically:
+
+```
+WWW-Authenticate: Bearer realm="...", resource_metadata="https://mcp.example.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp"
+```
+
+The plain `OidcMiddleware.protect()` (no argument), used by every other Flash5 app, is
+unaffected — this parameter is additive and MCP-specific.
+
+## Per-tool `@RolesAllowed`/`@ScopesAllowed`
+
+`McpTool` subclasses can carry `flash-ext-oidc`'s `@RolesAllowed`/`@ScopesAllowed`:
+
+```java
+@Tool(name = "delete_route", description = "Delete a route")
+@RolesAllowed("admin")
+public class DeleteRouteTool extends McpTool {
+    @Override public ToolResponse call(ToolArguments args) { ... }
+}
+```
+
+This does **not** reuse `flash-ext-oidc`'s per-route middleware mechanism (`ctx.addAnnotationProcessor`,
+the thing that makes these annotations work on a `RequestHandler`) — it can't: every tool shares
+one HTTP route (`POST {rootPath}`), already wrapped by whatever `McpSecurity` resolved above, so
+there is no per-tool route to attach a different middleware chain to. Instead,
+`McpOidcIntegration.compileToolPolicy` reads the annotations once at boot (`McpRegistry.scan`)
+and compiles them into a closure (`McpAuthPolicy`) that `McpDispatcher` runs *after* the
+route-wide auth has already succeeded and *before* invoking the specific tool named in the
+`tools/call` request — narrowing what's already-authenticated, not replacing it. A denial is a
+normal `isError: true` tool result (see `ToolResponse.error`), not an HTTP-level rejection — the
+model sees why, the same as any other tool failure.
+
+Roles are read via `OidcUser#hasRole` against `McpConfig.rolesClaimPath(...)` (default
+`"realm_access.roles"`, matching `OidcConfig`'s own default — set this explicitly if the two
+diverge; there's no way to read `OidcConfig`'s actual configured value from here). Scopes use
+`OidcUser#hasScope`'s built-in default claim paths (`scope`/`scp`), no extra config needed.
+`@ScopesAllowed(match = ScopesAllowed.Match.ANY)` and multi-role `@RolesAllowed({"admin",
+"editor"})` (OR semantics) both work exactly as they do on a `RequestHandler`.
+
+**`@Authenticated` alone has no effect and fails boot.** Once oidc is active for a server, every
+tool call is already authenticated — there's no per-tool public/authenticated split the way
+there is for HTTP routes, so a bare `@Authenticated` on a tool can't mean anything and would
+silently do nothing if allowed to compile. Boot fails instead, with a message pointing at
+`@RolesAllowed`/`@ScopesAllowed` as the actual narrowing mechanism.
+
+**Annotating a tool without active OAuth2 also fails boot**, not silently at request time: if
+`@RolesAllowed`/`@ScopesAllowed`/`@Authenticated` shows up on a tool while `McpSecurity` resolved
+to unprotected (`NONE`, or `AUTO` with no oidc installed), that's very likely a forgotten
+`OidcExtension` install or a `McpSecurity.NONE` left over from local dev — `IllegalStateException`
+at `app.start()`.

 ## The `HttpException` safety net

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+package dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp;
+
+import java.util.function.Supplier;
+
+/**
+ * Compiled per-tool authorization requirement, built once at boot by {@link McpOidcIntegration}
+ * from {@code @RolesAllowed}/{@code @ScopesAllowed} on an {@link McpTool} subclass — {@code null}
+ * on {@link McpRegistry.RegisteredTool} means no restriction beyond whatever {@link McpSecurity}
+ * already enforces route-wide.
+ *
+ * <p>{@code check} is a closure, not a raw role/scope list — this is what lets this record (and
+ * its only caller, {@link McpDispatcher}) stay free of any compile-time reference to a {@code
+ * flash-ext-oidc} type, preserving the same classload isolation {@link McpOidcIntegration}'s
+ * javadoc describes for the rest of the OIDC bridge. Only the plain-JDK {@link Supplier}
+ * signature crosses the boundary; the closure itself, built once inside {@code
+ * McpOidcIntegration}, is the only place that ever touches {@code OidcUser}/{@code ClaimsHolder}.
+ *
+ * <p>Returns {@code null} from {@link #check()}{@code .get()} when authorized, or a
+ * human-readable denial reason otherwise — invoked once per {@code tools/call} against an
+ * annotated tool, never allocated on that path (the closure and its captured role/scope arrays
+ * are built exactly once, at boot).
+ */
+record McpAuthPolicy(Supplier<String> check) {}
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ import java.util.List;
 *     .rootPath("/mcp")
 *     .toolsPackage("com.example.tools")
 *     .security(McpSecurity.REQUIRED)
- *     .resourceIdentifier("https://mcp.example.com/mcp")
+ *     .scopesSupported("openid", "profile", "email")
 *     .build();
 * }</pre>
 */
@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ public final class McpConfig {
    private final String resourceIdentifier;
    private final String authorizationServerIssuer;
    private final List<String> allowedOrigins;
+    private final List<String> scopesSupported;
+    private final String rolesClaimPath;

    private McpConfig(Builder b) {
        this.name = b.name;
@@ -38,6 +40,8 @@ public final class McpConfig {
        this.resourceIdentifier = b.resourceIdentifier;
        this.authorizationServerIssuer = b.authorizationServerIssuer;
        this.allowedOrigins = List.copyOf(b.allowedOrigins);
+        this.scopesSupported = List.copyOf(b.scopesSupported);
+        this.rolesClaimPath = b.rolesClaimPath;
    }

