refactor(ext-oidc): replace auth modules with security extensions
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Zakaria El Orche
@@ -1,188 +1,47 @@
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# Security
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Provider-specific setup steps (not generic OAuth2 mechanics) live in separate cookbooks —
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[`keycloak.md`](keycloak.md) for Keycloak: enabling Dynamic Client Registration, why the RFC 8707
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audience mapper needs to go on the built-in `basic` scope instead of a custom one, and the exact
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Allowed Client Scopes configuration `scopes_supported` needs to actually work.
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The MCP endpoint is secured by [`flash-ext-security-core`](../../flash-ext-security-core/docs/README.md):
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whatever mechanisms the application registers — OAuth2 bearer tokens, API keys, custom ones —
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authenticate `/mcp` exactly as they authenticate every other route.
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## `McpSecurity`
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| `McpConfig.security(...)` | |
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|---|---|
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| `REQUIRED` (default) | every call must be authenticated; boot fails without a `SecurityExtension` |
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| `NONE` | a public endpoint; a tool carrying security annotations fails the boot |
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`McpConfig.security(...)` controls how the MCP endpoint reacts to `flash-ext-auth-oidc` being
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installed (`ctx.find(OidcMiddleware.class)`), resolved once at boot in `McpExtension.routes()`:
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## OAuth2 protected resource
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| Policy | `flash-ext-auth-oidc` installed | `flash-ext-auth-oidc` absent |
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|---|---|---|
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| `REQUIRED` | protected | **boot fails** (`IllegalStateException`) |
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| `AUTO` (default) | protected | runs unprotected, logs a warning |
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| `NONE` | never protected, even if oidc is installed elsewhere in the app | runs unprotected |
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When a registered mechanism publishes an OAuth2 issuer — `flash-ext-security-oidc` does — the endpoint
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behaves as the MCP authorization spec requires, with nothing to configure:
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### Guarding `/mcp` without OAuth2
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- `GET /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp` serves RFC 9728 metadata: the `resource` (derived per
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request from `X-Forwarded-Proto`/`-Host` or `Host`), every issuer as `authorization_servers`, and
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`scopes_supported` when `McpConfig.scopesSupported(...)` is set;
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- an anonymous call gets `401` with `WWW-Authenticate: Bearer resource_metadata="…"`;
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- a token whose `aud` does not include the resource is `403` (RFC 8707) and logged at `WARN`. Credentials
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that are not audience-bound, such as API keys, are unaffected.
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`McpSecurity` only ever answers "is `flash-ext-auth-oidc` installed". An app that authenticates
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some other way sets `McpSecurity.NONE` and supplies its own guard:
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For Keycloak, the audience comes from an *Audience* protocol mapper whose included custom audience is
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the resource URL, attached to a client scope every MCP client receives (the built-in `basic` scope is the
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one that needs no client cooperation). Clients that register dynamically need Keycloak's anonymous
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client registration policies relaxed for the trusted hosts.
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`McpConfig.requireTokenAudience(false)` drops that last check for an authorization server that cannot
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mint a resource audience at all — Keycloak ignores RFC 8707's `resource` parameter, so a deployment that
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cannot add the mapper has no other way in. Every token a registered issuer signs is then accepted on the
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endpoint, and the boot logs say so.
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## Tool policies
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The core annotations work on tools as on handlers, checked per `tools/call` against the caller the route
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authenticated:
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```java
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McpConfig.builder("my-server")
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.toolsPackage("com.example.mcp")
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.security(McpSecurity.NONE)
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.middleware(myAuthMiddleware.protect())
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.build();
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@Tool(name = "approve", description = "Approves a pending proposal")
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@RolesAllowed(value = "REVIEWER", on = {"project", "locale"}) // read from the tool's arguments
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public class ApproveTool extends McpTool { … }
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```
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`McpConfig.middleware(...)` runs after the transport guards and after whatever `McpSecurity`
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resolved to, so it composes with OAuth2 protection rather than replacing it — the same hook is how
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you add rate limiting, audit logging or tracing to the endpoint. It never satisfies `REQUIRED`,
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which still asks for a real authorization server.
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A denial is a tool result with `isError: true` — the call reached the server, the tool did not run.
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Use `REQUIRED` for anything you intend to run in production reachable over the network — it
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turns "someone forgot to wire up OAuth2" into a startup crash instead of a silently open
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endpoint. `AUTO` is meant for local development, where spinning up a real identity provider is
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friction you don't want yet.
