refactor(ext-oidc): replace auth modules with security extensions

This commit is contained in:
Zakaria El Orche
2026-09-16 15:54:19 +00:00
parent 017c2443f4
commit e0795299fc
126 changed files with 2944 additions and 5130 deletions
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp;
import java.util.function.Supplier;
/**
* Compiled per-tool authorization requirement, built once at boot by {@link McpOidcIntegration}
* from {@code @RolesAllowed}/{@code @ScopesAllowed} on an {@link McpTool} subclass — {@code null}
* on {@link McpRegistry.RegisteredTool} means no restriction beyond whatever {@link McpSecurity}
* already enforces route-wide.
*
* <p>{@code check} is a closure, not a raw role/scope list — this is what lets this record (and
* its only caller, {@link McpDispatcher}) stay free of any compile-time reference to a {@code
* flash-ext-auth-oidc} type, preserving the same classload isolation {@link McpOidcIntegration}'s
* javadoc describes for the rest of the OIDC bridge. Only the plain-JDK {@link Supplier}
* signature crosses the boundary; the closure itself, built once inside {@code
* McpOidcIntegration}, is the only place that ever touches {@code OidcUser}/{@code ClaimsHolder}.
*
* <p>Returns {@code null} from {@link #check()}{@code .get()} when authorized, or a
* human-readable denial reason otherwise — invoked once per {@code tools/call} against an
* annotated tool, never allocated on that path (the closure and its captured role/scope arrays
* are built exactly once, at boot).
*/
record McpAuthPolicy(Supplier<String> check) {}
@@ -26,8 +26,7 @@ public final class McpConfig {
private final String rootPath;
private final String toolsPackage;
private final McpSecurity security;
private final String resourceIdentifier;
private final String authorizationServerIssuer;
private final boolean requireTokenAudience;
private final List<String> allowedOrigins;
private final List<String> scopesSupported;
private final List<Middleware> middleware;
@@ -39,8 +38,7 @@ public final class McpConfig {
this.rootPath = b.rootPath;
this.toolsPackage = b.toolsPackage;
this.security = b.security;
this.resourceIdentifier = b.resourceIdentifier;
this.authorizationServerIssuer = b.authorizationServerIssuer;
this.requireTokenAudience = b.requireTokenAudience;
this.allowedOrigins = List.copyOf(b.allowedOrigins);
this.scopesSupported = List.copyOf(b.scopesSupported);
this.middleware = List.copyOf(b.middleware);
@@ -52,8 +50,7 @@ public final class McpConfig {
String rootPath() { return rootPath; }
String toolsPackage() { return toolsPackage; }
McpSecurity security() { return security; }
String resourceIdentifier() { return resourceIdentifier; }
String authorizationServerIssuer() { return authorizationServerIssuer; }
boolean requireTokenAudience() { return requireTokenAudience; }
List<String> allowedOrigins() { return allowedOrigins; }
List<String> scopesSupported() { return scopesSupported; }
List<Middleware> middleware() { return middleware; }
@@ -66,9 +63,8 @@ public final class McpConfig {
private String instructions;
private String rootPath = "/mcp";
private String toolsPackage;
private McpSecurity security = McpSecurity.AUTO;
private String resourceIdentifier;
private String authorizationServerIssuer;
private McpSecurity security = McpSecurity.REQUIRED;
private boolean requireTokenAudience = true;
private final List<String> allowedOrigins = new ArrayList<>();
private final List<String> scopesSupported = new ArrayList<>();
private final List<Middleware> middleware = new ArrayList<>();
@@ -91,28 +87,16 @@ public final class McpConfig {
/** Package scanned for {@link Tool @Tool}/{@link Resource @Resource}/{@link Prompt @Prompt} classes. Required. */
public Builder toolsPackage(String toolsPackage) { this.toolsPackage = toolsPackage; return this; }
/** OAuth2 requirement policy. Default {@link McpSecurity#AUTO}. */
/** Default {@link McpSecurity#REQUIRED}. */
public Builder security(McpSecurity security) { this.security = security; return this; }
/**
* Canonical URI of this MCP endpoint, used for RFC 8707 audience binding: tokens whose
* {@code aud} claim does not include this value are rejected. Optional — when
* {@code flash-ext-auth-oidc} is installed, this is auto-derived per request from the
* forwarded/{@code Host} headers (same resolution {@code OidcExtension} uses for its own
* redirect URIs) and audience binding is enforced unconditionally. Set this explicitly
* only to override that guess — a reverse proxy that forwards neither
* {@code X-Forwarded-Host} nor {@code X-Forwarded-Proto}.
* Whether a bearer token must name this endpoint in its {@code aud} (RFC 8707), as the MCP
* authorization spec requires. Default {@code true}. Turn it off for an authorization server
* that cannot mint a resource audience — every token a registered issuer signs is then
* accepted on the endpoint, and a warning is logged at boot.
*/
public Builder resourceIdentifier(String resourceIdentifier) { this.resourceIdentifier = resourceIdentifier; return this; }
/**
* Authorization server issuer URL, published in the RFC 9728 Protected Resource
* Metadata document at {@code /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource{rootPath}}. Optional
* — when {@code flash-ext-auth-oidc} is installed, this is auto-derived from its configured
* issuer. Set this explicitly only to override that (e.g. publishing a different issuer
* than the one actually validating tokens).
*/
public Builder authorizationServerIssuer(String issuer) { this.authorizationServerIssuer = issuer; return this; }
public Builder requireTokenAudience(boolean require) { this.requireTokenAudience = require; return this; }
/**
* Origins allowed to call the MCP endpoint (DNS-rebinding protection, per the Streamable
@@ -121,30 +105,10 @@ public final class McpConfig {
*/
public Builder allowedOrigins(String... origins) { this.allowedOrigins.addAll(List.of(origins)); return this; }
/**
* OAuth2 scopes this server expects clients to request, published as {@code
* scopes_supported} in the RFC 9728 Protected Resource Metadata document. Optional per
* the spec — omitted from the document entirely if never set. A spec-compliant client
* reads this to know what to put in its authorization/token requests instead of
* requesting nothing; see {@code docs/keycloak.md}'s "same story for any other claim"
* section for why this matters in practice (a client that requests no scope only gets
* whatever your authorization server treats as always-included, e.g. Keycloak's `basic`).
* Purely advertisement — this server still validates whatever token it actually receives
* the same way regardless of what a client requested.
*/
/** Published as {@code scopes_supported} in the RFC 9728 metadata, so OAuth clients request them. */
public Builder scopesSupported(String... scopes) { this.scopesSupported.addAll(List.of(scopes)); return this; }
/**
* Middleware to run on the MCP route, in the order given, after the transport guards and
* after whatever {@link McpSecurity} resolved to. Rate limiting, audit logging, tracing —
* anything that is routine on every other Flash route and had no way in here.
*
* <p>It runs on an authenticated request when OAuth2 protection is active, and is the only
* thing standing in front of the endpoint when it is not: {@link McpSecurity#NONE} plus a
* middleware of your own is how an app that authenticates some other way guards
* {@code /mcp}. It never satisfies {@link McpSecurity#REQUIRED}, which still asks for a
* real authorization server.