    String name()                     { return name; }
@@ -49,6 +53,8 @@ public final class McpConfig {
    String resourceIdentifier()       { return resourceIdentifier; }
    String authorizationServerIssuer() { return authorizationServerIssuer; }
    List<String> allowedOrigins()     { return allowedOrigins; }
+    List<String> scopesSupported()    { return scopesSupported; }
+    String rolesClaimPath()           { return rolesClaimPath; }

    public static Builder builder(String name) { return new Builder(name); }

@@ -62,6 +68,8 @@ public final class McpConfig {
        private String resourceIdentifier;
        private String authorizationServerIssuer;
        private final List<String> allowedOrigins = new ArrayList<>();
+        private final List<String> scopesSupported = new ArrayList<>();
+        private String rolesClaimPath = "realm_access.roles";

        private Builder(String name) {
            if (name == null || name.isBlank())
@@ -85,18 +93,22 @@ public final class McpConfig {
        public Builder security(McpSecurity security) { this.security = security; return this; }

        /**
-         * Resource identifier used for RFC 8707 audience binding: tokens whose {@code aud} claim
-         * does not include this value are rejected. Optional — if unset, only standard bearer
-         * validation (signature/issuer/expiry) is enforced, not audience binding.
+         * Canonical URI of this MCP endpoint, used for RFC 8707 audience binding: tokens whose
+         * {@code aud} claim does not include this value are rejected. Optional — when
+         * {@code flash-ext-oidc} is installed, this is auto-derived per request from the
+         * forwarded/{@code Host} headers (same resolution {@code OidcExtension} uses for its own
+         * redirect URIs) and audience binding is enforced unconditionally. Set this explicitly
+         * only to override that guess — a reverse proxy that forwards neither
+         * {@code X-Forwarded-Host} nor {@code X-Forwarded-Proto}.
         */
        public Builder resourceIdentifier(String resourceIdentifier) { this.resourceIdentifier = resourceIdentifier; return this; }

        /**
-         * Authorization server issuer URL, used to publish an RFC 9728 Protected Resource
-         * Metadata document at {@code /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource{rootPath}} so MCP
-         * clients can discover it automatically. Requires {@link #resourceIdentifier(String)}
-         * to also be set. Optional — without it, bearer validation still works, clients just
-         * need the authorization server configured out-of-band.
+         * Authorization server issuer URL, published in the RFC 9728 Protected Resource
+         * Metadata document at {@code /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource{rootPath}}. Optional
+         * — when {@code flash-ext-oidc} is installed, this is auto-derived from its configured
+         * issuer. Set this explicitly only to override that (e.g. publishing a different issuer
+         * than the one actually validating tokens).
         */
        public Builder authorizationServerIssuer(String issuer) { this.authorizationServerIssuer = issuer; return this; }

@@ -107,6 +119,28 @@ public final class McpConfig {
         */
        public Builder allowedOrigins(String... origins) { this.allowedOrigins.addAll(List.of(origins)); return this; }

+        /**
+         * OAuth2 scopes this server expects clients to request, published as {@code
+         * scopes_supported} in the RFC 9728 Protected Resource Metadata document. Optional per
+         * the spec — omitted from the document entirely if never set. A spec-compliant client
+         * reads this to know what to put in its authorization/token requests instead of
+         * requesting nothing; see {@code docs/keycloak.md}'s "same story for any other claim"
+         * section for why this matters in practice (a client that requests no scope only gets
+         * whatever your authorization server treats as always-included, e.g. Keycloak's `basic`).
+         * Purely advertisement — this server still validates whatever token it actually receives
+         * the same way regardless of what a client requested.
+         */
+        public Builder scopesSupported(String... scopes) { this.scopesSupported.addAll(List.of(scopes)); return this; }
+
+        /**
+         * Claim path used to resolve roles for {@code @RolesAllowed} on an {@link McpTool} —
+         * same dot-path syntax and default (Keycloak's {@code realm_access.roles}) as {@code
+         * OidcConfig#rolesClaimPath()}. Set this only if the two configs diverge; there is no
+         * way to auto-derive it from the installed {@code OidcExtension} (see {@code
+         * docs/security.md}'s {@code @RolesAllowed}/{@code @ScopesAllowed} section for why).
+         */
+        public Builder rolesClaimPath(String rolesClaimPath) { this.rolesClaimPath = rolesClaimPath; return this; }
+
        public McpConfig build() {
            if (toolsPackage == null || toolsPackage.isBlank())
                throw new IllegalStateException(
@@ -17,7 +17,11 @@ import java.io.IOException;
 * error — the model needs to see it. Everything else that goes wrong (bad params, unknown
 * tool/resource/prompt name, resource/prompt handler exceptions) is a JSON-RPC error object,
 * always returned with HTTP 200: the HTTP request itself succeeded, only the RPC did not. Only
- * malformed HTTP-level input (unparsable JSON, not a JSON object) gets HTTP 400.
+ * malformed HTTP-level input (unparsable JSON, not a JSON object) gets HTTP 400. A
+ * {@code @RolesAllowed}/{@code @ScopesAllowed} denial (see {@link McpAuthPolicy}) is the same
+ * category — {@code isError: true}, tool never invoked — not a transport-level rejection; the
+ * route-wide 401/403 for "not authenticated at all" already happened earlier, in the {@code
+ * OidcMiddleware}/audience-guard middleware chain, before this dispatcher ever runs.
 */
 final class McpDispatcher {

@@ -132,12 +136,17 @@ final class McpDispatcher {
        if (tool == null)
            throw McpProtocolException.invalidParams("Unknown tool: " + name);

