refactor(ext-oidc): replace auth modules with security extensions #17

Merged
Relism merged 12 commits from feature/ext-auth/split-oidc-into-auth-core into master 2026-09-16 16:00:15 +00:00
126 changed files with 2944 additions and 5130 deletions
Showing only changes of commit e0795299fc - Show all commits
+2 -2
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@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@
<file url="file://$PROJECT_DIR$/flash-extensions/flash-ext-jackson/src/main/resources" charset="UTF-8" />
<file url="file://$PROJECT_DIR$/flash-extensions/flash-ext-limiter/src/main/java" charset="UTF-8" />
<file url="file://$PROJECT_DIR$/flash-extensions/flash-ext-limiter/src/main/resources" charset="UTF-8" />
<file url="file://$PROJECT_DIR$/flash-extensions/flash-ext-auth-oidc/src/main/java" charset="UTF-8" />
<file url="file://$PROJECT_DIR$/flash-extensions/flash-ext-auth-oidc/src/main/resources" charset="UTF-8" />
<file url="file://$PROJECT_DIR$/flash-extensions/flash-ext-security-oidc/src/main/java" charset="UTF-8" />
<file url="file://$PROJECT_DIR$/flash-extensions/flash-ext-security-oidc/src/main/resources" charset="UTF-8" />
<file url="file://$PROJECT_DIR$/flash-extensions/flash-ext-openapi/src/main/java" charset="UTF-8" />
<file url="file://$PROJECT_DIR$/flash-extensions/flash-ext-openapi/src/main/resources" charset="UTF-8" />
<file url="file://$PROJECT_DIR$/flash-extensions/flash-ext-routeviewer/src/main/java" charset="UTF-8" />
+11 -5
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@@ -11,9 +11,12 @@ a zero-allocation FSM router, bounded protocol state, and one shared request/res
| `flash-testing` | JUnit 5 harness — boot an app on an ephemeral port, fake its services, assert on responses |
| `flash-extensions/flash-ext-jackson` | Jackson JSON integration |
| `flash-extensions/flash-ext-openapi` | OpenAPI 3.0 spec + Swagger UI |
| `flash-extensions/flash-ext-auth-core` | Authentication seam + role/scope authorization |
| `flash-extensions/flash-ext-auth-oidc` | OIDC Authorization Code + PKCE flow |
| `flash-extensions/flash-ext-mcp` | MCP (Model Context Protocol) server — Streamable HTTP, optional OAuth2 via flash-ext-auth-oidc |
| `flash-extensions/flash-ext-security-core` | Security: authentication chain, annotations, sessions, OpenAPI |
| `flash-extensions/flash-ext-security-oidc` | OpenID Connect: bearer tokens, code flow + PKCE |
| `flash-extensions/flash-ext-security-apikey` | API keys |
| `flash-extensions/flash-ext-security-form` | Password sign-in |
| `flash-extensions/flash-ext-security-test` | Test identities, fake OpenID Provider |
| `flash-extensions/flash-ext-mcp` | MCP (Model Context Protocol) server — Streamable HTTP, secured by flash-ext-security-core |
| `flash-extensions/flash-ext-view-core` | Minimal shared SSR runtime primitives |
| `flash-extensions/flash-ext-view-jte` | Opinionated jte SSR extension |
| `flash-extensions/flash-ext-view-thymeleaf` | Opinionated Thymeleaf SSR extension |
@@ -147,8 +150,11 @@ FlashApp.create(8080)
See extension-specific READMEs for full details:
- [`flash-ext-jackson`](flash-extensions/flash-ext-jackson/README.md)
- [`flash-ext-openapi`](flash-extensions/flash-ext-openapi/README.md)
- [`flash-ext-auth-core`](flash-extensions/flash-ext-auth-core/docs/README.md)
- [`flash-ext-auth-oidc`](flash-extensions/flash-ext-auth-oidc/docs/README.md)
- [`flash-ext-security-core`](flash-extensions/flash-ext-security-core/docs/README.md)
- [`flash-ext-security-oidc`](flash-extensions/flash-ext-security-oidc/docs/README.md)
- [`flash-ext-security-apikey`](flash-extensions/flash-ext-security-apikey/docs/README.md)
- [`flash-ext-security-form`](flash-extensions/flash-ext-security-form/docs/README.md)
- [`flash-ext-security-test`](flash-extensions/flash-ext-security-test/docs/README.md)
- [`flash-ext-mcp`](flash-extensions/flash-ext-mcp/docs/README.md)
- [`flash-ext-view-jte`](flash-extensions/flash-ext-view-jte/README.md)
- [`flash-ext-view-thymeleaf`](flash-extensions/flash-ext-view-thymeleaf/README.md)
@@ -1,105 +0,0 @@
# flash-ext-auth-core
Authorization, and the plumbing that carries a caller's identity through a request. It does not
know how anyone signed in — that is a `CredentialSource`, and `flash-ext-auth-oidc` ships the
OpenID Connect one.
The split follows the same shape as `flash-ext-cache-core`/`-caffeine` and
`flash-ext-data-core`/`-hibernate`: the abstract half here, the implementations beside it.
## The model
```
request ──► CredentialSource.authenticate(req, res) ──► claims
ClaimsHolder.set (this module only)
AuthMiddleware matches roles / scopes
handler
```
| Type | What it is |
|---|---|
| `CredentialSource` | Turns what a request carries into claims, or rejects it. One per mechanism. |
| `AuthMiddleware` | Publishes the claims, enforces `@RolesAllowed`/`@ScopesAllowed`, clears up. |
| `ClaimsHolder` | The current request's claims. Read from anywhere; written only from here. |
| `Claims` | Typed view over a claims map — `sub()`, `email()`, `roles(path)`, `scopes()`. |
| `AuthPolicy` | What a handler's annotations compiled to, resolved once at boot. |
| `Session`, `SessionStore` | Server-side sessions for sources that keep them. |
Nothing outside this module can write `ClaimsHolder`. A source *returns* claims and the middleware
publishes them, so no code can put claims on a request that did not carry them.
## Using it
You rarely install this module directly — an extension that contributes a source does it for you:
```java
// inside your extension's configure(...)
AuthMiddleware auth = AuthMiddleware.install(ctx, AuthConfig.builder()
.rolesClaimPath("realm_access.roles")
.scopeClaimPaths("scope,scp")
.build(), mySource);
```
`install` publishes the middleware in the context and registers the annotation processor, so every
scanned handler carrying an auth annotation is mounted behind it. See
[`credential-sources.md`](credential-sources.md) to write a source of your own.
On lambda routes, take the middleware out of the context:
```java
AuthMiddleware auth = app.ctx().require(AuthMiddleware.class);
app.get("/api/me", (req, res) -> ClaimsHolder.claim("sub"), auth.protect());
app.get("/", homeHandler, auth.optional());
app.delete("/admin/users/{id}", deleteHandler, auth.requireRole("admin"));
app.post("/orders", createOrder, auth.requireScopes("orders:write"));
```
## Annotations
On a scanned handler class, and mounted automatically:
| Annotation | Effect |
|---|---|
| `@Authenticated` | Any accepted credential. No role check. |
| `@Authenticated(optional = true)` | Never rejects; publishes claims when there are some. |
| `@RolesAllowed({"a","b"})` | Authenticated **and** holding at least one of the roles. |
| `@ScopesAllowed({"x","y"})` | Authenticated **and** holding all of the scopes. |
| `@ScopesAllowed(value = {...}, match = ANY)` | …at least one of them. |
`@Authenticated(optional = true)` cannot be combined with a role or scope requirement — asking for
a role on a route that admits anonymous callers is a contradiction, and it fails at boot rather
than at 3am.
## Where roles and scopes are read from
`AuthConfig` names the claim paths, because every provider spells them differently:
| | Default | Common alternatives |
|---|---|---|
| `rolesClaimPath` | `roles` | `realm_access.roles` (Keycloak), `groups` (Authelia) |
| `scopeClaimPaths` | `scope,scp` | plus e.g. `permissions.scopes` |
Paths are dot-separated and walk nested maps. Scope paths are a comma-separated list tried in
order, so a token that puts scopes in `scp` and a legacy one that uses `scope` both work.