*/
/** Runs on the MCP route after the transport guards and authentication — rate limiting, auditing, tracing. */
public Builder middleware(Middleware... middleware) {
this.middleware.addAll(List.of(middleware));
return this;
@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ package dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp;
import com.fasterxml.jackson.core.JsonGenerator;
import com.fasterxml.jackson.databind.JsonNode;
import dev.relism.flash.http.ContentType;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.security.SecurityIdentity;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.security.SecurityPolicy;
import dev.relism.flash.models.Request;
import dev.relism.flash.models.Response;
@@ -18,10 +20,10 @@ import java.io.IOException;
* tool/resource/prompt name, resource/prompt handler exceptions) is a JSON-RPC error object,
* always returned with HTTP 200: the HTTP request itself succeeded, only the RPC did not. Only
* malformed HTTP-level input (unparsable JSON, not a JSON object) gets HTTP 400. A
* {@code @RolesAllowed}/{@code @ScopesAllowed} denial (see {@link McpAuthPolicy}) is the same
* {@code @RolesAllowed}/{@code @ScopesAllowed} denial (see {@link SecurityPolicy}) is the same
* category — {@code isError: true}, tool never invoked — not a transport-level rejection; the
* route-wide 401/403 for "not authenticated at all" already happened earlier, in the {@code
* OidcMiddleware}/audience-guard middleware chain, before this dispatcher ever runs.
* route-wide 401/403 already happened earlier, in the security middleware, before this
* dispatcher ever runs.
*/
final class McpDispatcher {
@@ -136,12 +138,14 @@ final class McpDispatcher {
if (tool == null)
throw McpProtocolException.invalidParams("Unknown tool: " + name);
ToolArguments args = new ToolArguments(params.path("arguments"));
SecurityPolicy policy = tool.policy();
ToolResponse result;
String denied = tool.policy() != null ? tool.policy().check().get() : null;
if (denied != null) {
result = ToolResponse.error("Tool \"" + name + "\" denied: " + denied);
if (policy != null && !policy.permitsScopes(SecurityIdentity.current())) {
result = ToolResponse.error("Tool \"" + name + "\" denied: missing scope");
} else if (policy != null && !policy.permitsRoles(SecurityIdentity.current(), args::getString)) {
result = ToolResponse.error("Tool \"" + name + "\" denied: missing role");
} else {
ToolArguments args = new ToolArguments(params.path("arguments"));
try {
result = tool.instance().call(args);
} catch (Exception e) {
@@ -1,5 +1,10 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp;
import dev.relism.flash.exceptions.HttpException;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.security.SecurityExtension;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.security.SecurityIdentity;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.security.SecurityPolicy;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.security.SecurityScheme;
import dev.relism.flash.extension.FlashContext;
import dev.relism.flash.extension.FlashExtension;
import dev.relism.flash.extension.FlashRegistrar;
@@ -9,38 +14,25 @@ import lombok.extern.slf4j.Slf4j;
import java.util.ArrayList;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Objects;
/**
* MCP (Model Context Protocol) server extension. Streamable HTTP transport — a single
* {@code POST} JSON-RPC endpoint, stateless in this revision (no session, no SSE stream; see
* {@code docs/transport.md}) — dispatch precompiled at boot from classes annotated with
* {@link Tool @Tool}/{@link Resource @Resource}/{@link Prompt @Prompt} under
* MCP (Model Context Protocol) server extension. Streamable HTTP transport — a single {@code POST}
* JSON-RPC endpoint, stateless in this revision (see {@code docs/transport.md}) — dispatching to
* {@link Tool @Tool}/{@link Resource @Resource}/{@link Prompt @Prompt} classes under
* {@link McpConfig#toolsPackage(String)}.
*
* <pre>{@code
* // Standalone, no OAuth2
* FlashApp.create(8080)
* .install(new McpExtension(McpConfig.builder("my-mcp-server")
* .toolsPackage("com.example.tools")
* .build()))
* .start();
*
* // With flash-ext-auth-oidc as the OAuth2 resource server — zero extra config: issuer, canonical
* // resource identifier, RFC 8707 audience binding and RFC 9728 metadata are all derived from
* // the installed OidcExtension.
* FlashApp.create(8080)
* .install(new OidcExtension(oidcConfig))
* .install(new McpExtension(McpConfig.builder("my-mcp-server")
* .toolsPackage("com.example.tools")
* .security(McpSecurity.REQUIRED)
* .build()))
* .start();
* app.install(new SecurityExtension())
* .install(new OidcExtension(OidcProvider.of("sso", issuer, clientId, secret)))
* .install(new McpExtension(McpConfig.builder("my-server").toolsPackage("com.example.tools").build()));
* }</pre>
*
* <p>One server per {@code McpExtension} instance — install multiple instances (distinct
* {@code rootPath}, distinct {@code toolsPackage}) for multiple MCP servers on one app,
* mirroring the {@code OidcExtension} multi-tenant pattern. See {@code docs/security.md} for
* the full OAuth2 resolution rules.
* <p>Every call is authenticated by the application's security chain — OAuth2 bearer tokens, API
* keys, anything registered. When an OAuth2 issuer is among its schemes, the endpoint is also an
* OAuth2 protected resource: RFC 9728 metadata, a {@code resource_metadata} challenge, and RFC 8707
* audience binding for audience-bound tokens. Tool annotations are enforced per call, with
* {@code @RolesAllowed(on = ...)} reading tool arguments.
*/
@Slf4j
public class McpExtension implements FlashExtension {
@@ -53,69 +45,54 @@ public class McpExtension implements FlashExtension {
@Override
public void configure(FlashRegistrar<?> app, FlashContext ctx) {
ctx.onReady(() -> registerRoutes(app, ctx));
}
ctx.onReady(() -> {
SecurityExtension security = config.security() == McpSecurity.NONE ? null : ctx.find(SecurityExtension.class)
.orElseThrow(() -> new IllegalStateException("MCP server \"" + config.name()
+ "\" requires flash-ext-security-core: install a SecurityExtension, or set McpSecurity.NONE for a public server"));
McpDispatcher dispatcher = new McpDispatcher(McpRegistry.scan(config.toolsPackage(), ctx, security),
config.name(), config.version(), config.instructions());
private void registerRoutes(FlashRegistrar<?> app, FlashContext ctx) {
// Resolved before scanning so McpRegistry knows, per tool, whether @RolesAllowed/
// @ScopesAllowed are backed by real OAuth2 protection or a boot-time misconfiguration
// (see McpOidcIntegration#compileToolPolicy) — must run first, not after.