-        ToolArguments args = new ToolArguments(params.path("arguments"));
        ToolResponse result;
-        try {
-            result = tool.instance().call(args);
-        } catch (Exception e) {
-            result = ToolResponse.error("Tool \"" + name + "\" failed: " + e.getMessage());
+        String denied = tool.policy() != null ? tool.policy().check().get() : null;
+        if (denied != null) {
+            result = ToolResponse.error("Tool \"" + name + "\" denied: " + denied);
+        } else {
+            ToolArguments args = new ToolArguments(params.path("arguments"));
+            try {
+                result = tool.instance().call(args);
+            } catch (Exception e) {
+                result = ToolResponse.error("Tool \"" + name + "\" failed: " + e.getMessage());
+            }
        }
        ToolResponse finalResult = result;
        writeResult(res, id, gen -> {
@@ -25,14 +25,14 @@ import java.util.List;
 *         .build()))
 *     .start();
 *
- * // With flash-ext-oidc as the OAuth2 resource server
+ * // With flash-ext-oidc as the OAuth2 resource server — zero extra config: issuer, canonical
+ * // resource identifier, RFC 8707 audience binding and RFC 9728 metadata are all derived from
+ * // the installed OidcExtension.
 * FlashApp.create(8080)
 *     .install(new OidcExtension(oidcConfig))
 *     .install(new McpExtension(McpConfig.builder("my-mcp-server")
 *         .toolsPackage("com.example.tools")
 *         .security(McpSecurity.REQUIRED)
- *         .resourceIdentifier("https://mcp.example.com/mcp")
- *         .authorizationServerIssuer("https://auth.example.com/realms/myrealm")
 *         .build()))
 *     .start();
 * }</pre>
@@ -51,42 +51,40 @@ public class McpExtension implements FlashExtension {
        this.config = config;
    }

-    /**
-     * Everything — scanning, binding, security resolution, route registration — happens here
-     * rather than in {@link #provide}, because binding a tool calls its {@code onInit()}, which
-     * may call {@code require()} on services other extensions registered lazily via
-     * {@code ctx.supply()}. Per {@link FlashExtension}'s contract, {@code require()} is only
-     * safe once {@code routes()} runs, after every extension's {@code provide()} phase has
-     * completed and {@code FlashContext.resolveAll()} has run.
-     */
    @Override
-    public void routes(FlashRegistrar<?> app, FlashContext ctx) {
-        McpRegistry registry = McpRegistry.scan(config.toolsPackage(), ctx);
+    public void configure(FlashRegistrar<?> app, FlashContext ctx) {
+        ctx.onReady(() -> registerRoutes(app, ctx));
+    }
+
+    private void registerRoutes(FlashRegistrar<?> app, FlashContext ctx) {
+        // Resolved before scanning so McpRegistry knows, per tool, whether @RolesAllowed/
+        // @ScopesAllowed are backed by real OAuth2 protection or a boot-time misconfiguration
+        // (see McpOidcIntegration#compileToolPolicy) — must run first, not after.
+        McpOidcIntegration.Resolved secured = resolveSecurity(ctx);
+        McpRegistry registry = McpRegistry.scan(config.toolsPackage(), ctx, secured != null, config.rolesClaimPath());
        McpDispatcher dispatcher = new McpDispatcher(registry, config.name(), config.version(), config.instructions());

        List<Middleware> chain = new ArrayList<>(3);
        chain.add(McpTransportGuards.httpExceptionGuard());
        chain.add(McpTransportGuards.originGuard(config.allowedOrigins()));
-
-        Middleware security = resolveSecurity(ctx);
-        if (security != null) chain.add(security);
+        if (secured != null) chain.add(secured.security());

        app.post(config.rootPath(), (req, res) -> { dispatcher.handle(req, res); return null; },
                chain.toArray(Middleware[]::new));

-        registerResourceMetadata(app, security != null);
+        registerResourceMetadata(app, secured);
    }

-    private Middleware resolveSecurity(FlashContext ctx) {
+    private McpOidcIntegration.Resolved resolveSecurity(FlashContext ctx) {
        if (config.security() == McpSecurity.NONE) return null;

-        Middleware oidcSecurity;
+        McpOidcIntegration.Resolved resolved;
        try {
-            oidcSecurity = McpOidcIntegration.resolve(ctx, config);
+            resolved = McpOidcIntegration.resolve(ctx, config);
        } catch (NoClassDefFoundError e) {
-            oidcSecurity = null; // flash-ext-oidc not on the classpath at all
+            resolved = null; // flash-ext-oidc not on the classpath at all
        }
-        if (oidcSecurity != null) return oidcSecurity;
+        if (resolved != null) return resolved;

        if (config.security() == McpSecurity.REQUIRED) {
            throw new IllegalStateException(
@@ -102,17 +100,20 @@ public class McpExtension implements FlashExtension {
        return null;
    }

-    private void registerResourceMetadata(FlashRegistrar<?> app, boolean secured) {
-        if (!secured) return;
-        String resourceId = config.resourceIdentifier();
-        String issuer = config.authorizationServerIssuer();
-        if (resourceId == null || resourceId.isBlank() || issuer == null || issuer.isBlank()) return;
-
-        String body = McpResourceMetadata.build(resourceId, issuer);
+    /**
+     * RFC 9728 Protected Resource Metadata, built once security is resolved — no longer
+     * conditioned on {@code resourceIdentifier}/{@code authorizationServerIssuer} being set
+     * explicitly, since {@link McpOidcIntegration#resolve} now derives both by default. The
+     * {@code resource} field is computed per request (it depends on that request's own
+     * forwarded/{@code Host} headers) via {@link McpOidcIntegration.Resolved#resourceIdentifier()}.
+     */
+    private void registerResourceMetadata(FlashRegistrar<?> app, McpOidcIntegration.Resolved secured) {
+        if (secured == null) return;
        String path = "/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource" + config.rootPath();
        app.get(path, (req, res) -> {
            res.type(ContentType.JSON);
-            return body;
+            return McpResourceMetadata.build(
+                    secured.resourceIdentifier().apply(req), secured.issuer(), config.scopesSupported());
        });
    }
 }
@@ -1,45 +1,84 @@
 package dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp;

+import dev.relism.flash.ext.oidc.Authenticated;
 import dev.relism.flash.ext.oidc.ClaimsHolder;
 import dev.relism.flash.ext.oidc.OidcMiddleware;
+import dev.relism.flash.ext.oidc.OidcUser;
+import dev.relism.flash.ext.oidc.RolesAllowed;
+import dev.relism.flash.ext.oidc.ScopesAllowed;
 import dev.relism.flash.exceptions.HttpException;
 import dev.relism.flash.extension.FlashContext;
+import dev.relism.flash.models.Request;
 import dev.relism.flash.routing.Middleware;
+import lombok.extern.slf4j.Slf4j;