Matching is deliberate about a distinction that bites otherwise:
- a **string** claim is split on spaces, tabs, newlines and commas — `"openid orders:read"` is two
scopes;
- a **list** claim is compared entry by entry, whole and trimmed — `["a b"]` is one role named
`a b`, not two.
Prefix matches never count: `administrator` does not satisfy `admin`.
## Ordering around authentication
`AuthMiddleware.POLICY` is the boot-time key the annotation-driven node mounts under. An extension
contributing its own middleware can order itself against it:
```java
MiddlewareNode.of(MY_KEY, myMiddleware).afterIfPresent(AuthMiddleware.POLICY);
```
@@ -1,95 +0,0 @@
# Writing a credential source
A `CredentialSource` is the only thing that stands between a request and its claims. Everything
else in this module — annotations, policy, matching, the holder — works the same regardless of
which one is installed.
```java
public interface CredentialSource {
Map<String, Object> authenticate(Request req, Response res);
Map<String, Object> peek(Request req);
default String insufficientScopeChallenge(String[] requiredScopes) { return null; }
}
```
## `authenticate` has three outcomes, and the last two are not the same
| Return | Means | The middleware then |
|---|---|---|
| claims | a valid credential was presented | publishes them and calls the handler |
| `null` | **no** credential, and the source has already answered the request | stops, writes nothing more |
| throws `HttpException` | a credential **was** presented and is invalid | propagates it |
Flattening the last two is the single easiest way to get this wrong. "No session, send the browser
to the sign-in page" and "this token is forged" are different answers, and a caller can tell:
the first is a `302` to a login screen, the second a `401` the client must not retry blindly.
A source that returns `null` owns the response by then — it has redirected, or written a `401` with
its own `WWW-Authenticate` header. A source that throws sets any challenge header it owes *before*
throwing, because the exception unwinds past the middleware.
`peek` is the same resolution with every rejection removed: no throwing, no redirecting, `null`
when there is nothing valid. It backs `@Authenticated(optional = true)`, where an anonymous caller
is a normal outcome. Never make `peek` refresh state that `authenticate` would not have.
## A minimal source
```java
public final class ApiKeySource implements CredentialSource {
private final Map<String, Map<String, Object>> keys; // key -> claims
@Override
public Map<String, Object> authenticate(Request req, Response res) {
String key = req.header("X-Api-Key");
if (key == null) {
res.header("WWW-Authenticate", "ApiKey realm=\"api\"");
throw HttpException.unauthorized();
}
Map<String, Object> claims = keys.get(key);
if (claims == null) throw HttpException.unauthorized(); // presented and wrong
return claims;
}
@Override
public Map<String, Object> peek(Request req) {
String key = req.header("X-Api-Key");
return key != null ? keys.get(key) : null;
}
}
```
This one never returns `null` from `authenticate` — it has no sign-in flow to redirect into, so
"absent" and "invalid" both mean `401`. That is a legitimate shape; the three outcomes are what
the interface *allows*, not a checklist.
## Claims are yours to shape
The claims map is whatever your mechanism produces. `Claims` reads a few conventional keys —
`sub`, `email`, `name`, `preferred_username` — so populating those makes your source work with
code written against any other. Roles and scopes are read from wherever `AuthConfig` points, so
they can live under any key you like as long as the two agree.
## Installing it
```java
public final class ApiKeyExtension implements FlashExtension {
@Override
public void configure(FlashRegistrar<?> app, FlashContext ctx) {
ctx.provide(ApiKeySource.class, source);
AuthMiddleware.install(ctx, AuthConfig.builder()
.rolesClaimPath("roles")
.build(), source);
}
}
```
`AuthMiddleware.install` also registers the annotation processor, so scanned handlers carrying
`@Authenticated` and friends are mounted behind your source with nothing further to do.
## One source at a time
`AuthMiddleware` is published in the context under its own type, so installing two extensions that
each call `install` leaves the last one winning — quietly. If an app genuinely needs to accept two
kinds of credential, that is one source that tries both, not two sources: the order they are tried
in, and what happens when the first rejects, are decisions that have to live somewhere explicit.
@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
# Sessions
A `Session` is what a credential source keeps server-side between requests, looked up by a cookie.
Core owns the container; what goes in it is the source's business.
```java
public final class Session {
String id();
Map<String, Object> claims();
Instant expiresAt();
Map<String, Object> attributes();
boolean isExpired();
Object attribute(String key);
String attributeAsString(String key);
}
```
## Why it expires early
`isExpired()` returns true **30 seconds before** `expiresAt`. Without that window a session can
pass the check at the top of a request and be dead by the time the handler uses it — a class of
failure that reproduces once a day and never in a test. Renewal is therefore always slightly
premature, on purpose.
## Attributes
`attributes()` is opaque to this module. `flash-ext-auth-oidc` keeps its access, id and refresh
tokens there under its own keys, which is what lets renewal stay entirely inside that extension
while the session itself carries no OAuth2 vocabulary.
Store what your source needs to renew or revoke, and nothing a handler should be reading — handlers
read `claims()`.
## The store
```java
public interface SessionStore {
void save(Session session);
Optional<Session> find(String sessionId);
void delete(String sessionId);
}
```
`InMemorySessionStore` is the default: a `ConcurrentHashMap`, fine for a single instance, and it
loses every session on restart. Supply your own for Redis or JDBC when sessions have to survive a
deploy or be shared across nodes.
Sessions are immutable. Renewing one builds a new instance with the same `id()` and `save`s it
over the old — there is no mutate-in-place path, so a store can cache or serialise freely.
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.auth;
/**
* Where authorization reads its inputs from. Deliberately small: everything about *obtaining* a
* credential belongs to the {@link CredentialSource} that produced it, and everything about
* *checking* one is right here.
*
* <p>Defaults are the generic spelling, not any one provider's. A source that knows better —
* {@code flash-ext-auth-oidc} defaults roles to Keycloak's {@code realm_access.roles} — builds
* its own {@code AuthConfig} with the paths its provider actually uses.
*/
public final class AuthConfig {
private final String rolesClaimPath;
private final String scopeClaimPaths;
private AuthConfig(Builder b) {
this.rolesClaimPath = b.rolesClaimPath;
this.scopeClaimPaths = b.scopeClaimPaths;
}
/** Dot-separated path to the roles list in the claims (default: {@code roles}). */
public String rolesClaimPath() { return rolesClaimPath; }
/** Comma-separated claim paths scopes are read from, in order (default: {@code scope,scp}). */
public String scopeClaimPaths() { return scopeClaimPaths; }
public static Builder builder() { return new Builder(); }
public static final class Builder {
private String rolesClaimPath = "roles";
private String scopeClaimPaths = "scope,scp";
private Builder() {}
/** Dot-separated path to the roles list — e.g. {@code realm_access.roles}, {@code groups}. */
public Builder rolesClaimPath(String path) { this.rolesClaimPath = path; return this; }
/** Comma-separated claim paths scopes are read from, tried in order. */
public Builder scopeClaimPaths(String paths) { this.scopeClaimPaths = paths; return this; }
public AuthConfig build() { return new AuthConfig(this); }
}
}
@@ -1,309 +0,0 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.auth;
import dev.relism.flash.exceptions.HttpException;
import dev.relism.flash.extension.FlashContext;
import dev.relism.flash.models.Request;
import dev.relism.flash.models.Response;
import dev.relism.flash.routing.Middleware;
import dev.relism.flash.routing.MiddlewareKey;
import dev.relism.flash.routing.MiddlewareNode;
import java.util.ArrayList;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Map;
/**
* Turns claims into a yes or a no. Exposed in the {@link FlashContext} for manual use on lambda
* routes, and injected automatically for handlers annotated with {@link Authenticated},
* {@link RolesAllowed} or {@link ScopesAllowed}.