McpOidcIntegration.Resolved secured = resolveSecurity(ctx);
McpRegistry registry = McpRegistry.scan(config.toolsPackage(), ctx, secured != null,
secured == null ? null : secured.rolesClaimPath());
McpDispatcher dispatcher = new McpDispatcher(registry, config.name(), config.version(), config.instructions());
List<Middleware> chain = new ArrayList<>(3 + config.middleware().size());
chain.add(McpTransportGuards.httpExceptionGuard());
chain.add(McpTransportGuards.originGuard(config.allowedOrigins()));
if (secured != null) chain.add(secured.security());
chain.addAll(config.middleware());
app.post(config.rootPath(), (req, res) -> { dispatcher.handle(req, res); return null; },
chain.toArray(Middleware[]::new));
registerResourceMetadata(app, secured);
}
private McpOidcIntegration.Resolved resolveSecurity(FlashContext ctx) {
if (config.security() == McpSecurity.NONE) return null;
McpOidcIntegration.Resolved resolved;
try {
resolved = McpOidcIntegration.resolve(ctx, config);
} catch (NoClassDefFoundError e) {
resolved = null; // flash-ext-auth-oidc not on the classpath at all
}
if (resolved != null) return resolved;
if (config.security() == McpSecurity.REQUIRED) {
throw new IllegalStateException(
"McpSecurity.REQUIRED but flash-ext-auth-oidc is not installed for MCP server \"" + config.name() +
"\" — install an OidcExtension before this McpExtension, or relax security to " +
"McpSecurity.AUTO/NONE if this server is meant to be public.");
}
log.warn("[flash-ext-mcp] MCP server \"{}\" is running WITHOUT OAuth2 protection — " +
"flash-ext-auth-oidc is not installed and McpSecurity.AUTO degrades to unprotected. " +
"Install flash-ext-auth-oidc or set McpSecurity.REQUIRED to make this a hard failure instead.",
config.name());
return null;
}
/**
* RFC 9728 Protected Resource Metadata, built once security is resolved — no longer
* conditioned on {@code resourceIdentifier}/{@code authorizationServerIssuer} being set
* explicitly, since {@link McpOidcIntegration#resolve} now derives both by default. The
* {@code resource} field is computed per request (it depends on that request's own
* forwarded/{@code Host} headers) via {@link McpOidcIntegration.Resolved#resourceIdentifier()}.
*/
private void registerResourceMetadata(FlashRegistrar<?> app, McpOidcIntegration.Resolved secured) {
if (secured == null) return;
String path = "/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource" + config.rootPath();
app.get(path, (req, res) -> {
res.type(ContentType.JSON);
return McpResourceMetadata.build(
secured.resourceIdentifier().apply(req), secured.issuer(), config.scopesSupported());
List<Middleware> chain = new ArrayList<>(List.of(
McpTransportGuards.httpExceptionGuard(), McpTransportGuards.originGuard(config.allowedOrigins())));
if (security != null) protect(app, security, chain);
chain.addAll(config.middleware());
app.post(config.rootPath(), (req, res) -> {
dispatcher.handle(req, res);
return null;
}, chain.toArray(Middleware[]::new));
});
}
private void protect(FlashRegistrar<?> app, SecurityExtension security, List<Middleware> chain) {
String metadataPath = "/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource" + config.rootPath();
chain.add(security.enforce(SecurityPolicy.AUTHENTICATED, (req, res) -> {
List<String> issuers = issuers(security);
res.header("WWW-Authenticate", issuers.isEmpty()
? String.join(", ", security.schemes().stream().map(SecurityScheme::challenge).toList())
: "Bearer resource_metadata=\"" + req.origin() + metadataPath + "\"");
throw HttpException.unauthorized();
}));
if (config.requireTokenAudience()) {
chain.add(next -> (req, res) -> {
String resource = req.origin() + config.rootPath();
if (!SecurityIdentity.current().principal().hasAudience(resource)) {
log.warn("[flash-ext-mcp] Rejected a token not issued for {} (RFC 8707) — the authorization server must put it in aud", resource);
throw HttpException.forbidden();
}
return next.handle(req, res);
});
} else {
log.warn("[flash-ext-mcp] Token audience validation (RFC 8707) is DISABLED for {} — every token a registered issuer signs is accepted.", config.rootPath());
}
app.get(metadataPath, (req, res) -> {
List<String> issuers = issuers(security);
if (issuers.isEmpty()) throw HttpException.notFound("Protected resource metadata");
res.type(ContentType.JSON);
return McpResourceMetadata.build(req.origin() + config.rootPath(), issuers, config.scopesSupported());
});
}
private static List<String> issuers(SecurityExtension security) {
return security.schemes().stream().map(SecurityScheme::issuer).filter(Objects::nonNull).toList();
}
}
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;
*
* <p>Not wired to {@code flash-ext-jackson} on purpose: the MCP JSON-RPC envelope is internal
* protocol plumbing, not a user-facing serialization concern, so this extension owns its
* mapper independently — same reasoning {@code flash-ext-auth-oidc} applies to its own JSON needs
* mapper independently — the same reasoning any protocol-level extension applies to its own JSON needs
* (see {@code json-smart} there). See {@code docs/jackson-interop.md} for the full rationale
* and how a future opt-in reuse of a shared {@code ObjectMapper} could work.
*/
@@ -1,186 +0,0 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.auth.AuthMiddleware;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.auth.Authenticated;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.auth.Claims;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.auth.ClaimsHolder;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.auth.RolesAllowed;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.auth.ScopesAllowed;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.oidc.OidcCredentialSource;
import dev.relism.flash.exceptions.HttpException;
import dev.relism.flash.extension.FlashContext;
import dev.relism.flash.models.Request;
import dev.relism.flash.routing.Middleware;
import lombok.extern.slf4j.Slf4j;
import java.util.LinkedHashSet;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.Optional;
import java.util.function.Function;
import java.util.function.Supplier;
/**
* Lazy, isolated bridge to {@code flash-ext-auth-oidc} and {@code flash-ext-auth-core}.
*
* <p>References to OIDC types only ever resolve when {@link #resolve}/{@link #compileToolPolicy}
* are actually invoked — never at {@link McpExtension} class-load time — because they live in
* this separate nested class. The caller wraps the invocation in {@code catch
* (NoClassDefFoundError)}, exactly like {@code OidcExtension}'s own lazy bridge to {@code
* flash-ext-openapi}. This is what lets {@code flash-ext-mcp} run standalone (MCP-only, no
* OAuth2) when {@code flash-ext-auth-oidc} is not even on the classpath. {@link Resolved}/{@link
* McpAuthPolicy} carry only oidc-free types back out ({@link Middleware}, {@link String}, a
* {@link Function}, a {@link Supplier}) so no other class in this package ever has to reference
* an OIDC type.
*
* <p>Zero-config by design: when {@code flash-ext-auth-oidc} is installed, everything an MCP OAuth2
* resource server needs — issuer, canonical resource identifier, RFC 8707 audience binding, and
* a spec-compliant {@code WWW-Authenticate} challenge (RFC 9728 §5.1) — is derived straight from
* the installed {@link OidcCredentialSource}, with no additional {@link McpConfig} calls.
* {@link McpConfig#resourceIdentifier(String)}/{@link McpConfig#authorizationServerIssuer(String)}
* remain as explicit overrides for the rare case where that guess is wrong.
*/
@Slf4j
final class McpOidcIntegration {
private static final String[] NO_VALUES = new String[0];
private McpOidcIntegration() {}
/** Everything {@link McpExtension} needs once oidc security is resolved. */
record Resolved(Middleware security, String issuer, String rolesClaimPath,
Function<Request, String> resourceIdentifier) {}
/** Returns the resolved security bundle, or {@code null} if oidc is not installed. */
static Resolved resolve(FlashContext ctx, McpConfig config) {
// Deliberately keyed on the OIDC source and not on AuthMiddleware: McpSecurity means
// "a real OAuth2 authorization server is protecting this endpoint", and an app that
// authenticates some other way must not satisfy REQUIRED by accident.