+import java.util.LinkedHashSet;
 import java.util.Map;
 import java.util.Optional;
+import java.util.function.Function;
+import java.util.function.Supplier;

 /**
 * Lazy, isolated bridge to {@code flash-ext-oidc}.
 *
- * <p>References to OIDC types only ever resolve when {@link #resolve} is actually invoked —
- * never at {@link McpExtension} class-load time — because they live in this separate nested
- * class. The caller wraps the invocation in {@code catch (NoClassDefFoundError)}, exactly like
- * {@code OidcExtension}'s own lazy bridge to {@code flash-ext-openapi}. This is what lets
- * {@code flash-ext-mcp} run standalone (MCP-only, no OAuth2) when {@code flash-ext-oidc} is not
- * even on the classpath.
+ * <p>References to OIDC types only ever resolve when {@link #resolve}/{@link #compileToolPolicy}
+ * are actually invoked — never at {@link McpExtension} class-load time — because they live in
+ * this separate nested class. The caller wraps the invocation in {@code catch
+ * (NoClassDefFoundError)}, exactly like {@code OidcExtension}'s own lazy bridge to {@code
+ * flash-ext-openapi}. This is what lets {@code flash-ext-mcp} run standalone (MCP-only, no
+ * OAuth2) when {@code flash-ext-oidc} is not even on the classpath. {@link Resolved}/{@link
+ * McpAuthPolicy} carry only oidc-free types back out ({@link Middleware}, {@link String}, a
+ * {@link Function}, a {@link Supplier}) so no other class in this package ever has to reference
+ * an OIDC type.
+ *
+ * <p>Zero-config by design: when {@code flash-ext-oidc} is installed, everything an MCP OAuth2
+ * resource server needs — issuer, canonical resource identifier, RFC 8707 audience binding, and
+ * a spec-compliant {@code WWW-Authenticate} challenge (RFC 9728 §5.1) — is derived straight from
+ * the installed {@link OidcMiddleware}, with no additional {@link McpConfig} calls.
+ * {@link McpConfig#resourceIdentifier(String)}/{@link McpConfig#authorizationServerIssuer(String)}
+ * remain as explicit overrides for the rare case where that guess is wrong.
 */
+@Slf4j
 final class McpOidcIntegration {

+    private static final String[] NO_VALUES = new String[0];
+
    private McpOidcIntegration() {}

-    /** Returns the security {@link Middleware} to apply, or {@code null} if oidc is not installed. */
-    static Middleware resolve(FlashContext ctx, McpConfig config) {
+    /** Everything {@link McpExtension} needs once oidc security is resolved. */
+    record Resolved(Middleware security, String issuer, Function<Request, String> resourceIdentifier) {}
+
+    /** Returns the resolved security bundle, or {@code null} if oidc is not installed. */
+    static Resolved resolve(FlashContext ctx, McpConfig config) {
        Optional<OidcMiddleware> oidc = ctx.find(OidcMiddleware.class);
        if (oidc.isEmpty()) return null;

-        Middleware protect = oidc.get().protect();
-        String resourceId = config.resourceIdentifier();
-        if (resourceId == null || resourceId.isBlank()) return protect;
+        OidcMiddleware oidcMw = oidc.get();
+        String resourceMetadataPath = "/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource" + config.rootPath();
+        String issuer = config.authorizationServerIssuer() != null
+                ? config.authorizationServerIssuer() : oidcMw.issuer();
+        Function<Request, String> resourceId = req -> config.resourceIdentifier() != null
+                ? config.resourceIdentifier()
+                : OidcMiddleware.selfOrigin(req, oidcMw.selfScheme()) + config.rootPath();

-        return Middleware.of(protect, audienceGuard(resourceId));
+        Middleware protect = oidcMw.protect(resourceMetadataPath);
+        Middleware secured = Middleware.of(protect, audienceGuard(resourceId));
+        return new Resolved(secured, issuer, resourceId);
    }