*
* <p>It knows nothing about how the caller proved who they are — that is the
* {@link CredentialSource} it is built with. What lives here is the half that is the same for
* every mechanism: publish the claims for the request, match roles and scopes against them, clear
* up afterwards.
*
* <pre>{@code
* AuthMiddleware auth = app.ctx().require(AuthMiddleware.class);
* app.get("/api/me", (req, res) -> ClaimsHolder.claim("sub"), auth.protect());
* app.delete("/admin/users/{id}", handler, auth.requireRole("admin"));
* }</pre>
*/
public class AuthMiddleware {
/**
* Boot-time identity of the node annotation-driven authorization mounts under. Public so an
* extension that contributes its own middleware can order itself around authentication —
* {@code MiddlewareNode.of(...).afterIfPresent(AuthMiddleware.POLICY)}.
*/
public static final MiddlewareKey POLICY = MiddlewareKey.of("flash.auth.policy");
private final AuthConfig config;
private final CredentialSource source;
private final String[] roleClaimPathParts;
private final String[][] scopeClaimPathParts;
public AuthMiddleware(AuthConfig config, CredentialSource source) {
this.config = config;
this.source = source;
this.roleClaimPathParts = splitClaimPath(config.rolesClaimPath());
this.scopeClaimPathParts = splitClaimPaths(config.scopeClaimPaths());
}
/**
* Builds the middleware for {@code source}, publishes it in the context and registers the
* annotation processor that mounts {@link Authenticated}, {@link RolesAllowed} and
* {@link ScopesAllowed} on scanned handlers.
*
* <p>Every extension that contributes a {@link CredentialSource} calls this rather than
* repeating the wiring — the processor and the {@link #POLICY} key belong to one place.
*/
public static AuthMiddleware install(FlashContext ctx, AuthConfig config, CredentialSource source) {
AuthMiddleware middleware = new AuthMiddleware(config, source);
ctx.provide(AuthMiddleware.class, middleware);
ctx.addAnnotationProcessor(handlerClass -> {
AuthPolicy policy = AuthPolicy.compileFromAnnotations(handlerClass);
return policy != null
? List.of(MiddlewareNode.of(POLICY, middleware.authorize(policy)))
: List.of();
});
return middleware;
}
// -- Public API -----------------------------------------------------------
/** The single configured claim path used by every transport for role checks. */
public String rolesClaimPath() { return config.rolesClaimPath(); }
/** The source this middleware authenticates with. */
public CredentialSource source() { return source; }
/**
* The same authorization rules against a different credential source. Used where one route
* needs a variant of an installed source — {@code flash-ext-mcp} protects {@code /mcp} with an
* OIDC source whose challenges carry RFC 9728 resource metadata, while every other route keeps
* the plain one.
*/
public AuthMiddleware withSource(CredentialSource source) {
return new AuthMiddleware(config, source);
}
/**
* Rejects the request unless the caller is authenticated. How it is rejected — a 401 with a
* challenge, a redirect into a sign-in flow — is the source's decision, not this one's.
*/
public Middleware protect() {
return next -> (req, res) -> {
Map<String, Object> claims = source.authenticate(req, res);
if (claims == null) return null; // the source already answered the request
ClaimsHolder.set(claims);
try {
return next.handle(req, res);
} finally {
ClaimsHolder.clear();
}
};
}
/**
* Publishes claims when the caller happens to be authenticated and never rejects anyone. Use
* it on public routes that personalise their response for signed-in callers.
*
* <pre>{@code
* app.get("/", handler, auth.optional());
* // Inside handler: ClaimsHolder.current() is non-null iff the caller is signed in.
* }</pre>
*/
public Middleware optional() {
return next -> (req, res) -> {
Map<String, Object> claims = source.peek(req);
if (claims != null) ClaimsHolder.set(claims);
try {
return next.handle(req, res);
} finally {
ClaimsHolder.clear();
}
};
}
/**
* Applies a policy compiled once at boot from a handler's annotations. This is the path
* annotation-driven mounting takes.
*/
public Middleware authorize(AuthPolicy policy) {
if (policy.optionalAuth()) return optional();
return next -> (req, res) -> {
Map<String, Object> claims = source.authenticate(req, res);
if (claims == null) return null;
enforcePolicy(claims, policy, res);
ClaimsHolder.set(claims);
try {
return next.handle(req, res);
} finally {
ClaimsHolder.clear();
}
};
}
/** {@link #protect()} plus at least one of the given roles (OR semantics). */
public Middleware requireRole(String... roles) {
return authorize(AuthPolicy.rolesAny(roles));
}
/** {@link #protect()} plus every one of the given scopes. */
public Middleware requireScopes(String... scopes) {
return authorize(AuthPolicy.scopes(scopes, ScopesAllowed.Match.ALL));
}
/** {@link #protect()} plus at least one of the given scopes. */
public Middleware requireAnyScope(String... scopes) {
return authorize(AuthPolicy.scopes(scopes, ScopesAllowed.Match.ANY));
}
// -- Policy enforcement ---------------------------------------------------
private void enforcePolicy(Map<String, Object> claims, AuthPolicy policy, Response res) {
checkRoles(claims, policy.requiredRoles());
checkScopes(claims, policy.requiredScopes(), policy.scopeMatch(), res);
}
private void checkRoles(Map<String, Object> claims, String[] required) {
if (required.length == 0) return;
if (rolesAllowed(claims, required)) return;
throw HttpException.forbidden();
}
private void checkScopes(Map<String, Object> claims, String[] required, ScopesAllowed.Match match,
Response res) {
if (required.length == 0) return;
if (scopesAllowed(claims, required, match)) return;
String challenge = source.insufficientScopeChallenge(required);
if (challenge != null) res.header("WWW-Authenticate", challenge);
throw HttpException.forbidden();
}
// -- Claim matching -------------------------------------------------------
boolean rolesAllowed(Map<String, Object> claims, String[] required) {
Object actual = valueAtPath(claims, roleClaimPathParts);
if (actual == null) return false;
for (String role : required) {
if (containsToken(actual, role)) return true;
}
return false;
}
boolean scopesAllowed(Map<String, Object> claims, String[] required, ScopesAllowed.Match match) {
if (match == ScopesAllowed.Match.ALL) {
for (String scope : required) {
if (!hasScope(claims, scope)) return false;
}
return true;
}
for (String scope : required) {
if (hasScope(claims, scope)) return true;
}
return false;
}
private boolean hasScope(Map<String, Object> claims, String scope) {
for (String[] pathParts : scopeClaimPathParts) {
Object value = valueAtPath(claims, pathParts);
if (value != null && containsToken(value, scope)) return true;
}
return false;
}
private static Object valueAtPath(Map<String, Object> claims, String[] pathParts) {
Object current = claims;
for (String part : pathParts) {
if (!(current instanceof Map<?, ?> map)) return null;
current = map.get(part);
if (current == null) return null;
}
return current;
}
private static boolean containsToken(Object source, String token) {
if (source instanceof String s) return containsDelimitedToken(s, token);
if (source instanceof List<?> list) {
for (Object item : list) {
if (item == null) continue;
if (tokenEquals(item.toString(), token)) return true;
}
return false;
}
if (source instanceof Object[] arr) {
for (Object item : arr) {
if (item == null) continue;
if (tokenEquals(item.toString(), token)) return true;
}
return false;
}
return tokenEquals(source.toString(), token);
}
private static boolean containsDelimitedToken(String value, String token) {
int len = value.length();
int i = 0;
while (i < len) {
while (i < len && isScopeDelimiter(value.charAt(i))) i++;
int start = i;
while (i < len && !isScopeDelimiter(value.charAt(i))) i++;
int end = i;
if (end > start && end - start == token.length() && value.regionMatches(start, token, 0, token.length())) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
private static boolean tokenEquals(String value, String token) {
int start = 0;
int end = value.length();
while (start < end && Character.isWhitespace(value.charAt(start))) start++;
while (end > start && Character.isWhitespace(value.charAt(end - 1))) end--;
return end - start == token.length() && value.regionMatches(start, token, 0, token.length());
}
private static boolean isScopeDelimiter(char c) {
return c == ' ' || c == '\t' || c == '\n' || c == '\r' || c == ',';
}
private static String[] splitClaimPath(String path) {
if (path == null || path.isBlank()) {
throw new IllegalStateException("Claim path cannot be blank");
}
List<String> parts = new ArrayList<>(4);
int start = 0;
int len = path.length();
for (int i = 0; i <= len; i++) {
if (i == len || path.charAt(i) == '.') {
String p = path.substring(start, i).trim();
if (!p.isEmpty()) parts.add(p);
start = i + 1;
}
}
if (parts.isEmpty()) {
throw new IllegalStateException("Claim path cannot be blank");
}
return parts.toArray(String[]::new);
}
private static String[][] splitClaimPaths(String paths) {
String source = (paths == null || paths.isBlank()) ? "scope,scp" : paths;
List<String[]> out = new ArrayList<>(4);
int start = 0;
int len = source.length();
for (int i = 0; i <= len; i++) {
if (i == len || source.charAt(i) == ',') {
String raw = source.substring(start, i).trim();
if (!raw.isEmpty()) out.add(splitClaimPath(raw));
start = i + 1;
}
}
if (out.isEmpty()) {
return new String[][]{ splitClaimPath("scope"), splitClaimPath("scp") };
}
return out.toArray(String[][]::new);
}
}
@@ -1,98 +0,0 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.auth;
import java.util.LinkedHashSet;
import java.util.List;
/**
* Compiled authorization policy derived from handler annotations at mount time.