Optional<OidcCredentialSource> oidc = ctx.find(OidcCredentialSource.class);
Optional<AuthMiddleware> auth = ctx.find(AuthMiddleware.class);
if (oidc.isEmpty() || auth.isEmpty()) return null;
OidcCredentialSource source = oidc.get();
AuthMiddleware authMw = auth.get();
String resourceMetadataPath = "/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource" + config.rootPath();
String issuer = config.authorizationServerIssuer() != null
? config.authorizationServerIssuer() : source.issuer();
Function<Request, String> resourceId = req -> config.resourceIdentifier() != null
? config.resourceIdentifier()
: OidcCredentialSource.selfOrigin(req, source.selfScheme()) + config.rootPath();
Middleware protect = authMw.withSource(source.withResourceMetadata(resourceMetadataPath)).protect();
Middleware secured = Middleware.of(protect, audienceGuard(resourceId));
return new Resolved(secured, issuer, authMw.rolesClaimPath(), resourceId);
}
/**
* RFC 8707 audience binding, unconditionally enforced once oidc is protecting the MCP
* route — no longer opt-in behind an explicit {@code resourceIdentifier(...)} call.
*/
private static Middleware audienceGuard(Function<Request, String> resourceIdentifier) {
return next -> (req, res) -> {
Map<String, Object> claims = ClaimsHolder.map();
String expected = resourceIdentifier.apply(req);
if (claims != null && !audienceMatches(claims.get("aud"), expected)) {
log.warn("[flash-ext-mcp] Rejecting token (RFC 8707): aud={} does not include expected " +
"resource identifier \"{}\" — the authorization server must include this exact " +
"value in the access token's aud claim (e.g. an Audience protocol mapper in " +
"Keycloak) for this MCP server to accept it.", claims.get("aud"), expected);
throw HttpException.forbidden();
}
return next.handle(req, res);
};
}
private static boolean audienceMatches(Object aud, String expected) {
if (aud instanceof String s) return s.equals(expected);
if (aud instanceof Iterable<?> it) {
for (Object o : it) if (expected.equals(String.valueOf(o))) return true;
}
return false;
}
/**
* Compiles {@code @RolesAllowed}/{@code @ScopesAllowed} on a tool class into a {@link
* McpAuthPolicy}, or returns {@code null} if the tool carries none of the three OIDC
* annotations. Called once per tool at boot ({@link McpRegistry#scan}), never on the
* request hot path — the {@link Supplier} it returns is what runs per {@code tools/call},
* closing over the already-normalized role/scope arrays so the hot path itself allocates
* nothing beyond what {@link Claims#hasRole}/{@link Claims#hasScope} already do.
*
* <p>Fails fast at boot, not silently at request time, for the two ways this can be
* misconfigured: the annotation present without OAuth2 actually protecting this MCP server
* ({@code oidcActive == false}), and {@code @Authenticated} — which has no per-tool meaning
* here (see below) — used at all.
*/
static McpAuthPolicy compileToolPolicy(Class<? extends McpTool> toolClass, boolean oidcActive,
String rolesClaimPath) {
Authenticated auth = toolClass.getAnnotation(Authenticated.class);
RolesAllowed roles = toolClass.getAnnotation(RolesAllowed.class);
ScopesAllowed scopes = toolClass.getAnnotation(ScopesAllowed.class);
if (auth == null && roles == null && scopes == null) return null;
if (!oidcActive) {
throw new IllegalStateException(
"MCP tool \"" + toolClass.getSimpleName() + "\" declares @Authenticated/@RolesAllowed/" +
"@ScopesAllowed, but this MCP server has no active OAuth2 protection — flash-ext-auth-oidc " +
"is not installed for it, or McpSecurity is NONE. These annotations require " +
"McpSecurity.AUTO/REQUIRED with an OidcExtension installed; install one, or remove the " +
"annotation from " + toolClass.getSimpleName() + ".");
}
if (auth != null) {
throw new IllegalStateException(
"MCP tool \"" + toolClass.getSimpleName() + "\" is annotated @Authenticated, which has " +
"no effect on an McpTool: the whole MCP endpoint is already all-or-nothing " +
"authenticated once oidc is active (McpSecurity.AUTO/REQUIRED) — unlike a RequestHandler " +
"route, there is no per-tool public/authenticated split to opt into. Remove it, or use " +
"@RolesAllowed/@ScopesAllowed to narrow further.");
}
String[] requiredRoles = roles != null ? normalizeRequired("RolesAllowed", roles.value()) : NO_VALUES;
String[] requiredScopes = scopes != null ? normalizeRequired("ScopesAllowed", scopes.value()) : NO_VALUES;
ScopesAllowed.Match scopeMatch = scopes != null ? scopes.match() : ScopesAllowed.Match.ALL;
Supplier<String> check = () -> {
Claims user = ClaimsHolder.current();
if (user == null) return "not authenticated";
if (requiredRoles.length > 0 && !hasAnyRole(user, rolesClaimPath, requiredRoles))
return "missing required role (any of: " + String.join(", ", requiredRoles) + ")";
if (requiredScopes.length > 0 && !hasScopes(user, requiredScopes, scopeMatch))
return "missing required scope (" + scopeMatch + " of: " + String.join(", ", requiredScopes) + ")";
return null;
};
return new McpAuthPolicy(check);
}
private static boolean hasAnyRole(Claims user, String claimPath, String[] roles) {
for (String role : roles) if (user.hasRole(claimPath, role)) return true;
return false;
}
private static boolean hasScopes(Claims user, String[] scopes, ScopesAllowed.Match match) {
if (match == ScopesAllowed.Match.ALL) {
for (String scope : scopes) if (!user.hasScope(scope)) return false;
return true;
}
for (String scope : scopes) if (user.hasScope(scope)) return true;
return false;
}
/** Mirrors {@code OidcAuthPolicy}'s own normalization — trim, dedupe, require non-blank. */
private static String[] normalizeRequired(String annotationName, String[] values) {
if (values == null || values.length == 0)
throw new IllegalStateException("@" + annotationName + " requires at least one value");
LinkedHashSet<String> normalized = new LinkedHashSet<>(values.length);
for (String raw : values) {
if (raw == null) continue;
String trimmed = raw.trim();
if (!trimmed.isEmpty()) normalized.add(trimmed);
}
if (normalized.isEmpty())
throw new IllegalStateException("@" + annotationName + " requires at least one non-empty value");
return normalized.toArray(String[]::new);
}
}
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ package dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp;
import com.fasterxml.jackson.core.JsonGenerator;
import dev.relism.flash.exceptions.InitializationException;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.security.SecurityExtension;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.security.SecurityPolicy;
import dev.relism.flash.extension.FlashContext;
import java.io.IOException;
@@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ final class McpRegistry {
private static final String EMPTY_ARRAY = "[]";
/** {@code policy} is {@code null} unless the tool carries @RolesAllowed/@ScopesAllowed. */
record RegisteredTool(String name, McpTool instance, McpAuthPolicy policy) {}
record RegisteredTool(String name, McpTool instance, SecurityPolicy policy) {}
record RegisteredResource(String uri, McpResource instance) {}
record RegisteredPrompt(String name, McpPrompt instance) {}
@@ -39,15 +41,8 @@ final class McpRegistry {
private McpRegistry() {}
/**
* @param oidcActive whether this MCP server's route is actually OAuth2-protected right
* now (see {@link McpOidcIntegration#resolve}) — gates whether
* {@code @RolesAllowed}/{@code @ScopesAllowed} on a tool are honored or
* rejected at boot as a misconfiguration; see
* {@link McpOidcIntegration#compileToolPolicy}.