-    /** RFC 8707 audience binding: rejects tokens whose {@code aud} claim doesn't include ours. */
-    private static Middleware audienceGuard(String resourceIdentifier) {
+    /**
+     * RFC 8707 audience binding, unconditionally enforced once oidc is protecting the MCP
+     * route — no longer opt-in behind an explicit {@code resourceIdentifier(...)} call.
+     */
+    private static Middleware audienceGuard(Function<Request, String> resourceIdentifier) {
        return next -> (req, res) -> {
            Map<String, Object> claims = ClaimsHolder.get();
-            if (claims != null && !audienceMatches(claims.get("aud"), resourceIdentifier)) {
+            String expected = resourceIdentifier.apply(req);
+            if (claims != null && !audienceMatches(claims.get("aud"), expected)) {
+                log.warn("[flash-ext-mcp] Rejecting token (RFC 8707): aud={} does not include expected " +
+                        "resource identifier \"{}\" — the authorization server must include this exact " +
+                        "value in the access token's aud claim (e.g. an Audience protocol mapper in " +
+                        "Keycloak) for this MCP server to accept it.", claims.get("aud"), expected);
                throw HttpException.forbidden();
            }
            return next.handle(req, res);
@@ -53,4 +92,88 @@ final class McpOidcIntegration {
        }
        return false;
    }
+
+    /**
+     * Compiles {@code @RolesAllowed}/{@code @ScopesAllowed} on a tool class into a {@link
+     * McpAuthPolicy}, or returns {@code null} if the tool carries none of the three OIDC
+     * annotations. Called once per tool at boot ({@link McpRegistry#scan}), never on the
+     * request hot path — the {@link Supplier} it returns is what runs per {@code tools/call},
+     * closing over the already-normalized role/scope arrays so the hot path itself allocates
+     * nothing beyond what {@link OidcUser#hasRole}/{@link OidcUser#hasScope} already do.
+     *
+     * <p>Fails fast at boot, not silently at request time, for the two ways this can be
+     * misconfigured: the annotation present without OAuth2 actually protecting this MCP server
+     * ({@code oidcActive == false}), and {@code @Authenticated} — which has no per-tool meaning
+     * here (see below) — used at all.
+     */
+    static McpAuthPolicy compileToolPolicy(Class<? extends McpTool> toolClass, boolean oidcActive,
+                                            String rolesClaimPath) {
+        Authenticated auth = toolClass.getAnnotation(Authenticated.class);
+        RolesAllowed roles = toolClass.getAnnotation(RolesAllowed.class);
+        ScopesAllowed scopes = toolClass.getAnnotation(ScopesAllowed.class);
+        if (auth == null && roles == null && scopes == null) return null;
+
+        if (!oidcActive) {
+            throw new IllegalStateException(
+                    "MCP tool \"" + toolClass.getSimpleName() + "\" declares @Authenticated/@RolesAllowed/" +
+                    "@ScopesAllowed, but this MCP server has no active OAuth2 protection — flash-ext-oidc " +
+                    "is not installed for it, or McpSecurity is NONE. These annotations require " +
+                    "McpSecurity.AUTO/REQUIRED with an OidcExtension installed; install one, or remove the " +
+                    "annotation from " + toolClass.getSimpleName() + ".");
+        }
+        if (auth != null) {
+            throw new IllegalStateException(
+                    "MCP tool \"" + toolClass.getSimpleName() + "\" is annotated @Authenticated, which has " +
+                    "no effect on an McpTool: the whole MCP endpoint is already all-or-nothing " +
+                    "authenticated once oidc is active (McpSecurity.AUTO/REQUIRED) — unlike a RequestHandler " +
+                    "route, there is no per-tool public/authenticated split to opt into. Remove it, or use " +
+                    "@RolesAllowed/@ScopesAllowed to narrow further.");
+        }
+
+        String[] requiredRoles = roles != null ? normalizeRequired("RolesAllowed", roles.value()) : NO_VALUES;
+        String[] requiredScopes = scopes != null ? normalizeRequired("ScopesAllowed", scopes.value()) : NO_VALUES;
+        ScopesAllowed.Match scopeMatch = scopes != null ? scopes.match() : ScopesAllowed.Match.ALL;
+
+        Supplier<String> check = () -> {
+            OidcUser user = ClaimsHolder.user();
+            if (user == null) return "not authenticated";
+            if (requiredRoles.length > 0 && !hasAnyRole(user, rolesClaimPath, requiredRoles))
+                return "missing required role (any of: " + String.join(", ", requiredRoles) + ")";
+            if (requiredScopes.length > 0 && !hasScopes(user, requiredScopes, scopeMatch))
+                return "missing required scope (" + scopeMatch + " of: " + String.join(", ", requiredScopes) + ")";
+            return null;
+        };
+        return new McpAuthPolicy(check);
+    }
+
+    private static boolean hasAnyRole(OidcUser user, String claimPath, String[] roles) {
+        for (String role : roles) if (user.hasRole(claimPath, role)) return true;
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    private static boolean hasScopes(OidcUser user, String[] scopes, ScopesAllowed.Match match) {
+        if (match == ScopesAllowed.Match.ALL) {
+            for (String scope : scopes) if (!user.hasScope(scope)) return false;
+            return true;
+        }
+        for (String scope : scopes) if (user.hasScope(scope)) return true;
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    /** Mirrors {@code OidcAuthPolicy}'s own normalization — trim, dedupe, require non-blank. */
+    private static String[] normalizeRequired(String annotationName, String[] values) {
+        if (values == null || values.length == 0)
+            throw new IllegalStateException("@" + annotationName + " requires at least one value");
+
+        LinkedHashSet<String> normalized = new LinkedHashSet<>(values.length);
+        for (String raw : values) {
+            if (raw == null) continue;
+            String trimmed = raw.trim();
+            if (!trimmed.isEmpty()) normalized.add(trimmed);
+        }
+        if (normalized.isEmpty())
+            throw new IllegalStateException("@" + annotationName + " requires at least one non-empty value");
+
+        return normalized.toArray(String[]::new);
+    }
 }
@@ -24,7 +24,8 @@ final class McpRegistry {

    private static final String EMPTY_ARRAY = "[]";

-    record RegisteredTool(String name, McpTool instance) {}
+    /** {@code policy} is {@code null} unless the tool carries @RolesAllowed/@ScopesAllowed. */
+    record RegisteredTool(String name, McpTool instance, McpAuthPolicy policy) {}
    record RegisteredResource(String uri, McpResource instance) {}
    record RegisteredPrompt(String name, McpPrompt instance) {}

@@ -38,7 +39,16 @@ final class McpRegistry {

    private McpRegistry() {}

-    static McpRegistry scan(String packageName, FlashContext ctx) {
+    /**
+     * @param oidcActive    whether this MCP server's route is actually OAuth2-protected right
+     *                      now (see {@link McpOidcIntegration#resolve}) — gates whether
+     *                      {@code @RolesAllowed}/{@code @ScopesAllowed} on a tool are honored or
+     *                      rejected at boot as a misconfiguration; see
+     *                      {@link McpOidcIntegration#compileToolPolicy}.
+     * @param rolesClaimPath claim path forwarded to {@code @RolesAllowed} checks; see
+     *                      {@link McpConfig#rolesClaimPath(String)}.
+     */
+    static McpRegistry scan(String packageName, FlashContext ctx, boolean oidcActive, String rolesClaimPath) {
        McpPackageScanner.ScanResult found = McpPackageScanner.scan(packageName);
        McpRegistry registry = new McpRegistry();

@@ -46,7 +56,8 @@ final class McpRegistry {
            Tool ann = cls.getAnnotation(Tool.class);
            McpTool instance = instantiate(cls);
            instance.bind(ctx);
-            if (registry.tools.putIfAbsent(ann.name(), new RegisteredTool(ann.name(), instance)) != null)
+            McpAuthPolicy policy = compileToolPolicy(cls, oidcActive, rolesClaimPath);
+            if (registry.tools.putIfAbsent(ann.name(), new RegisteredTool(ann.name(), instance, policy)) != null)
                throw new InitializationException("Duplicate MCP tool name: \"" + ann.name() + "\"");
        }
        for (Class<? extends McpResource> cls : found.resources()) {
@@ -163,6 +174,24 @@ final class McpRegistry {
        gen.writeEndArray();
    }