* Immutable and allocation-free on the request hot path.
*/
public final class AuthPolicy {
private static final String[] EMPTY = new String[0];
private static final AuthPolicy AUTH_REQUIRED = new AuthPolicy(
false, EMPTY, EMPTY, ScopesAllowed.Match.ALL);
private static final AuthPolicy AUTH_OPTIONAL = new AuthPolicy(
true, EMPTY, EMPTY, ScopesAllowed.Match.ALL);
private final boolean optionalAuth;
private final String[] requiredRoles;
private final String[] requiredScopes;
private final ScopesAllowed.Match scopeMatch;
private AuthPolicy(boolean optionalAuth,
String[] requiredRoles,
String[] requiredScopes,
ScopesAllowed.Match scopeMatch) {
this.optionalAuth = optionalAuth;
this.requiredRoles = requiredRoles;
this.requiredScopes = requiredScopes;
this.scopeMatch = scopeMatch;
}
public static AuthPolicy authenticated() { return AUTH_REQUIRED; }
public static AuthPolicy optional() { return AUTH_OPTIONAL; }
public static AuthPolicy rolesAny(String... roles) {
return new AuthPolicy(false, normalizeRequired("RolesAllowed", roles), EMPTY, ScopesAllowed.Match.ALL);
}
public static AuthPolicy scopes(String[] scopes, ScopesAllowed.Match match) {
return new AuthPolicy(false, EMPTY, normalizeRequired("ScopesAllowed", scopes), match);
}
public static AuthPolicy compileFromAnnotations(Class<?> handlerClass) {
Authenticated auth = handlerClass.getAnnotation(Authenticated.class);
RolesAllowed roles = handlerClass.getAnnotation(RolesAllowed.class);
ScopesAllowed scopes = handlerClass.getAnnotation(ScopesAllowed.class);
if (auth == null && roles == null && scopes == null) return null;
boolean optionalAuth = auth != null && auth.optional();
String[] requiredRoles = roles != null ? normalizeRequired("RolesAllowed", roles.value()) : EMPTY;
String[] requiredScopes = scopes != null ? normalizeRequired("ScopesAllowed", scopes.value()) : EMPTY;
ScopesAllowed.Match scopeMatch = scopes != null ? scopes.match() : ScopesAllowed.Match.ALL;
if (optionalAuth && (requiredRoles.length > 0 || requiredScopes.length > 0)) {
throw new IllegalStateException("@Authenticated(optional = true) cannot be combined with @RolesAllowed/@ScopesAllowed on "
+ handlerClass.getName());
}
return new AuthPolicy(optionalAuth, requiredRoles, requiredScopes, scopeMatch);
}
public static List<String> openApiScopesFor(Class<?> handlerClass) {
Authenticated auth = handlerClass.getAnnotation(Authenticated.class);
RolesAllowed roles = handlerClass.getAnnotation(RolesAllowed.class);
ScopesAllowed scopes = handlerClass.getAnnotation(ScopesAllowed.class);
if (auth == null && roles == null && scopes == null) return null;
if (scopes == null) return List.of();
return List.of(normalizeRequired("ScopesAllowed", scopes.value()));
}
public boolean optionalAuth() { return optionalAuth; }
public String[] requiredRoles() { return requiredRoles; }
public String[] requiredScopes() { return requiredScopes; }
public ScopesAllowed.Match scopeMatch() { return scopeMatch; }
private static String[] normalizeRequired(String annotation, String[] values) {
if (values == null || values.length == 0)
throw new IllegalStateException("@" + annotation + " requires at least one value");
LinkedHashSet<String> normalized = new LinkedHashSet<>(values.length);
for (String raw : values) {
if (raw == null) continue;
String trimmed = raw.trim();
if (!trimmed.isEmpty()) normalized.add(trimmed);
}
if (normalized.isEmpty())
throw new IllegalStateException("@" + annotation + " requires at least one non-empty value");
return normalized.toArray(String[]::new);
}
}
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.auth;
import java.lang.annotation.ElementType;
import java.lang.annotation.Retention;
import java.lang.annotation.RetentionPolicy;
import java.lang.annotation.Target;
/**
* Marks a handler as requiring an authenticated caller. Any credential a registered source
* accepts is enough — no role or scope check is performed.
*
* <p>For role-based access use {@link RolesAllowed} instead (it implies authentication).
*
* <p>Set {@code optional = true} on public routes that personalise their response when the caller
* happens to be signed in but should remain reachable by guests. The middleware populates
* {@link ClaimsHolder} when a credential is present and silently skips it otherwise — the request
* is never rejected.
*
* <pre>{@code
* // Hard auth — 401 or a redirect when unauthenticated:
* @Route(method = HttpMethod.GET, path = "/api/profile")
* @Authenticated
* public class GetProfile extends JacksonHandler { ... }
*
* // Soft auth — guest-friendly, ClaimsHolder populated only when signed in:
* @Route(method = HttpMethod.GET, path = "/")
* @Authenticated(optional = true)
* public class HomePage extends HtmlHandler { ... }
* }</pre>
*/
@Retention(RetentionPolicy.RUNTIME)
@Target(ElementType.TYPE)
public @interface Authenticated {
/**
* When {@code true} the middleware never rejects unauthenticated requests — it only
* populates {@link ClaimsHolder} when valid credentials are present.
* Defaults to {@code false} (hard authentication required).
*/
boolean optional() default false;
}
@@ -1,230 +0,0 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.auth;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.ArrayList;
/**
* A typed view over one request's claims — whatever the {@link CredentialSource} that
* authenticated it produced. Obtained from {@link ClaimsHolder#current()}.
*
* <p>The accessors name claim <em>keys</em>, not a protocol: {@code sub} is RFC 7519, and
* {@code email}, {@code name} and {@code preferred_username} are spelled the same way by every
* token issuer worth integrating. A source that uses different keys exposes them through
* {@link #claim(String)} or {@link #roles(String)}.
*
* <pre>{@code
* app.get("/api/whoami", (req, res) -> {
* Claims c = ClaimsHolder.current();
* return Map.of("sub", c.sub(), "email", c.email(), "roles", c.roles("realm_access.roles"));
* }, auth.protect());
* }</pre>
*/
public final class Claims {
private final Map<String, Object> claims;
Claims(Map<String, Object> claims) {
this.claims = claims;
}
// ── Common claims ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/** Subject identifier — the stable, unique id of the caller. */
public String sub() { return str("sub"); }
/** User's email address ({@code email} claim). */
public String email() { return str("email"); }
/** Human-readable username ({@code preferred_username} claim). */
public String username() { return str("preferred_username"); }
/** Full display name ({@code name} claim). */
public String name() { return str("name"); }
// ── Roles ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* Extracts the roles list by traversing a dot-separated claim path.