* @param rolesClaimPath claim path resolved from the installed OIDC extension.
*/
static McpRegistry scan(String packageName, FlashContext ctx, boolean oidcActive, String rolesClaimPath) {
/** @param security {@code null} for a server running with {@link McpSecurity#NONE} */
static McpRegistry scan(String packageName, FlashContext ctx, SecurityExtension security) {
McpPackageScanner.ScanResult found = McpPackageScanner.scan(packageName);
McpRegistry registry = new McpRegistry();
@@ -55,7 +50,9 @@ final class McpRegistry {
Tool ann = cls.getAnnotation(Tool.class);
McpTool instance = instantiate(cls);
instance.bind(ctx);
McpAuthPolicy policy = compileToolPolicy(cls, oidcActive, rolesClaimPath);
if (security == null && SecurityPolicy.of(cls) != null)
throw new InitializationException("MCP tool \"" + ann.name() + "\" declares security annotations, but the server runs with McpSecurity.NONE");
SecurityPolicy policy = security == null ? null : security.policy(cls);
if (registry.tools.putIfAbsent(ann.name(), new RegisteredTool(ann.name(), instance, policy)) != null)
throw new InitializationException("Duplicate MCP tool name: \"" + ann.name() + "\"");
}
@@ -173,24 +170,6 @@ final class McpRegistry {
gen.writeEndArray();
}
/**
* Isolated the same way {@link McpOidcIntegration#resolve} is — {@code
* NoClassDefFoundError} here means {@code flash-ext-auth-oidc} genuinely isn't on the runtime
* classpath, in which case a tool couldn't have been compiled against
* {@code @RolesAllowed}/{@code @ScopesAllowed} in the first place, so there's nothing to
* check (and nothing lost: {@code oidcActive} is only ever {@code true} once {@link
* McpOidcIntegration#resolve} has already succeeded once this boot, which proves those
* types resolve fine).
*/
private static McpAuthPolicy compileToolPolicy(Class<? extends McpTool> cls, boolean oidcActive,
String rolesClaimPath) {
try {
return McpOidcIntegration.compileToolPolicy(cls, oidcActive, rolesClaimPath);
} catch (NoClassDefFoundError e) {
return null;
}
}
private static <T> T instantiate(Class<T> cls) {
try {
Constructor<T> ctor = cls.getDeclaredConstructor();
@@ -2,18 +2,18 @@ package dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp;
import java.util.List;
/** RFC 9728 OAuth 2.0 Protected Resource Metadata document, built once at boot. */
/** RFC 9728 OAuth 2.0 Protected Resource Metadata. */
final class McpResourceMetadata {
private McpResourceMetadata() {}
/** {@code scopesSupported} is optional per RFC 9728 — omitted from the document if empty. */
static String build(String resourceIdentifier, String authorizationServerIssuer, List<String> scopesSupported) {
/** {@code scopesSupported} is optional — omitted when empty. */
static String build(String resource, List<String> authorizationServers, List<String> scopesSupported) {
return McpJson.buildString(gen -> {
gen.writeStartObject();
gen.writeStringField("resource", resourceIdentifier);
gen.writeStringField("resource", resource);
gen.writeArrayFieldStart("authorization_servers");
gen.writeString(authorizationServerIssuer);
for (String issuer : authorizationServers) gen.writeString(issuer);
gen.writeEndArray();
if (!scopesSupported.isEmpty()) {
gen.writeArrayFieldStart("scopes_supported");
@@ -1,17 +1,11 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp;
/**
* OAuth2 requirement policy for the MCP endpoint, resolved against whether
* {@code flash-ext-auth-oidc} is installed ({@code ctx.find(OidcMiddleware.class)}).
*/
/** Whether the MCP endpoint requires an authenticated caller. */
public enum McpSecurity {
/** Fail fast at boot if {@code flash-ext-auth-oidc} is not installed — never expose an unprotected MCP endpoint. */
/** The default: every call is authenticated by {@code flash-ext-security-core}, which must be installed. */
REQUIRED,
/** Protect the endpoint if {@code flash-ext-auth-oidc} is installed; otherwise run unprotected and log a warning. */
AUTO,
/** Never protect the endpoint, even if {@code flash-ext-auth-oidc} is installed elsewhere in the app. */
/** A public endpoint. Tools declaring security annotations fail the boot. */
NONE
}
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ final class McpTransportGuards {
* allowed through — only a <em>present but disallowed</em> value is rejected.
*
* <p>If {@code allowedOrigins} is empty, validation is skipped and a boot-time warning is
* logged — same graceful-degradation shape as {@link McpSecurity#AUTO}.
* logged.
*/
static Middleware originGuard(List<String> allowedOrigins) {
if (allowedOrigins.isEmpty()) {
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ final class McpTransportGuards {
/**
* Safety net around the whole MCP route: translates {@link HttpException} (thrown by
* {@link #originGuard} or by {@code flash-ext-auth-oidc}'s middleware) into a proper HTTP status
* {@link #originGuard} or by {@code flash-ext-security-core}) into a proper HTTP status
* directly, instead of relying on the app's global exception handler — which defaults to a
* generic 500 for every exception type unless the app owner overrides it (see
* {@code AbstractRouter}'s default {@code exceptionHandler}). Keeps the MCP endpoint
@@ -1,109 +0,0 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp;
import com.nimbusds.jose.JWSAlgorithm;
import com.nimbusds.jose.JWSHeader;
import com.nimbusds.jose.crypto.RSASSASigner;
import com.nimbusds.jose.jwk.JWKSet;
import com.nimbusds.jose.jwk.KeyUse;
import com.nimbusds.jose.jwk.RSAKey;
import com.nimbusds.jwt.JWTClaimsSet;
import com.nimbusds.jwt.SignedJWT;
import com.sun.net.httpserver.HttpServer;
import java.io.OutputStream;
import java.net.InetSocketAddress;
import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;
import java.security.KeyPair;
import java.security.KeyPairGenerator;
import java.security.interfaces.RSAPrivateKey;
import java.security.interfaces.RSAPublicKey;
import java.time.Instant;
import java.util.Date;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.UUID;
/**
* Minimal, self-contained fake OIDC provider for tests: real discovery document, real JWKS
* endpoint, real RS256-signed tokens — no network dependency beyond localhost, no mocking
* framework. Exercises {@code flash-ext-auth-oidc}'s actual discovery + JWKS + JWT validation path.
