Fixes the request-smuggling and resource-exhaustion debt in the existing
HTTP/1.1 parser, and adds the ALPN/h2c-preface negotiation seam so a
connection's protocol is decided once, before any request is parsed, per
flash/docs/http2/IMPLEMENTATION-PLAN.md Phase 1.
Existing-code defects fixed (EX-nn):
- EX-02: reject Content-Length + Transfer-Encoding together (RFC 9112 6.1
CL.TE/TE.CL smuggling), and conflicting duplicate Content-Length values.
- EX-03: strict, overflow-safe Content-Length parsing, replacing a parser
that silently skipped non-digit bytes ("5abc" -> 5, "-1" -> 1).
- EX-07: header-read / idle-keep-alive / body-read timeouts enforced by an
absolute deadline (dev.relism.flash.transport.BufferedByteSource), not
merely Socket#setSoTimeout, which never trips against a peer trickling
one byte per read within the window.
- EX-08: header count / name length / value length / request-line length
bounds (Http1Limits), 431 on violation.
- EX-10: ChunkedInputStream now reads through BufferedByteSource instead
of the raw unbuffered socket stream, and the header-parser's read-ahead
bytes are handed over via a zero-copy prependOnce() instead of a
SequenceInputStream/ByteArrayInputStream pair.
- EX-17: HttpStatus's status-code bound is computed from values() instead
of a hand-maintained constant that silently threw
ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException when a code above it was added; added
421, 431, 505, 507, 511 and others HTTP/2 and this hardening need.
- EX-18: bare-CR desync and obsolete line folding rejected.
- EX-30: the TLS handshake is forced explicitly, under a timeout, before
any protocol decision -- SSLSocket#getApplicationProtocol() returned
null until the handshake had run, and nothing previously forced it.
- EX-31: TLS 1.2 cipher suites on the RFC 9113 Appendix A blocklist are
filtered out of a listener's enabled set whenever it offers h2 via ALPN.
- EX-35 (found in this phase): Transfer-Encoding values listing multiple
codings ("gzip, chunked") were silently treated as not chunked at all,
corrupting the message boundary -- only the whole value was compared.
- EX-36 (found in this phase): a header line with no ':' was silently
skipped instead of rejected.
New:
- dev.relism.flash.transport.BufferedByteSource: the single buffered,
deadline-aware, peekable view over a connection's inbound bytes.
- dev.relism.flash.transport.ProtocolNegotiator/NegotiatedProtocol: ALPN
and h2c prior-knowledge detection. In this phase an H2 result is always
closed cleanly -- there is no Http2Connection to hand off to until
Phase 8. FlashConfiguration.http2Enabled gates the h2c preface peek.
- dev.relism.flash.exceptions.MalformedRequestException: a typed,
status-carrying rejection distinct from HttpException, caught at the
parse site so a malformed request never reaches the handler chain or
the user's exception handler, and the connection is always closed.
Two small plan-document corrections recorded as DEC-12 (Phase 1's Files
list omitted BufferedByteSource.java and MalformedRequestException.java;
the request-line-length check description pointed at the wrong offset).
DEC-13/DEC-14 record the deadline and exception-hierarchy designs.
277/277 tests green (flash module), run twice for stability of the new
wall-clock-based HttpServerTimeoutTest cases. Whole-repo build green.
h1 benchmark regression check is left unverified in the plan's DoD: no
JMH harness exists yet (Phase 3 deliverable).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Streamable HTTP transport (JSON-RPC 2.0 over POST), one-class-per-tool/resource/prompt
API mirroring RequestHandler, boot-time-precompiled schema/list payloads for a zero-alloc
hot path, and optional OAuth2 protection built on flash-ext-oidc (lazy-loaded, RFC 8707
audience binding, RFC 9728 Protected Resource Metadata). Registers the module in the
root and flash-extensions POMs and adds the ext-mcp commit scope to AGENTS.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- TlsConfig.applicationProtocols(String...) sets the listener's negotiable
ALPN protocol list via SSLParameters, inherited by every accepted socket
like clientAuth — works on both keystore() and ofContext(), untouched
unless called. Enables TLS-ALPN-01 (RFC 8737) style on-demand cert
issuance: a custom KeyManager can read the already-resolved protocol via
engine/socket getHandshakeApplicationProtocol() inside
chooseEngineServerAlias/chooseServerAlias, since ALPN is resolved during
ClientHello/ServerHello, always before Certificate production.
- Request gains isSecure()/sslSession(), threaded through RequestParser from
the accepted SSLSocket exactly like remoteAddress() — reference-only,
zero per-request allocation. sslSession() defers to SSLSocket#getSession()
lazily, so it's a cached-field read (handshake already completed by the
time a handler can call it), never a forced handshake.
- WebSocketSession.isSecure()/sslSession() delegate to the upgrading
Request rather than tracking the socket a second time.
- Documents TLS end-to-end in README.md (listeners, TlsConfig, SNI, ALPN,
mTLS, Request/WebSocketSession accessors).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Zakaria El OrcheandClaude Sonnet 5
Relism