*
* <p>Example paths:
* <ul>
* <li>{@code "realm_access.roles"} — Keycloak realm roles</li>
* <li>{@code "resource_access.my-client.roles"} — Keycloak client roles</li>
* <li>{@code "groups"} — Authelia / generic IdPs</li>
* </ul>
*
* @return list of role strings, or an empty list if the path doesn't exist
*/
@SuppressWarnings("unchecked")
public List<String> roles(String claimPath) {
String[] parts = claimPath.split("\\.");
Object current = claims;
for (String part : parts) {
if (!(current instanceof Map<?, ?> m)) return List.of();
current = m.get(part);
}
if (current instanceof List<?> list)
return list.stream().map(Object::toString).toList();
return List.of();
}
/** Returns {@code true} if the user holds {@code role} at the given claim path. */
public boolean hasRole(String claimPath, String role) {
return roles(claimPath).contains(role);
}
// -- Scopes ---------------------------------------------------------------
/**
* Resolves scopes using the conventional fallback order:
* {@code scope} then {@code scp}. Supports both space-separated string and list forms.
*/
public List<String> scopes() {
return scopes("scope,scp");
}
/**
* Resolves scopes from comma-separated claim paths (example: {@code "scope,scp,permissions.scopes"}).
*/
public List<String> scopes(String claimPaths) {
List<String> out = new ArrayList<>();
for (String[] path : splitClaimPaths(claimPaths)) {
Object value = valueAtPath(path);
if (value == null) continue;
if (value instanceof String s) {
appendDelimitedTokens(out, s);
continue;
}
if (value instanceof List<?> list) {
for (Object item : list) {
if (item == null) continue;
String token = item.toString().trim();
if (!token.isEmpty()) out.add(token);
}
continue;
}
String token = value.toString().trim();
if (!token.isEmpty()) out.add(token);
}
return out.isEmpty() ? List.of() : List.copyOf(out);
}
/** Returns {@code true} if the user has {@code scope}, searching default claim paths {@code scope,scp}. */
public boolean hasScope(String scope) {
return hasScope("scope,scp", scope);
}
/** Returns {@code true} if the user has {@code scope} in any of {@code claimPaths}. */
public boolean hasScope(String claimPaths, String scope) {
if (scope == null || scope.isBlank()) return false;
String target = scope.trim();
for (String[] path : splitClaimPaths(claimPaths)) {
Object value = valueAtPath(path);
if (value == null) continue;
if (value instanceof String s && containsDelimitedToken(s, target)) return true;
if (value instanceof List<?> list) {
for (Object item : list) {
if (item == null) continue;
if (target.equals(item.toString().trim())) return true;
}
continue;
}
if (target.equals(value.toString().trim())) return true;
}
return false;
}
// ── Arbitrary claim access ─────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* Returns the value of any claim, cast to {@code T}.
*
* @throws ClassCastException if the stored value is not assignable to {@code type}
*/
public <T> T claim(String key, Class<T> type) {
return type.cast(claims.get(key));
}
/** Returns the raw claim value, or {@code null} if absent. */
public Object claim(String key) { return claims.get(key); }
/** Escape hatch — returns the full unmodified claims map. */
public Map<String, Object> claims() { return claims; }
// ── Internals ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
private String str(String key) {
Object v = claims.get(key);
return v != null ? v.toString() : null;
}
private Object valueAtPath(String[] path) {
Object current = claims;
for (String part : path) {
if (!(current instanceof Map<?, ?> m)) return null;
current = m.get(part);
if (current == null) return null;
}
return current;
}
private static String[][] splitClaimPaths(String claimPaths) {
String source = (claimPaths == null || claimPaths.isBlank()) ? "scope,scp" : claimPaths;
List<String[]> out = new ArrayList<>(4);
int start = 0;
int len = source.length();
for (int i = 0; i <= len; i++) {
if (i == len || source.charAt(i) == ',') {
String raw = source.substring(start, i).trim();
if (!raw.isEmpty()) out.add(splitPath(raw));
start = i + 1;
}
}
return out.isEmpty() ? new String[][]{ splitPath("scope"), splitPath("scp") } : out.toArray(String[][]::new);
}
private static String[] splitPath(String path) {
List<String> out = new ArrayList<>(4);
int start = 0;
int len = path.length();
for (int i = 0; i <= len; i++) {
if (i == len || path.charAt(i) == '.') {
String raw = path.substring(start, i).trim();
if (!raw.isEmpty()) out.add(raw);
start = i + 1;
}
}
return out.isEmpty() ? new String[]{ path } : out.toArray(String[]::new);
}
private static void appendDelimitedTokens(List<String> target, String source) {
int len = source.length();
int i = 0;
while (i < len) {
while (i < len && isDelimiter(source.charAt(i))) i++;
int start = i;
while (i < len && !isDelimiter(source.charAt(i))) i++;
if (i > start) target.add(source.substring(start, i));
}
}
private static boolean containsDelimitedToken(String source, String token) {
int len = source.length();
int i = 0;
while (i < len) {
while (i < len && isDelimiter(source.charAt(i))) i++;
int start = i;
while (i < len && !isDelimiter(source.charAt(i))) i++;
int end = i;
if (end > start && end - start == token.length() && source.regionMatches(start, token, 0, token.length())) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
private static boolean isDelimiter(char c) {
return c == ' ' || c == '\t' || c == '\n' || c == '\r' || c == ',';
}
}
@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.auth;
import java.util.Map;
/**
* The current request's claims, published by {@link AuthMiddleware} before the handler runs and
* cleared in a {@code finally} afterwards.
*
* <p>Safe with virtual threads: each request gets its own, so a {@link ThreadLocal} is naturally
* isolated per request.
*
* <p>Writing is deliberately not public. A {@link CredentialSource} returns claims and the
* middleware publishes them, so no code outside this module can put claims on a request that did
* not carry them.
*
* <pre>{@code
* // Inside any handler behind @Authenticated or @RolesAllowed:
* Claims caller = ClaimsHolder.current();
* String email = caller.email();
* List<String> roles = caller.roles("realm_access.roles");
*
* // Raw escape hatch:
* Map<String, Object> all = ClaimsHolder.map();
* }</pre>
*/
public final class ClaimsHolder {
private static final ThreadLocal<Map<String, Object>> HOLDER = new ThreadLocal<>();
private ClaimsHolder() {}
/** Called by {@link AuthMiddleware} once a source has authenticated the request. */
static void set(Map<String, Object> claims) {
HOLDER.set(claims);
}
/** Called by {@link AuthMiddleware} in the {@code finally} block. */
static void clear() {
HOLDER.remove();
}
/**
* A typed view of the current request's claims, or {@code null} when the route carries no
* authentication middleware or the caller is anonymous under
* {@link Authenticated}{@code (optional = true)}.
*/
public static Claims current() {
Map<String, Object> claims = HOLDER.get();
return claims != null ? new Claims(claims) : null;
}
/** The raw claims map for the current request, or {@code null}. @see #current() */
public static Map<String, Object> map() {
return HOLDER.get();
}
/** A single claim as a String, or {@code null} when absent or the caller is anonymous. */
public static String claim(String key) {
Map<String, Object> claims = HOLDER.get();
if (claims == null) return null;
Object v = claims.get(key);
return v != null ? v.toString() : null;
}
}
@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.auth;
import dev.relism.flash.exceptions.HttpException;
import dev.relism.flash.models.Request;
import dev.relism.flash.models.Response;
import java.util.Map;
/**
* Turns whatever a request carries — a bearer token, a session cookie, an API key — into the
* claims authorization runs on. One is installed per authentication mechanism;
* {@code flash-ext-auth-oidc} contributes the OpenID Connect one.