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## Why `flash-ext-auth-oidc` is an *optional* Maven dependency, concretely
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Maven's `<optional>true</optional>` only affects **transitive** propagation: consumers of
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`flash-ext-mcp` don't get `flash-ext-auth-oidc` pulled in automatically unless they add it themselves.
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Within `flash-ext-mcp` itself, `flash-ext-auth-oidc`'s classes are on the compile/test classpath as
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normal — this extension can (and does) reference `OidcMiddleware`/`ClaimsHolder` directly in
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source.
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That reference is isolated in its own class, `McpOidcIntegration`, invoked only from inside a
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`catch (NoClassDefFoundError)` block. A bare class-literal like `OidcMiddleware.class` (which
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`ctx.find(OidcMiddleware.class)` needs) forces the JVM to resolve that type the moment it's
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evaluated — if `flash-ext-auth-oidc` is not on the *runtime* classpath at all (a genuinely
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MCP-only install, no OAuth2 anywhere in the app), the first such reference throws
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`NoClassDefFoundError`. Keeping that reference inside a separate, lazily-loaded class means
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`McpExtension` itself loads and works fine standalone; only the attempt to actually use OIDC
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fails, and only when there's something to fail. This mirrors `OidcExtension`'s own lazy bridge to
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`flash-ext-openapi` — same technique, same reason.
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## OAuth2 resolution details — zero-config by default
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When oidc is available and `security() != NONE`, `McpOidcIntegration` (an isolated,
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lazily-loaded bridge — see its javadoc) derives everything an MCP OAuth2 resource server needs
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straight from the installed `OidcMiddleware`, with no additional `McpConfig` calls required:
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1. The MCP route is wrapped with `flash-ext-auth-oidc`'s own `OidcMiddleware.protect(resourceMetadataPath)`
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— the same Bearer-token/JWKS validation path used everywhere else in Flash5, plus a
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`resource_metadata` challenge parameter (see below). No JWT parsing or JWKS handling is
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reimplemented here.
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2. An audience guard always runs after `protect(...)`: it reads the validated claims from
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`ClaimsHolder` and rejects (`403`) any token whose `aud` claim does not include the resource
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identifier — **RFC 8707 Resource Indicators / audience binding**, enforced unconditionally,
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not opt-in. `OidcMiddleware` itself validates `aud` against its own `clientId` for ID
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tokens, but deliberately does not enforce audience on access tokens (it varies by provider)
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— the MCP extension adds that check on top, scoped to its own resource identifier.
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3. The resource identifier is the canonical URI of the MCP endpoint, resolved **per request** by
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`OidcMiddleware#selfOrigin` + `rootPath` — the same scheme/host resolution `OidcExtension`
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uses for its own redirect URIs: `X-Forwarded-Host`/`X-Forwarded-Proto` when the request came
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through a reverse proxy, otherwise `{selfScheme()}://{Host header}`. Behind a proxy the
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`Host` alone is the upstream address the proxy dialled, which would publish a resource
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identifier no client can reach. `McpConfig.resourceIdentifier(...)` still overrides it
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outright for a proxy that forwards neither header.
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4. The authorization server issuer is read from `OidcMiddleware#issuer()` unless
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`McpConfig.authorizationServerIssuer(...)` overrides it.
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## RFC 9728 Protected Resource Metadata
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Whenever the endpoint ends up protected, `flash-ext-mcp` publishes a Protected Resource Metadata
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document at `/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource{rootPath}` — no explicit `resourceIdentifier`/
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`authorizationServerIssuer` configuration required, both are auto-derived as described above:
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```json
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{ "resource": "https://mcp.example.com/mcp", "authorization_servers": ["https://auth.example.com/realms/myrealm"] }
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```
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`resource` is computed per request from the incoming request's forwarded/`Host` headers (see
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above), so the document is correct without hardcoding the server's own public URL.
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### `scopes_supported`
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Optional per RFC 9728, omitted from the document entirely unless set via
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`McpConfig.scopesSupported("openid", "profile", "email")`:
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```json
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{ "resource": "...", "authorization_servers": ["..."], "scopes_supported": ["openid", "profile", "email"] }
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```
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This is pure advertisement — token validation doesn't change based on it — but it matters in
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practice: a client that ignores it and requests no scope at all (many do — see `keycloak.md`)
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only gets back whatever the authorization server treats as always-included regardless of
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request, which for Keycloak is just its built-in `basic` scope. A client that *does* read
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`scopes_supported` and echoes it back in its authorization/token requests gets a token with the
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claims those scopes actually provide (`profile` → `preferred_username`/`name`, etc.), without
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needing every one of those claims hand-mapped onto `basic`. Set it to whatever scopes your
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`McpTool`s actually read off `ClaimsHolder`/`OidcUser` — there's no way to auto-derive this list,
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it depends entirely on what your tools do with the claims.