+    /**
+     * Isolated the same way {@link McpOidcIntegration#resolve} is — {@code
+     * NoClassDefFoundError} here means {@code flash-ext-oidc} genuinely isn't on the runtime
+     * classpath, in which case a tool couldn't have been compiled against
+     * {@code @RolesAllowed}/{@code @ScopesAllowed} in the first place, so there's nothing to
+     * check (and nothing lost: {@code oidcActive} is only ever {@code true} once {@link
+     * McpOidcIntegration#resolve} has already succeeded once this boot, which proves those
+     * types resolve fine).
+     */
+    private static McpAuthPolicy compileToolPolicy(Class<? extends McpTool> cls, boolean oidcActive,
+                                                     String rolesClaimPath) {
+        try {
+            return McpOidcIntegration.compileToolPolicy(cls, oidcActive, rolesClaimPath);
+        } catch (NoClassDefFoundError e) {
+            return null;
+        }
+    }
+
    private static <T> T instantiate(Class<T> cls) {
        try {
            Constructor<T> ctor = cls.getDeclaredConstructor();
@@ -1,17 +1,25 @@
 package dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp;

+import java.util.List;
+
 /** RFC 9728 OAuth 2.0 Protected Resource Metadata document, built once at boot. */
 final class McpResourceMetadata {

    private McpResourceMetadata() {}

-    static String build(String resourceIdentifier, String authorizationServerIssuer) {
+    /** {@code scopesSupported} is optional per RFC 9728 — omitted from the document if empty. */
+    static String build(String resourceIdentifier, String authorizationServerIssuer, List<String> scopesSupported) {
        return McpJson.buildString(gen -> {
            gen.writeStartObject();
            gen.writeStringField("resource", resourceIdentifier);
            gen.writeArrayFieldStart("authorization_servers");
            gen.writeString(authorizationServerIssuer);
            gen.writeEndArray();
+            if (!scopesSupported.isEmpty()) {
+                gen.writeArrayFieldStart("scopes_supported");
+                for (String scope : scopesSupported) gen.writeString(scope);
+                gen.writeEndArray();
+            }
            gen.writeEndObject();
        });
    }
@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ import java.security.interfaces.RSAPrivateKey;
 import java.security.interfaces.RSAPublicKey;
 import java.time.Instant;
 import java.util.Date;
+import java.util.List;
+import java.util.Map;
 import java.util.UUID;

 /**
@@ -56,16 +58,27 @@ final class FakeOidcProvider implements AutoCloseable {

    /** Mints a valid RS256 access token — bearer-validation only, no full authorization-code round-trip needed. */
    String signToken(String subject, String audience) {
+        return signToken(subject, audience, null, NO_ROLES);
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Same as {@link #signToken(String, String)}, plus a {@code scope} claim (space-delimited,
+     * matching {@link dev.relism.flash.ext.oidc.OidcUser#hasScope}'s default claim path) and a
+     * Keycloak-shaped {@code realm_access.roles} claim (matching {@code McpConfig}'s default
+     * {@code rolesClaimPath}) when {@code roles} is non-empty.
+     */
+    String signToken(String subject, String audience, String scope, String... roles) {
        try {
-            JWTClaimsSet claims = new JWTClaimsSet.Builder()
+            JWTClaimsSet.Builder builder = new JWTClaimsSet.Builder()
                    .issuer(issuer)
                    .subject(subject)
                    .audience(audience)
                    .issueTime(Date.from(Instant.now()))
-                    .expirationTime(Date.from(Instant.now().plusSeconds(300)))
-                    .build();
+                    .expirationTime(Date.from(Instant.now().plusSeconds(300)));
+            if (scope != null) builder.claim("scope", scope);
+            if (roles.length > 0) builder.claim("realm_access", Map.of("roles", List.of(roles)));
            SignedJWT jwt = new SignedJWT(
-                    new JWSHeader.Builder(JWSAlgorithm.RS256).keyID(rsaKey.getKeyID()).build(), claims);
+                    new JWSHeader.Builder(JWSAlgorithm.RS256).keyID(rsaKey.getKeyID()).build(), builder.build());
            jwt.sign(new RSASSASigner(rsaKey));
            return jwt.serialize();
        } catch (Exception e) {
@@ -73,6 +86,8 @@ final class FakeOidcProvider implements AutoCloseable {
        }
    }