*
* <p>Implementations never touch {@link ClaimsHolder}: they produce claims and {@link
* AuthMiddleware} publishes them for the duration of the request. Nothing outside this module can
* inject claims into a request, which is the point.
*/
public interface CredentialSource {
/**
* Resolves the caller's claims, rejecting the request when it cannot.
*
* <p>Three outcomes, and the difference between the last two matters:
* <ul>
* <li>claims — the caller presented a valid credential;</li>
* <li>{@code null} — no credential was presented and this source has already answered the
* request itself (typically a redirect into a sign-in flow). The middleware stops and
* writes nothing more;</li>
* <li>{@link HttpException} — a credential <em>was</em> presented and is invalid. The source
* sets any challenge header it owes the caller before throwing.</li>
* </ul>
*/
Map<String, Object> authenticate(Request req, Response res);
/**
* Resolves claims without ever rejecting: {@code null} when no valid credential is present.
* Backs {@link Authenticated}{@code (optional = true)}, where an anonymous caller is a normal
* outcome rather than a failure.
*/
Map<String, Object> peek(Request req);
/**
* The {@code WWW-Authenticate} value to send with a 403 caused by missing scopes, or
* {@code null} when this source has no such concept. Only consulted after authentication has
* already succeeded.
*/
default String insufficientScopeChallenge(String[] requiredScopes) { return null; }
}
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.auth;
import java.util.Optional;
import java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentHashMap;
/**
* Thread-safe in-memory {@link SessionStore}.
*
* <p>Sessions are lost on restart and not shared across instances. For
* production deployments with multiple nodes or restart-persistence requirements,
* supply another implementation to whichever {@link CredentialSource} owns the session.
*/
public final class InMemorySessionStore implements SessionStore {
private final ConcurrentHashMap<String, Session> store = new ConcurrentHashMap<>();
@Override public void save(Session s) { store.put(s.id(), s); }
@Override public Optional<Session> find(String id) { return Optional.ofNullable(store.get(id)); }
@Override public void delete(String id) { store.remove(id); }
}
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.auth;
import java.lang.annotation.ElementType;
import java.lang.annotation.Retention;
import java.lang.annotation.RetentionPolicy;
import java.lang.annotation.Target;
/**
* Restricts a handler to callers holding at least one of the named roles. Authentication is
* implied — there is no need to combine it with {@link Authenticated}.
*
* <p>Roles are read from the claim path the installed credential source is configured with
* (Keycloak's is {@code realm_access.roles}; many providers use a flat {@code roles} or
* {@code groups}). Nested paths use dot notation.
*
* <pre>{@code
* @Route(method = HttpMethod.DELETE, path = "/api/admin/blogs/{id}")
* @RolesAllowed("admin")
* public class DeleteBlog extends JacksonHandler { ... }
*
* // Multiple accepted roles (OR semantics — any one is sufficient):
* @RolesAllowed({"admin", "editor"})
* public class UpdateBlog extends JacksonHandler { ... }
* }</pre>
*/
@Retention(RetentionPolicy.RUNTIME)
@Target(ElementType.TYPE)
public @interface RolesAllowed {
/** One or more role names. Access is granted if the caller has any of them. */
String[] value();
}
@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.auth;
import java.lang.annotation.ElementType;
import java.lang.annotation.Retention;
import java.lang.annotation.RetentionPolicy;
import java.lang.annotation.Target;
/**
* Restricts a handler to callers whose credential carries the required scopes.
* Authentication is implicitly required.
*
* <p>Scopes are resolved from the configured claim paths in
* {@link AuthConfig#scopeClaimPaths()} (default: {@code "scope,scp"}) and support
* both standard formats:
* <ul>
* <li>{@code scope}: space-separated string</li>
* <li>{@code scp}: string list (or string)</li>
* </ul>
*
* <pre>{@code
* @Route(method = HttpMethod.GET, path = "/api/orders")
* @ScopesAllowed("orders:read")
* public class ListOrders extends JacksonHandler { ... }
*
* @Route(method = HttpMethod.POST, path = "/api/orders")
* @ScopesAllowed(value = {"orders:write", "payments:write"}, match = ScopesAllowed.Match.ANY)
* public class CreateOrder extends JacksonHandler { ... }
* }</pre>
*/
@Retention(RetentionPolicy.RUNTIME)
@Target(ElementType.TYPE)
public @interface ScopesAllowed {
/** Required scopes. */
String[] value();
/** Matching mode for {@link #value()}. */
Match match() default Match.ALL;
enum Match {
/** Any one required scope is sufficient. */
ANY,
/** All required scopes must be present. */
ALL
}
}
@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.auth;
import java.time.Instant;
import java.util.Map;
/**
* A signed-in caller's server-side session — saved in a {@link SessionStore} and looked up by a
* cookie on every request.
*
* <p>Immutable: renewing one produces a new instance that replaces the old under the same
* {@link #id()}.
*
* <p>{@link #attributes()} is whatever the {@link CredentialSource} needs to keep alongside the
* claims and nothing this module interprets — OpenID Connect stores its access, id and refresh
* tokens there so that renewal is its business rather than core's.
*/
public final class Session {
/** Renew this far before the real expiry, so a session cannot lapse mid-request. */
private static final long EAGER_RENEWAL_SECONDS = 30;
private final String id;
private final Map<String, Object> claims;
private final Instant expiresAt;
private final Map<String, Object> attributes;
public Session(String id, Map<String, Object> claims, Instant expiresAt,
Map<String, Object> attributes) {
this.id = id;
this.claims = Map.copyOf(claims);
this.expiresAt = expiresAt;
this.attributes = attributes == null ? Map.of() : Map.copyOf(attributes);
}
/** True once the session is within {@value #EAGER_RENEWAL_SECONDS} seconds of expiring. */
public boolean isExpired() {
return Instant.now().isAfter(expiresAt.minusSeconds(EAGER_RENEWAL_SECONDS));
}
/** One attribute, or {@code null} when the source never stored it. */
public Object attribute(String key) { return attributes.get(key); }
/** One attribute as a String, or {@code null}. */
public String attributeAsString(String key) {
Object v = attributes.get(key);
return v != null ? v.toString() : null;
}
public String id() { return id; }
public Map<String, Object> claims() { return claims; }
public Instant expiresAt() { return expiresAt; }
public Map<String, Object> attributes() { return attributes; }
}
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.auth;
import java.util.Optional;
/**
* Where {@link Session}s live between requests. {@link InMemorySessionStore} is the default;
* supply another for Redis, JDBC, or anything that survives a restart or spans instances.
