flash-ext-security-core

Authentication and authorization for Flash, independent of any credential. Mechanisms — -oidc, -apikey, -form, or your own — register into one chain; this module owns everything downstream of "who is the caller".

app.install(new SecurityExtension()
        .users(principal -> users.findOrProvision(principal))   // optional: principal → your user
        .roles((identity, role, on) -> members.has(identity.user(User.class), role, on.get("project"))))
   .install(new OidcExtension(OidcProvider.of("sso", issuer, clientId, secret)));

The model

Type	Role
`AuthenticationMechanism`	reads one kind of credential: returns a `Principal`, `null` (not mine), or throws `AuthenticationFailedException` (mine, invalid)
`Principal`	who the mechanism proved the caller to be — typed per mechanism (`OidcPrincipal`, `ApiKeyPrincipal`, …)
`SecurityIdentity`	the current caller: `principal(OidcPrincipal.class)`, `user(User.class)`, `hasRole`, `hasScope`
`UserResolver`	principal → application user, resolved lazily, once per request
`RoleResolver`	whether a caller holds a role, optionally on a resource
`AuthenticationEntryPoint`	the answer to a request that needs a caller and carries no credential

Mechanisms never write the response. That is what keeps the one mistake that matters impossible to make: a credential that was presented and rejected is always a 401, never a redirect into a sign-in page an API client cannot parse.

Annotations

On a handler or an MCP tool class:


`@Authenticated`	any authenticated caller
`@PermitAll`	anyone; a caller who authenticates is still identified, one who fails is anonymous
`@RolesAllowed(value, on)`	any of the roles; `on` names the path/query parameters (tool arguments on MCP) identifying the resource
`@ScopesAllowed(value)`	every one of the credential's scopes

@RolesAllowed(value = "MANAGER", on = "project") on /projects/{project}/keys asks the RoleResolver whether the caller is a manager of that project. A handler declaring roles with no RoleResolver configured fails the boot. Policies compile once; checking one allocates nothing.

The chain

Mechanisms are tried in registration order, then the session cookie. The first to return a principal wins. When none does:

a browser (Accept: text/html) is redirected to the only login method, or to loginPage when there are several;
anything else gets 401 with every mechanism's challenge in WWW-Authenticate.

entryPoint(...) replaces that, e.g. to pick an identity provider from the user's email domain.

Sessions

signIn(req, res, principal[, expiresAt]) stores the principal under a flash_session cookie; POST /auth/logout ends it and follows Principal.logoutUrl(). An expired session is handed to the SessionRefresher registered for its principal type, or ended. InMemorySessionStore is the default; sessions(...) swaps it for one that survives a restart or spans instances.

GET /auth/methods lists every registered LoginMethod for a client to render.

OpenAPI

With flash-ext-openapi present, every registered mechanism's SecurityScheme is published, and every protected operation lists them as alternatives, with its 401 and — for roles or scopes — its 403 and what it requires. Nothing to write per mechanism.

Writing a mechanism

security.mechanism(new AuthenticationMechanism() {
    public Principal authenticate(Request req) {
        String key = req.header("X-Key");
        if (key == null) return null;                                  // not mine
        Principal p = keys.get(key);
        if (p == null) throw new AuthenticationFailedException(null);  // mine, and invalid
        return p;
    }
    public SecurityScheme scheme() { return SecurityScheme.bearer("key", "opaque"); }
});

Testing

flash-ext-security-test authenticates requests as any principal without an identity provider.

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