+    private static final String[] NO_ROLES = new String[0];
+
    private String discoveryDocument() {
        return "{"
                + "\"issuer\":\"" + issuer + "\","
@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+package dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp;
+
+import dev.relism.flash.ext.oidc.OidcConfig;
+import dev.relism.flash.ext.oidc.OidcExtension;
+import dev.relism.flash.extension.FlashApp;
+import org.junit.jupiter.api.AfterEach;
+import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
+
+import java.net.ServerSocket;
+import java.net.URI;
+import java.net.http.HttpClient;
+import java.net.http.HttpRequest;
+import java.net.http.HttpResponse;
+
+import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertEquals;
+import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertThrows;
+import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertTrue;
+
+/**
+ * {@code @RolesAllowed}/{@code @ScopesAllowed} on an {@link McpTool} — see
+ * {@link McpOidcIntegration#compileToolPolicy}. Same real-discovery/real-JWKS/real-RS256-token
+ * approach as {@link McpExtensionSecurityTest}, against {@code fixtures.secured}'s tools.
+ */
+class McpAuthPolicyTest {
+
+    private static final String SECURED_TOOLS = "dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.authfixtures.secured";
+    private static final String AUTHENTICATED_ONLY_TOOLS = "dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.authfixtures.authenticatedonly";
+
+    private FlashApp app;
+    private FakeOidcProvider provider;
+
+    @AfterEach
+    void tearDown() {
+        if (app != null) app.stop();
+        if (provider != null) provider.close();
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    void rolesAllowed_deniesWithoutRole_allowsWithRole() throws Exception {
+        int port = bootSecuredApp(SECURED_TOOLS);
+        String resourceId = "http://127.0.0.1:" + port + "/mcp";
+
+        String noRole = provider.signToken("user-1", resourceId, null);
+        HttpResponse<String> denied = callTool(port, "admin_only", noRole);
+        assertEquals(200, denied.statusCode());
+        assertTrue(denied.body().contains("\"isError\":true"), denied.body());
+        assertTrue(denied.body().contains("missing required role"), denied.body());
+
+        String withRole = provider.signToken("user-1", resourceId, null, "admin");
+        HttpResponse<String> allowed = callTool(port, "admin_only", withRole);
+        assertEquals(200, allowed.statusCode());
+        assertTrue(allowed.body().contains("\"isError\":false"), allowed.body());
+        assertTrue(allowed.body().contains("ok"), allowed.body());
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    void scopesAllowed_deniesWithoutScope_allowsWithScope() throws Exception {
+        int port = bootSecuredApp(SECURED_TOOLS);
+        String resourceId = "http://127.0.0.1:" + port + "/mcp";
+
+        String noScope = provider.signToken("user-1", resourceId, "read");
+        HttpResponse<String> denied = callTool(port, "write_only", noScope);
+        assertEquals(200, denied.statusCode());
+        assertTrue(denied.body().contains("\"isError\":true"), denied.body());
+        assertTrue(denied.body().contains("missing required scope"), denied.body());
+
+        String withScope = provider.signToken("user-1", resourceId, "read write");
+        HttpResponse<String> allowed = callTool(port, "write_only", withScope);
+        assertEquals(200, allowed.statusCode());
+        assertTrue(allowed.body().contains("\"isError\":false"), allowed.body());
+        assertTrue(allowed.body().contains("written"), allowed.body());
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    void unannotatedTool_unaffectedByOtherToolsPolicies() throws Exception {
+        int port = bootSecuredApp(SECURED_TOOLS);
+        String resourceId = "http://127.0.0.1:" + port + "/mcp";
+
+        String plain = provider.signToken("user-1", resourceId, null);
+        HttpResponse<String> resp = callTool(port, "open", plain);
+        assertEquals(200, resp.statusCode());
+        assertTrue(resp.body().contains("\"isError\":false"), resp.body());
+        assertTrue(resp.body().contains("open"), resp.body());
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    void toolAnnotated_butSecurityNone_failsAtBoot() throws Exception {
+        provider = new FakeOidcProvider();
+        int port = freePort();
+        app = FlashApp.create(port);
+        app.install(new OidcExtension(OidcConfig.builder(
+                provider.issuer(), "mcp-client", "secret", "/auth/callback").build()));
+        app.install(new McpExtension(McpConfig.builder("secure-server")
+                .toolsPackage(SECURED_TOOLS)
+                .security(McpSecurity.NONE)
+                .build()));
+
+        IllegalStateException e = assertThrows(IllegalStateException.class, () -> app.start());
+        assertTrue(e.getMessage().contains("no active OAuth2 protection"), e.getMessage());
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    void bareAuthenticated_hasNoEffect_failsAtBoot() throws Exception {
+        provider = new FakeOidcProvider();
+        int port = freePort();
+        app = FlashApp.create(port);
+        app.install(new OidcExtension(OidcConfig.builder(
+                provider.issuer(), "mcp-client", "secret", "/auth/callback").build()));
+        app.install(new McpExtension(McpConfig.builder("secure-server")
+                .toolsPackage(AUTHENTICATED_ONLY_TOOLS)
+                .security(McpSecurity.REQUIRED)
+                .build()));
+
+        IllegalStateException e = assertThrows(IllegalStateException.class, () -> app.start());
+        assertTrue(e.getMessage().contains("no effect"), e.getMessage());
+    }
+
+    // ── Helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+    private int bootSecuredApp(String toolsPackage) throws Exception {
+        provider = new FakeOidcProvider();
+        int port = freePort();
+
+        app = FlashApp.create(port);
+        app.install(new OidcExtension(OidcConfig.builder(
+                provider.issuer(), "mcp-client", "secret", "/auth/callback").build()));
+        app.install(new McpExtension(McpConfig.builder("secure-server")
+                .toolsPackage(toolsPackage)
+                .security(McpSecurity.REQUIRED)
+                .build()));
+        app.start();
+        return port;
+    }
+
+    private static HttpResponse<String> callTool(int port, String toolName, String token) throws Exception {
+        String body = "{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":1,\"method\":\"tools/call\",\"params\":{\"name\":\"" + toolName + "\"}}";
+        HttpRequest.Builder req = HttpRequest.newBuilder(URI.create("http://127.0.0.1:" + port + "/mcp"))
+                .header("Content-Type", "application/json")
+                .header("Accept", "application/json")
+                .header("Authorization", "Bearer " + token)
+                .POST(HttpRequest.BodyPublishers.ofString(body));
+        return HttpClient.newHttpClient().send(req.build(), HttpResponse.BodyHandlers.ofString());
+    }
+
+    private static int freePort() throws Exception {
+        try (ServerSocket s = new ServerSocket(0)) {
+            return s.getLocalPort();
+        }
+    }
+}
@@ -88,6 +88,69 @@ class McpExtensionSecurityTest {
        assertTrue(resp.body().contains("\"protocolVersion\""));
    }