*/
final class FakeOidcProvider implements AutoCloseable {
private final HttpServer server;
private final String issuer;
private final RSAKey rsaKey;
FakeOidcProvider() throws Exception {
KeyPairGenerator gen = KeyPairGenerator.getInstance("RSA");
gen.initialize(2048);
KeyPair kp = gen.generateKeyPair();
this.rsaKey = new RSAKey.Builder((RSAPublicKey) kp.getPublic())
.privateKey((RSAPrivateKey) kp.getPrivate())
.keyUse(KeyUse.SIGNATURE)
.algorithm(JWSAlgorithm.RS256)
.keyID(UUID.randomUUID().toString())
.build();
this.server = HttpServer.create(new InetSocketAddress("127.0.0.1", 0), 0);
this.issuer = "http://127.0.0.1:" + server.getAddress().getPort();
server.createContext("/.well-known/openid-configuration", ex -> respond(ex, discoveryDocument()));
server.createContext("/jwks", ex -> respond(ex, new JWKSet(rsaKey.toPublicJWK()).toJSONObject().toString()));
server.setExecutor(null);
server.start();
}
String issuer() { return issuer; }
/** Mints a valid RS256 access token — bearer-validation only, no full authorization-code round-trip needed. */
String signToken(String subject, String audience) {
return signToken(subject, audience, null, NO_ROLES);
}
/**
* Same as {@link #signToken(String, String)}, plus a {@code scope} claim (space-delimited,
* matching {@link dev.relism.flash.ext.auth.Claims#hasScope}'s default claim path) and a
* Keycloak-shaped {@code realm_access.roles} claim (matching {@code McpConfig}'s default
* {@code rolesClaimPath}) when {@code roles} is non-empty.
*/
String signToken(String subject, String audience, String scope, String... roles) {
try {
JWTClaimsSet.Builder builder = new JWTClaimsSet.Builder()
.issuer(issuer)
.subject(subject)
.audience(audience)
.issueTime(Date.from(Instant.now()))
.expirationTime(Date.from(Instant.now().plusSeconds(300)));
if (scope != null) builder.claim("scope", scope);
if (roles.length > 0) builder.claim("realm_access", Map.of("roles", List.of(roles)));
SignedJWT jwt = new SignedJWT(
new JWSHeader.Builder(JWSAlgorithm.RS256).keyID(rsaKey.getKeyID()).build(), builder.build());
jwt.sign(new RSASSASigner(rsaKey));
return jwt.serialize();
} catch (Exception e) {
throw new IllegalStateException(e);
}
}
private static final String[] NO_ROLES = new String[0];
private String discoveryDocument() {
return "{"
+ "\"issuer\":\"" + issuer + "\","
+ "\"authorization_endpoint\":\"" + issuer + "/auth\","
+ "\"token_endpoint\":\"" + issuer + "/token\","
+ "\"jwks_uri\":\"" + issuer + "/jwks\""
+ "}";
}
private static void respond(com.sun.net.httpserver.HttpExchange ex, String body) throws java.io.IOException {
byte[] bytes = body.getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
ex.getResponseHeaders().add("Content-Type", "application/json");
ex.sendResponseHeaders(200, bytes.length);
try (OutputStream os = ex.getResponseBody()) { os.write(bytes); }
}
@Override
public void close() { server.stop(0); }
}
@@ -1,141 +0,0 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.oidc.OidcConfig;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.oidc.OidcExtension;
import dev.relism.flash.extension.FlashApp;
import dev.relism.flash.extension.FlashConfiguration;
import dev.relism.flash.testing.FlashResponse;
import dev.relism.flash.testing.FlashTest;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.AfterAll;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.AfterEach;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.extension.RegisterExtension;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertThrows;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertTrue;
/**
* {@code @RolesAllowed}/{@code @ScopesAllowed} on an {@link McpTool} — see
* {@link McpOidcIntegration#compileToolPolicy}. Same real-discovery/real-JWKS/real-RS256-token
* approach as {@link McpExtensionSecurityTest}, against {@code fixtures.secured}'s tools.
*/
class McpAuthPolicyTest {
private static final String SECURED_TOOLS = "dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.authfixtures.secured";
private static final String AUTHENTICATED_ONLY_TOOLS = "dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.authfixtures.authenticatedonly";
private static final FakeOidcProvider provider = newProvider();
@RegisterExtension
static FlashTest secured = FlashTest.of(app -> {
app.install(new OidcExtension(OidcConfig.builder(
provider.issuer(), "mcp-client", "secret", "/auth/callback").build()));
app.install(new McpExtension(McpConfig.builder("secure-server")
.toolsPackage(SECURED_TOOLS)
.security(McpSecurity.REQUIRED)
.build()));
});
/** Tokens are audience-bound to this server, so the port has to be read back after boot. */
private static String resourceId() {
return "http://127.0.0.1:" + secured.port() + "/mcp";
}
@AfterAll
static void closeProvider() {
provider.close();
}
// ── Tool policy ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@Test
void rolesAllowed_deniesWithoutRole_allowsWithRole() throws Exception {
callTool("admin_only", provider.signToken("user-1", resourceId(), null))
.expectStatus(200)
.expectBodyContains("\"isError\":true")
.expectBodyContains("missing required role");
callTool("admin_only", provider.signToken("user-1", resourceId(), null, "admin"))
.expectStatus(200)
.expectBodyContains("\"isError\":false")
.expectBodyContains("ok");
}
@Test
void scopesAllowed_deniesWithoutScope_allowsWithScope() throws Exception {
callTool("write_only", provider.signToken("user-1", resourceId(), "read"))
.expectStatus(200)
.expectBodyContains("\"isError\":true")
.expectBodyContains("missing required scope");
callTool("write_only", provider.signToken("user-1", resourceId(), "read write"))
.expectStatus(200)
.expectBodyContains("\"isError\":false")
.expectBodyContains("written");
}
@Test
void unannotatedTool_unaffectedByOtherToolsPolicies() throws Exception {
callTool("open", provider.signToken("user-1", resourceId(), null))
.expectStatus(200)
.expectBodyContains("\"isError\":false")
.expectBodyContains("open");
}
private static FlashResponse callTool(String toolName, String token) {
return secured.request()
.header("Accept", "application/json")
.header("Authorization", "Bearer " + token)
.json("{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":1,\"method\":\"tools/call\",\"params\":{\"name\":\""
+ toolName + "\"}}")
.post("/mcp");
}
// ── Boot-time rejection ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
// These assert that start() throws, so they build the app directly rather than through
// FlashTest — a harness whose job is to boot an app is the wrong tool for asserting that
// booting fails. Port 0 still removes the old free-port dance.