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## `WWW-Authenticate: resource_metadata` (RFC 9728 §5.1)
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The MCP Authorization spec **requires** a `401` to carry `resource_metadata` in
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`WWW-Authenticate`, pointing at the Protected Resource Metadata document above — this is how a
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spec-compliant client discovers the authorization server without out-of-band configuration.
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`OidcMiddleware.protect(String resourceMetadataPath)` (an overload added specifically for this)
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builds that challenge automatically:
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```
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WWW-Authenticate: Bearer realm="...", resource_metadata="https://mcp.example.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp"
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```
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The plain `OidcMiddleware.protect()` (no argument), used by every other Flash5 app, is
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unaffected — this parameter is additive and MCP-specific.
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## Per-tool `@RolesAllowed`/`@ScopesAllowed`
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`McpTool` subclasses can carry `flash-ext-auth-oidc`'s `@RolesAllowed`/`@ScopesAllowed`:
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```java
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@Tool(name = "delete_route", description = "Delete a route")
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@RolesAllowed("admin")
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public class DeleteRouteTool extends McpTool {
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@Override public ToolResponse call(ToolArguments args) { ... }
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}
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```
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This does **not** reuse `flash-ext-auth-oidc`'s per-route middleware mechanism (`ctx.addAnnotationProcessor`,
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the thing that makes these annotations work on a `RequestHandler`) — it can't: every tool shares
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one HTTP route (`POST {rootPath}`), already wrapped by whatever `McpSecurity` resolved above, so
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there is no per-tool route to attach a different middleware chain to. Instead,
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`McpOidcIntegration.compileToolPolicy` reads the annotations once at boot (`McpRegistry.scan`)
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and compiles them into a closure (`McpAuthPolicy`) that `McpDispatcher` runs *after* the
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route-wide auth has already succeeded and *before* invoking the specific tool named in the
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`tools/call` request — narrowing what's already-authenticated, not replacing it. A denial is a
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normal `isError: true` tool result (see `ToolResponse.error`), not an HTTP-level rejection — the
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model sees why, the same as any other tool failure.
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Roles are read via `OidcUser#hasRole` against `McpConfig.rolesClaimPath(...)` (default
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`"realm_access.roles"`, matching `OidcConfig`'s own default — set this explicitly if the two
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diverge; there's no way to read `OidcConfig`'s actual configured value from here). Scopes use
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`OidcUser#hasScope`'s built-in default claim paths (`scope`/`scp`), no extra config needed.
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`@ScopesAllowed(match = ScopesAllowed.Match.ANY)` and multi-role `@RolesAllowed({"admin",
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"editor"})` (OR semantics) both work exactly as they do on a `RequestHandler`.
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**`@Authenticated` alone has no effect and fails boot.** Once oidc is active for a server, every
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tool call is already authenticated — there's no per-tool public/authenticated split the way
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there is for HTTP routes, so a bare `@Authenticated` on a tool can't mean anything and would
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silently do nothing if allowed to compile. Boot fails instead, with a message pointing at
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`@RolesAllowed`/`@ScopesAllowed` as the actual narrowing mechanism.
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**Annotating a tool without active OAuth2 also fails boot**, not silently at request time: if
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`@RolesAllowed`/`@ScopesAllowed`/`@Authenticated` shows up on a tool while `McpSecurity` resolved
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to unprotected (`NONE`, or `AUTO` with no oidc installed), that's very likely a forgotten
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`OidcExtension` install or a `McpSecurity.NONE` left over from local dev — `IllegalStateException`
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at `app.start()`.
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## The `HttpException` safety net
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`flash-ext-auth-oidc`'s middleware throws `HttpException.unauthorized()`/`forbidden()` on auth
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failure. Flash5's core does **not** special-case `HttpException` in the default exception
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handler — the out-of-the-box `AbstractRouter` default always returns a generic `500`, regardless
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of the thrown exception's embedded status code; only an app that explicitly calls
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`FlashApp#onException(...)` (or installs something that does) gets `HttpException.status()`
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honored.
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To keep the MCP endpoint correct regardless of what the rest of the app configures,
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`McpTransportGuards.httpExceptionGuard()` wraps the whole route and translates `HttpException`
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into the right HTTP status itself, rather than letting it fall through to the app's (possibly
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unconfigured) global handler. This is scoped entirely to the MCP route — it does not touch or
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override the app's `onException` for any other route.
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`McpConfig.middleware(...)` runs after authentication, for rate limiting, auditing or tracing.
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