+    @Test
+    void required_withOidc_noExplicitResourceIdentifier_derivesFromRequestAndEnforcesAudience() throws Exception {
+        int port = bootSecuredApp(null);
+        String derivedResourceId = "http://127.0.0.1:" + port + "/mcp";
+
+        String matching = provider.signToken("user-1", derivedResourceId);
+        assertEquals(200, post(port, initializeBody(), matching).statusCode());
+
+        String mismatched = provider.signToken("user-1", "https://someone-else.example.com/resource");
+        assertEquals(403, post(port, initializeBody(), mismatched).statusCode());
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    void required_withOidc_missingToken_challengeIncludesResourceMetadata() throws Exception {
+        int port = bootSecuredApp(null);
+
+        HttpResponse<String> resp = post(port, initializeBody(), null);
+        assertEquals(401, resp.statusCode());
+        String challenge = resp.headers().firstValue("WWW-Authenticate").orElse("");
+        assertTrue(challenge.contains(
+                "resource_metadata=\"http://127.0.0.1:" + port + "/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp\""),
+                "WWW-Authenticate: " + challenge);
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    void required_withOidc_noExplicitConfig_publishesProtectedResourceMetadata() throws Exception {
+        int port = bootSecuredApp(null);
+
+        HttpResponse<String> resp = HttpClient.newHttpClient().send(
+                HttpRequest.newBuilder(URI.create(
+                        "http://127.0.0.1:" + port + "/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp")).GET().build(),
+                HttpResponse.BodyHandlers.ofString());
+
+        assertEquals(200, resp.statusCode());
+        assertTrue(resp.body().contains("\"resource\":\"http://127.0.0.1:" + port + "/mcp\""), resp.body());
+        assertTrue(resp.body().contains("\"authorization_servers\":[\"" + provider.issuer() + "\"]"), resp.body());
+        assertTrue(!resp.body().contains("scopes_supported"), "scopes_supported must be omitted when unset: " + resp.body());
+    }
+
+    @Test
+    void scopesSupported_published_inProtectedResourceMetadata() throws Exception {
+        provider = new FakeOidcProvider();
+        int port = freePort();
+
+        app = FlashApp.create(port);
+        app.install(new OidcExtension(OidcConfig.builder(
+                provider.issuer(), "mcp-client", "secret", "/auth/callback").build()));
+        app.install(new McpExtension(McpConfig.builder("secure-server")
+                .toolsPackage(TOOLS_PACKAGE)
+                .security(McpSecurity.REQUIRED)
+                .scopesSupported("openid", "profile", "email")
+                .build()));
+        app.start();
+
+        HttpResponse<String> resp = HttpClient.newHttpClient().send(
+                HttpRequest.newBuilder(URI.create(
+                        "http://127.0.0.1:" + port + "/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp")).GET().build(),
+                HttpResponse.BodyHandlers.ofString());
+
+        assertEquals(200, resp.statusCode());
+        assertTrue(resp.body().contains("\"scopes_supported\":[\"openid\",\"profile\",\"email\"]"), resp.body());
+    }
+
    // ── Helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

    private int bootSecuredApp(String resourceIdentifier) throws Exception {
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ class McpRegistryTest {

    @Test
    void scan_findsAndPrecompilesToolsResourcesPrompts() throws Exception {
-        McpRegistry registry = McpRegistry.scan("dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.fixtures", new FlashContext());
+        McpRegistry registry = McpRegistry.scan("dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.fixtures", new FlashContext(), false, "realm_access.roles");

        assertTrue(registry.hasTools());
        assertTrue(registry.hasResources());
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ class McpRegistryTest {
    @Test
    void scan_emptyPackage_throwsInitializationException() {
        assertThrows(InitializationException.class,
-                () -> McpRegistry.scan("dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.doesnotexist", new FlashContext()));
+                () -> McpRegistry.scan("dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.doesnotexist", new FlashContext(), false, "realm_access.roles"));
    }

    private static JsonNode findByField(JsonNode array, String field, String value) {
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+package dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.authfixtures.authenticatedonly;
+
+import dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.McpTool;
+import dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.TextContent;
+import dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.Tool;
+import dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.ToolArguments;
+import dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.ToolResponse;
+import dev.relism.flash.ext.oidc.Authenticated;
+
+/** Deliberately misconfigured fixture: bare @Authenticated has no effect on an McpTool — see
+ *  McpOidcIntegration#compileToolPolicy. Boot must fail with a clear message, not silently no-op. */
+@Tool(name = "pointless", description = "Exists only to prove @Authenticated alone fails boot")
+@Authenticated
+public class PointlessAuthTool extends McpTool {
+
+    @Override
+    public ToolResponse call(ToolArguments args) {
+        return ToolResponse.success(new TextContent("unreachable"));
+    }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+package dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.authfixtures.secured;
+
+import dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.McpTool;
+import dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.TextContent;
+import dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.Tool;
+import dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.ToolArguments;
+import dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.ToolResponse;
+import dev.relism.flash.ext.oidc.RolesAllowed;
+
+@Tool(name = "admin_only", description = "Only callable with the admin role")
+@RolesAllowed("admin")
+public class AdminOnlyTool extends McpTool {
+
+    @Override
+    public ToolResponse call(ToolArguments args) {
+        return ToolResponse.success(new TextContent("ok"));
+    }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+package dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.authfixtures.secured;
+
+import dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.McpTool;
+import dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.TextContent;
+import dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.Tool;
+import dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.ToolArguments;
+import dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.ToolResponse;
+
+/** No role/scope annotation — any authenticated caller, confirms unrelated tools are unaffected. */
+@Tool(name = "open", description = "Callable by anyone already authenticated")
+public class OpenTool extends McpTool {
+
+    @Override
+    public ToolResponse call(ToolArguments args) {
+        return ToolResponse.success(new TextContent("open"));
+    }
+}
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+package dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.authfixtures.secured;
+
+import dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.McpTool;
+import dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.TextContent;
+import dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.Tool;
+import dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.ToolArguments;
+import dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.ToolResponse;
+import dev.relism.flash.ext.oidc.ScopesAllowed;
+
+@Tool(name = "write_only", description = "Only callable with the write scope")
+@ScopesAllowed("write")
+public class WriteScopeTool extends McpTool {
+
+    @Override
+    public ToolResponse call(ToolArguments args) {
+        return ToolResponse.success(new TextContent("written"));
+    }
+}