*/
public interface SessionStore {
void save(Session session);
Optional<Session> find(String sessionId);
void delete(String sessionId);
}
@@ -1,94 +0,0 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.auth;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import java.util.List;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;
class AuthPolicyTest {
static class PlainHandler {}
@Authenticated
static class AuthenticatedHandler {}
@Authenticated(optional = true)
static class OptionalHandler {}
@RolesAllowed({"admin", " editor ", "admin"})
static class RolesHandler {}
@ScopesAllowed(value = {"orders:write", " payments:write ", "orders:write"}, match = ScopesAllowed.Match.ANY)
static class ScopesHandler {}
@Authenticated
@RolesAllowed("admin")
@ScopesAllowed(value = {"orders:read", "payments:read"}, match = ScopesAllowed.Match.ALL)
static class CombinedHandler {}
@Authenticated(optional = true)
@ScopesAllowed("orders:read")
static class InvalidOptionalHandler {}
@Test
void compileFromAnnotations_noSecurityAnnotations_returnsNull() {
assertNull(AuthPolicy.compileFromAnnotations(PlainHandler.class));
}
@Test
void compileFromAnnotations_authenticated_createsRequiredAuthPolicy() {
AuthPolicy policy = AuthPolicy.compileFromAnnotations(AuthenticatedHandler.class);
assertNotNull(policy);
assertFalse(policy.optionalAuth());
assertEquals(0, policy.requiredRoles().length);
assertEquals(0, policy.requiredScopes().length);
}
@Test
void compileFromAnnotations_optionalAuth_createsOptionalPolicy() {
AuthPolicy policy = AuthPolicy.compileFromAnnotations(OptionalHandler.class);
assertNotNull(policy);
assertTrue(policy.optionalAuth());
}
@Test
void compileFromAnnotations_rolesAndScopes_areNormalizedAndMerged() {
AuthPolicy policy = AuthPolicy.compileFromAnnotations(CombinedHandler.class);
assertNotNull(policy);
assertFalse(policy.optionalAuth());
assertArrayEquals(new String[]{"admin"}, policy.requiredRoles());
assertArrayEquals(new String[]{"orders:read", "payments:read"}, policy.requiredScopes());
assertEquals(ScopesAllowed.Match.ALL, policy.scopeMatch());
}
@Test
void compileFromAnnotations_scopesAny_preservesMatchModeAndDedupes() {
AuthPolicy policy = AuthPolicy.compileFromAnnotations(ScopesHandler.class);
assertNotNull(policy);
assertArrayEquals(new String[]{"orders:write", "payments:write"}, policy.requiredScopes());
assertEquals(ScopesAllowed.Match.ANY, policy.scopeMatch());
}
@Test
void compileFromAnnotations_optionalCannotBeCombinedWithConstraints() {
assertThrows(IllegalStateException.class,
() -> AuthPolicy.compileFromAnnotations(InvalidOptionalHandler.class));
}
@Test
void openApiScopesFor_returnsScopesWhenPresent() {
assertEquals(List.of("orders:write", "payments:write"),
AuthPolicy.openApiScopesFor(ScopesHandler.class));
}
@Test
void openApiScopesFor_rolesOnly_returnsEmptyList() {
assertEquals(List.of(), AuthPolicy.openApiScopesFor(RolesHandler.class));
}
@Test
void openApiScopesFor_noSecurity_returnsNull() {
assertNull(AuthPolicy.openApiScopesFor(PlainHandler.class));
}
}
@@ -1,209 +0,0 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.auth;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import java.util.Arrays;
import java.util.HashMap;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Map;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertFalse;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertThrows;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertTrue;
/**
* Characterisation tests for claim matching — the part of authorization that has nothing to do
* with OIDC: given a claims map, does the caller hold a role or a scope.
*
* <p>Written to pin the <em>current</em> behaviour, including the edges that are easy to change by
* accident: which characters separate scopes in a string claim, whether a list entry is trimmed
* before comparison, what an empty requirement means under each match mode, and how a claim path
* that walks into a non-map resolves. Every assertion here reflects what the code does today, not
* what it arguably should do.
*/
class ClaimMatchingTest {
/** No credential source: every assertion here is about claims that are already resolved. */
private static AuthMiddleware middleware(String rolesPath, String scopePaths) {
return new AuthMiddleware(AuthConfig.builder()
.rolesClaimPath(rolesPath)
.scopeClaimPaths(scopePaths)
.build(), null);
}
private static AuthMiddleware middleware() {
return middleware("realm_access.roles", "scope,scp");
}
// ── Claim path traversal ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
@Test
void aPathWalksNestedMaps() {
Map<String, Object> claims = Map.of("a", Map.of("b", Map.of("c", List.of("x"))));
assertTrue(middleware("a.b.c", "scope").rolesAllowed(claims, new String[]{"x"}));
}
@Test
void aPathThatWalksIntoANonMapResolvesToNothing() {
// "a" is a string, so "a.b" has nowhere to go — not an error, just no match.
Map<String, Object> claims = Map.of("a", "not-a-map");
assertFalse(middleware("a.b", "scope").rolesAllowed(claims, new String[]{"anything"}));
}
@Test
void aMissingPathResolvesToNothing() {
assertFalse(middleware().rolesAllowed(Map.of("other", "value"), new String[]{"admin"}));
}
@Test
void emptySegmentsInAPathAreSkipped() {
// "realm_access..roles" collapses to the same two segments.
Map<String, Object> claims = Map.of("realm_access", Map.of("roles", List.of("admin")));
assertTrue(middleware("realm_access..roles", "scope").rolesAllowed(claims, new String[]{"admin"}));
}
@Test
void segmentsAreTrimmed() {
Map<String, Object> claims = Map.of("realm_access", Map.of("roles", List.of("admin")));
assertTrue(middleware(" realm_access . roles ", "scope").rolesAllowed(claims, new String[]{"admin"}));
}
@Test
void aBlankRolesPathIsRejectedAtConstruction() {
assertThrows(IllegalStateException.class, () -> middleware(" ", "scope"));
}
@Test
void aNullClaimValueResolvesToNothing() {
Map<String, Object> nested = new HashMap<>();
nested.put("roles", null);
Map<String, Object> claims = Map.of("realm_access", nested);
assertFalse(middleware().rolesAllowed(claims, new String[]{"admin"}));
}
// ── Roles: ANY semantics ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
@Test
void anyOneOfTheRequiredRolesIsEnough() {
Map<String, Object> claims = Map.of("realm_access", Map.of("roles", List.of("user")));
assertTrue(middleware().rolesAllowed(claims, new String[]{"admin", "user"}));
assertFalse(middleware().rolesAllowed(claims, new String[]{"admin", "ops"}));
}
@Test
void requiringNoRoleAtAllMatchesNothing() {
// The loop never runs, so the answer is false even when the claim is present.
Map<String, Object> claims = Map.of("realm_access", Map.of("roles", List.of("admin")));
assertFalse(middleware().rolesAllowed(claims, new String[0]));
}
// ── What counts as "contains" ────────────────────────────────────────────
@Test
void aListClaimMatchesEntrywiseAndTrimsEachEntry() {
Map<String, Object> claims = Map.of("realm_access", Map.of("roles", List.of(" admin ", "user")));
assertTrue(middleware().rolesAllowed(claims, new String[]{"admin"}));
}
@Test
void aListEntryIsNeverSplitOnDelimiters() {
// Unlike a string claim, a list entry is compared whole: "a b" is one role named "a b".
Map<String, Object> claims = Map.of("realm_access", Map.of("roles", List.of("a b")));
assertFalse(middleware().rolesAllowed(claims, new String[]{"a"}));
assertTrue(middleware().rolesAllowed(claims, new String[]{"a b"}));
}
@Test
void nullEntriesInAListAreSkipped() {
Map<String, Object> claims = Map.of("realm_access",
Map.of("roles", Arrays.asList(null, "admin")));
assertTrue(middleware().rolesAllowed(claims, new String[]{"admin"}));
}
@Test
void anArrayClaimBehavesLikeAList() {
Map<String, Object> claims = Map.of("realm_access",
Map.of("roles", (Object) new String[]{"admin", "user"}));
assertTrue(middleware().rolesAllowed(claims, new String[]{"user"}));
}
@Test
void aScalarClaimIsComparedWhole() {
Map<String, Object> claims = Map.of("realm_access", Map.of("roles", 42));
assertTrue(middleware().rolesAllowed(claims, new String[]{"42"}));
}
@Test
void aStringClaimIsSplitOnSpacesTabsNewlinesAndCommas() {
for (String separator : List.of(" ", "\t", "\n", "\r", ",")) {
Map<String, Object> claims = Map.of("realm_access",
Map.of("roles", "admin" + separator + "user"));
assertTrue(middleware().rolesAllowed(claims, new String[]{"user"}),
"separator " + separator.strip().isEmpty() + " should split the claim");
}
}
@Test
void aStringClaimDoesNotMatchAPrefixOrASubstring() {
Map<String, Object> claims = Map.of("realm_access", Map.of("roles", "administrator"));
assertFalse(middleware().rolesAllowed(claims, new String[]{"admin"}));
}
@Test
void repeatedDelimitersProduceNoEmptyTokens() {
Map<String, Object> claims = Map.of("realm_access", Map.of("roles", " ,, admin ,, "));
assertTrue(middleware().rolesAllowed(claims, new String[]{"admin"}));
}
// ── Scopes: ALL vs ANY, across several claim paths ───────────────────────
@Test
void allRequiresEveryScope() {
Map<String, Object> claims = Map.of("scope", "openid orders:read");
assertTrue(middleware().scopesAllowed(claims, new String[]{"openid", "orders:read"}, ScopesAllowed.Match.ALL));
assertFalse(middleware().scopesAllowed(claims, new String[]{"openid", "orders:write"}, ScopesAllowed.Match.ALL));
}
@Test
void anyRequiresOne() {
Map<String, Object> claims = Map.of("scope", "openid");
assertTrue(middleware().scopesAllowed(claims, new String[]{"nope", "openid"}, ScopesAllowed.Match.ANY));
assertFalse(middleware().scopesAllowed(claims, new String[]{"nope", "neither"}, ScopesAllowed.Match.ANY));
}
@Test
void requiringNoScopeIsVacuouslyTrueUnderAllAndFalseUnderAny() {
// The asymmetry falls out of the loops and is load-bearing for @ScopesAllowed's validation,
// which rejects an empty value list before it can ever reach here.