private FlashApp bootFailure;
@AfterEach
void releaseBootFailureListener() {
if (bootFailure != null) bootFailure.stop().join();
}
@Test
void toolAnnotated_butSecurityNone_failsAtBoot() {
bootFailure = mcpApp(SECURED_TOOLS, McpSecurity.NONE);
IllegalStateException error = assertThrows(IllegalStateException.class, bootFailure::start);
assertTrue(error.getMessage().contains("no active OAuth2 protection"), error.getMessage());
}
@Test
void bareAuthenticated_hasNoEffect_failsAtBoot() {
bootFailure = mcpApp(AUTHENTICATED_ONLY_TOOLS, McpSecurity.REQUIRED);
IllegalStateException error = assertThrows(IllegalStateException.class, bootFailure::start);
assertTrue(error.getMessage().contains("no effect"), error.getMessage());
}
private static FlashApp mcpApp(String toolsPackage, McpSecurity security) {
FlashApp app = FlashApp.create(FlashConfiguration.builder()
.port(0).host("127.0.0.1").shutdownDrainTimeoutMs(250).build());
app.install(new OidcExtension(OidcConfig.builder(
provider.issuer(), "mcp-client", "secret", "/auth/callback").build()));
app.install(new McpExtension(McpConfig.builder("secure-server")
.toolsPackage(toolsPackage)
.security(security)
.build()));
return app;
}
private static FakeOidcProvider newProvider() {
try {
return new FakeOidcProvider();
} catch (Exception failure) {
throw new IllegalStateException("Could not start the fake OIDC provider", failure);
}
}
}
@@ -1,179 +0,0 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.oidc.OidcConfig;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.oidc.OidcExtension;
import dev.relism.flash.extension.FlashApp;
import dev.relism.flash.extension.FlashApplication;
import dev.relism.flash.extension.FlashConfiguration;
import dev.relism.flash.testing.FlashRequest;
import dev.relism.flash.testing.FlashResponse;
import dev.relism.flash.testing.FlashTest;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.AfterAll;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.extension.RegisterExtension;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertThrows;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertTrue;
/**
* Exercises the actual OAuth2 resolution rules against a real {@code flash-ext-auth-oidc}
* installation backed by {@link FakeOidcProvider} — real discovery, real JWKS, real RS256
* tokens — plus the fail-fast/degrade behavior when oidc is absent.
*
* <p>Four server configurations differ only in how MCP security is declared, so each gets its
* own {@link FlashTest} and they share one provider.
*/
class McpExtensionSecurityTest {
private static final String TOOLS_PACKAGE = "dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.fixtures";
private static final String EXPLICIT_RESOURCE_ID = "https://mcp.example.com/mcp";
private static final FakeOidcProvider provider = newProvider();
/** MCP asked for AUTO security with no oidc installed — should degrade to public. */
@RegisterExtension
static FlashTest degraded = FlashTest.of(app -> app.install(new McpExtension(
McpConfig.builder("auto-server")
.toolsPackage(TOOLS_PACKAGE)
.security(McpSecurity.AUTO)
.build())));
/** REQUIRED with oidc, resource identifier derived from the request. */
@RegisterExtension
static FlashTest secured = FlashTest.of(securedApp(null, null));
/** REQUIRED with oidc and an explicitly declared resource identifier. */
@RegisterExtension
static FlashTest securedWithResourceId = FlashTest.of(securedApp(EXPLICIT_RESOURCE_ID, null));
/** REQUIRED with oidc and advertised scopes. */
@RegisterExtension
static FlashTest securedWithScopes =
FlashTest.of(securedApp(null, new String[] {"openid", "profile", "email"}));
@AfterAll
static void closeProvider() {
provider.close();
}
// ── No oidc installed ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@Test
void required_withoutOidc_throwsAtBoot() {
// Asserting that boot fails, so this one builds its app directly rather than through
// the harness; port(0) still removes the old free-port dance.
FlashApp app = FlashApp.create(FlashConfiguration.builder()
.port(0).host("127.0.0.1").shutdownDrainTimeoutMs(250).build());
app.install(new McpExtension(McpConfig.builder("secure-server")
.toolsPackage(TOOLS_PACKAGE)
.security(McpSecurity.REQUIRED)
.build()));
try {
assertThrows(IllegalStateException.class, app::start);
} finally {
app.stop().join();
}
}
@Test
void auto_withoutOidc_degradesToPublic() {
post(degraded, initializeBody(), null).expectStatus(200);
}
// ── REQUIRED with oidc ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
@Test
void required_withOidc_rejectsMissingToken() {
post(secured, initializeBody(), null).expectStatus(401);
}
@Test
void required_withOidc_rejectsWrongAudience() throws Exception {
String token = provider.signToken("user-1", "https://someone-else.example.com/resource");
post(securedWithResourceId, initializeBody(), token).expectStatus(403);
}
@Test
void required_withOidc_acceptsValidAudience() throws Exception {
String token = provider.signToken("user-1", EXPLICIT_RESOURCE_ID);
post(securedWithResourceId, initializeBody(), token)
.expectStatus(200)
.expectBodyContains("\"protocolVersion\"");
}
@Test
void required_withOidc_noExplicitResourceIdentifier_derivesFromRequestAndEnforcesAudience() throws Exception {
String derivedResourceId = "http://127.0.0.1:" + secured.port() + "/mcp";
post(secured, initializeBody(), provider.signToken("user-1", derivedResourceId))
.expectStatus(200);
post(secured, initializeBody(), provider.signToken("user-1", "https://someone-else.example.com/resource"))
.expectStatus(403);
}
@Test
void required_withOidc_missingToken_challengeIncludesResourceMetadata() {
FlashResponse response = post(secured, initializeBody(), null).expectStatus(401);
String challenge = response.header("WWW-Authenticate");
assertTrue(challenge != null && challenge.contains("resource_metadata=\"http://127.0.0.1:"
+ secured.port() + "/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp\""),
"WWW-Authenticate: " + challenge);
}
// ── Protected resource metadata ──────────────────────────────────────────
@Test
void required_withOidc_noExplicitConfig_publishesProtectedResourceMetadata() {
FlashResponse response = secured.get("/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp")
.expectStatus(200)
.expectBodyContains("\"resource\":\"http://127.0.0.1:" + secured.port() + "/mcp\"")
.expectBodyContains("\"authorization_servers\":[\"" + provider.issuer() + "\"]");
assertTrue(!response.body().contains("scopes_supported"),
"scopes_supported must be omitted when unset: " + response.body());
}
@Test
void scopesSupported_published_inProtectedResourceMetadata() {
securedWithScopes.get("/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp")
.expectStatus(200)
.expectBodyContains("\"scopes_supported\":[\"openid\",\"profile\",\"email\"]");
}
// ── Helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
private static FlashApplication securedApp(String resourceIdentifier, String[] scopesSupported) {
return app -> {
app.install(new OidcExtension(OidcConfig.builder(
provider.issuer(), "mcp-client", "secret", "/auth/callback").build()));
McpConfig.Builder mcp = McpConfig.builder("secure-server")
.toolsPackage(TOOLS_PACKAGE)
.security(McpSecurity.REQUIRED);
if (resourceIdentifier != null) mcp.resourceIdentifier(resourceIdentifier);
if (scopesSupported != null) mcp.scopesSupported(scopesSupported);
app.install(new McpExtension(mcp.build()));
};
}
private static FlashResponse post(FlashTest server, String body, String bearerToken) {
FlashRequest request = server.request().header("Accept", "application/json").json(body);
if (bearerToken != null) request.header("Authorization", "Bearer " + bearerToken);
return request.post("/mcp");
}
private static String initializeBody() {
return "{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":1,\"method\":\"initialize\",\"params\":{}}";
}
private static FakeOidcProvider newProvider() {
try {
return new FakeOidcProvider();
} catch (Exception failure) {
throw new IllegalStateException("Could not start the fake OIDC provider", failure);
}
}
}
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ class McpRegistryTest {
@Test
void scan_findsAndPrecompilesToolsResourcesPrompts() throws Exception {
McpRegistry registry = McpRegistry.scan("dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.fixtures", new FlashContext(), false, "realm_access.roles");
McpRegistry registry = McpRegistry.scan("dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.fixtures", new FlashContext(), null);
assertTrue(registry.hasTools());
assertTrue(registry.hasResources());
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ class McpRegistryTest {
@Test
void scan_emptyPackage_throwsInitializationException() {
assertThrows(InitializationException.class,
() -> McpRegistry.scan("dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.doesnotexist", new FlashContext(), false, "realm_access.roles"));
() -> McpRegistry.scan("dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.doesnotexist", new FlashContext(), null));
}
private static JsonNode findByField(JsonNode array, String field, String value) {
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.security.SecurityExtension;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.security.apikey.ApiKey;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.security.apikey.ApiKeyExtension;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.security.apikey.GeneratedApiKey;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.security.oidc.OidcExtension;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.security.oidc.OidcProvider;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.security.test.FakeOidcProvider;
import dev.relism.flash.testing.FlashRequest;
import dev.relism.flash.testing.FlashResponse;
import dev.relism.flash.testing.FlashTest;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.extension.RegisterExtension;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.function.Consumer;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertThrows;
class McpSecurityTest {
static final FakeOidcProvider provider = start();
static final GeneratedApiKey KEY = new ApiKeyExtension<String>("mk", id -> null).generate();
static final ApiKeyExtension<String> apiKeys = new ApiKeyExtension<>("mk", id -> id.equals(KEY.id()) ? new ApiKey<>(KEY.id(), KEY.secretHash(), "agent", null, null) : null);
@RegisterExtension
static final FlashTest app = FlashTest.of(flash -> flash
.install(new SecurityExtension().roles((identity, role, on) -> identity.principal().name().equals(role + "@" + on.get("project"))))
.install(new OidcExtension(OidcProvider.of("fake", provider.issuer(), "app", "secret")))
.install(apiKeys)
.install(new McpExtension(McpConfig.builder("secure").toolsPackage("dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.authfixtures.secured")
.scopesSupported("openid", "email").build())));
/** The same chain with the RFC 8707 check turned off, for an authorization server that cannot mint a resource audience. */
@RegisterExtension
static final FlashTest relaxed = FlashTest.of(flash -> flash
.install(new SecurityExtension().roles((identity, role, on) -> false))
.install(new OidcExtension(OidcProvider.of("fake", provider.issuer(), "app", "secret")))
.install(new McpExtension(McpConfig.builder("relaxed").toolsPackage("dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.authfixtures.secured")
.requireTokenAudience(false).build())));
static FakeOidcProvider start() {
try {
return new FakeOidcProvider();
} catch (Exception e) {
throw new IllegalStateException(e);
}
}
static String resource() {
return "http://127.0.0.1:" + app.port() + "/mcp";
}
static FlashResponse call(Consumer<FlashRequest> credential, String method, String params) {
return app.request().with(credential).header("Accept", "application/json")
.json("{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":1,\"method\":\"" + method + "\",\"params\":" + params + "}")
.post("/mcp");
}
@Test
void anAnonymousCallIsChallengedWithTheResourceMetadata() {
call(request -> {}, "initialize", "{}").expectStatus(401)
.expectHeader("WWW-Authenticate", "Bearer resource_metadata=\"http://127.0.0.1:" + app.port() + "/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp\"");
}
@Test
void theProtectedResourceMetadataNamesTheIssuer() {
app.get("/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp").expectStatus(200)
.expectBody("{\"resource\":\"" + resource() + "\",\"authorization_servers\":[\"" + provider.issuer() + "\"],\"scopes_supported\":[\"openid\",\"email\"]}");
}
@Test
void aTokenIsAcceptedOnlyForThisResource() {
call(provider.bearer("u", Map.of("aud", resource())), "initialize", "{}").expectStatus(200).expectBodyContains("protocolVersion");
call(provider.bearer("u", Map.of("aud", "https://elsewhere.example/mcp")), "initialize", "{}").expectStatus(403);
}
@Test
void aTokenWithoutTheResourceAudienceIsAcceptedWhenTheCheckIsOff() {
relaxed.request().with(provider.bearer("u", Map.of("aud", "https://elsewhere.example/mcp"))).header("Accept", "application/json")
.json("{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":1,\"method\":\"initialize\",\"params\":{}}")
.post("/mcp").expectStatus(200).expectBodyContains("protocolVersion");
}
/** An API key is not audience-bound: the same chain authenticates agents that never saw an authorization server. */
@Test
void anApiKeyIsAcceptedBesideOAuth() {
call(request -> request.header("Authorization", "Bearer " + KEY.token()), "initialize", "{}").expectStatus(200);
}
@Test
void toolPoliciesReadTheirTargetFromTheArguments() {
Consumer<FlashRequest> admin = provider.bearer("admin@42", Map.of("aud", resource()));
call(admin, "tools/call", "{\"name\":\"admin_only\",\"arguments\":{\"project\":\"42\"}}").expectBodyContains("\"isError\":false");
call(admin, "tools/call", "{\"name\":\"admin_only\",\"arguments\":{\"project\":\"7\"}}").expectBodyContains("denied: missing role");
call(provider.bearer("u", Map.of("aud", resource(), "scope", "write")), "tools/call", "{\"name\":\"write_only\"}").expectBodyContains("written");
call(provider.bearer("u", Map.of("aud", resource())), "tools/call", "{\"name\":\"write_only\"}").expectBodyContains("denied: missing scope");
}
@Test
void securityIsRequiredUnlessDeclaredOff() {
FlashTest unsecured = FlashTest.of(flash -> flash.install(new McpExtension(McpConfig.builder("x").toolsPackage("dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.fixtures").build())));
assertThrows(Exception.class, () -> unsecured.get("/mcp"));
FlashTest contradictory = FlashTest.of(flash -> flash.install(new McpExtension(McpConfig.builder("x")
.toolsPackage("dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.authfixtures.secured").security(McpSecurity.NONE).build())));
assertThrows(Exception.class, () -> contradictory.get("/mcp"));
}
}
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.authfixtures.authenticatedonly;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.McpTool;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.TextContent;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.Tool;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.ToolArguments;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.ToolResponse;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.auth.Authenticated;
/** Deliberately misconfigured fixture: bare @Authenticated has no effect on an McpTool — see
* McpOidcIntegration#compileToolPolicy. Boot must fail with a clear message, not silently no-op. */
@Tool(name = "pointless", description = "Exists only to prove @Authenticated alone fails boot")
@Authenticated
public class PointlessAuthTool extends McpTool {
@Override
public ToolResponse call(ToolArguments args) {
return ToolResponse.success(new TextContent("unreachable"));
}
}
@@ -5,10 +5,10 @@ import dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.TextContent;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.Tool;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.ToolArguments;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.ToolResponse;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.auth.RolesAllowed;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.security.RolesAllowed;
@Tool(name = "admin_only", description = "Only callable with the admin role")
@RolesAllowed("admin")
@RolesAllowed(value = "admin", on = "project")
public class AdminOnlyTool extends McpTool {
@Override
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.TextContent;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.Tool;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.ToolArguments;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.ToolResponse;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.auth.ScopesAllowed;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.security.ScopesAllowed;
@Tool(name = "write_only", description = "Only callable with the write scope")
@ScopesAllowed("write")