Map<String, Object> claims = Map.of("scope", "openid");
assertTrue(middleware().scopesAllowed(claims, new String[0], ScopesAllowed.Match.ALL));
assertFalse(middleware().scopesAllowed(claims, new String[0], ScopesAllowed.Match.ANY));
}
@Test
void scopesAreLookedForInEveryConfiguredPathUntilOneMatches() {
AuthMiddleware mw = middleware("roles", "scope, scp , permissions.scopes");
Map<String, Object> claims = Map.of(
"scp", List.of("payments:write"),
"permissions", Map.of("scopes", "orders:approve"));
assertTrue(mw.scopesAllowed(claims, new String[]{"payments:write"}, ScopesAllowed.Match.ALL));
assertTrue(mw.scopesAllowed(claims, new String[]{"orders:approve"}, ScopesAllowed.Match.ALL));
// ALL is satisfied even when the two scopes come from different claims.
assertTrue(mw.scopesAllowed(claims,
new String[]{"payments:write", "orders:approve"}, ScopesAllowed.Match.ALL));
}
@Test
void blankScopePathsFallBackToScopeAndScp() {
AuthMiddleware mw = middleware("roles", " ");
assertTrue(mw.scopesAllowed(Map.of("scope", "a"), new String[]{"a"}, ScopesAllowed.Match.ALL));
assertTrue(mw.scopesAllowed(Map.of("scp", "b"), new String[]{"b"}, ScopesAllowed.Match.ALL));
}
@Test
void aScopePathListOfOnlySeparatorsFallsBackToScopeAndScp() {
AuthMiddleware mw = middleware("roles", " , , ");
assertTrue(mw.scopesAllowed(Map.of("scp", "b"), new String[]{"b"}, ScopesAllowed.Match.ALL));
}
}
@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.auth;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Map;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.*;
class ClaimsScopesTest {
@Test
void scopes_readsStandardScopeString() {
Claims user = new Claims(Map.of("scope", "openid profile orders:read"));
assertEquals(List.of("openid", "profile", "orders:read"), user.scopes());
assertTrue(user.hasScope("orders:read"));
assertFalse(user.hasScope("orders:write"));
}
@Test
void scopes_fallsBackToScpArray() {
Claims user = new Claims(Map.of("scp", List.of("orders:write", "payments:write")));
assertEquals(List.of("orders:write", "payments:write"), user.scopes());
assertTrue(user.hasScope("payments:write"));
}
@Test
void scopes_supportsCustomClaimPaths() {
Claims user = new Claims(Map.of("permissions", Map.of("scopes", List.of("a", "b"))));
assertEquals(List.of("a", "b"), user.scopes("permissions.scopes"));
assertTrue(user.hasScope("permissions.scopes", "a"));
assertFalse(user.hasScope("permissions.scopes", "x"));
}
@Test
void scopes_combinesMultipleClaimPathsInOrder() {
Claims user = new Claims(Map.of(
"scope", "openid",
"scp", List.of("profile", "orders:read")
));
assertEquals(List.of("openid", "profile", "orders:read"), user.scopes("scope,scp"));
}
}
@@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.auth;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import java.time.Instant;
import java.util.HashMap;
import java.util.Map;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertEquals;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertFalse;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertNull;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertThrows;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertTrue;
/**
* The two things a session has to get right: it reports itself expired early enough that it
* cannot lapse midway through a request, and it hands back what a credential source stored on it
* without interpreting any of it.
*/
class SessionTest {
private static Session at(Instant expiry, Map<String, Object> attributes) {
return new Session("s1", Map.of("sub", "u1"), expiry, attributes);
}
@Test
void aSessionIsExpiredWellBeforeItsDeadline() {
// The eager window is what stops a session from lapsing between the check and the handler.
assertFalse(at(Instant.now().plusSeconds(120), Map.of()).isExpired());
assertTrue(at(Instant.now().plusSeconds(10), Map.of()).isExpired());
assertTrue(at(Instant.now().minusSeconds(1), Map.of()).isExpired());
}
@Test
void attributesAreReturnedUninterpreted() {
Session session = at(Instant.now().plusSeconds(60), Map.of("oidc.id_token", "abc", "n", 7));
assertEquals("abc", session.attributeAsString("oidc.id_token"));
assertEquals("7", session.attributeAsString("n"));
assertEquals(7, session.attribute("n"));
assertNull(session.attributeAsString("absent"));
}
@Test
void aSessionWithoutAttributesIsUsableRatherThanNull() {
assertNull(at(Instant.now().plusSeconds(60), null).attributeAsString("anything"));
}
@Test
void claimsAndAttributesAreCopiedAndImmutable() {
Map<String, Object> mutable = new HashMap<>(Map.of("k", "v"));
Session session = at(Instant.now().plusSeconds(60), mutable);
mutable.put("k", "changed");
assertEquals("v", session.attributeAsString("k"));
assertThrows(UnsupportedOperationException.class, () -> session.attributes().put("x", "y"));
assertThrows(UnsupportedOperationException.class, () -> session.claims().put("x", "y"));
}
}
@@ -1,474 +0,0 @@
# flash-ext-auth-oidc
Full OIDC Authorization Code + PKCE flow for the Flash HTTP server.
Supports Keycloak, Authelia, Auth0, Google, and any RFC 8414-compliant provider.
Standards alignment focuses on OIDC Core + OAuth2 bearer APIs while preserving Flash's
hot-path model (middleware compiled at mount time, no heavy runtime work).
This extension is the OpenID Connect **credential source** for
[`flash-ext-auth-core`](../flash-ext-auth-core/docs/README.md), which owns everything downstream of
identifying the caller. Shorter guides live in [`docs/`](docs/README.md), including
[migration notes](docs/interop.md#migrating-from-flash-ext-oidc) from `flash-ext-oidc`.
## What it provides
| Component | Description |
|---|---|
| `GET {prefix}/login` | Starts the OIDC flow: builds the authorization URL with PKCE + state, redirects |
| `GET {prefix}/callback` | Exchanges the code, validates the ID token, creates a session, redirects |
| `POST {prefix}/logout` | Invalidates the session, redirects to the provider's `end_session_endpoint` |
| `OidcCredentialSource` | The `CredentialSource` this extension contributes to `flash-ext-auth-core` |
| `JwtValidator` | JWKS-backed JWT validator (PKCE + key rotation + caching) |
`@Authenticated`, `@RolesAllowed`, `@ScopesAllowed`, `AuthMiddleware`, `ClaimsHolder` and `Claims`
belong to [`flash-ext-auth-core`](../flash-ext-auth-core/docs/README.md) and work the same behind
any credential source. Installing this extension brings them in and wires them up — you do not
install auth-core yourself.
## Dependencies
```xml
<dependency>
<groupId>dev.relism</groupId>
<artifactId>flash-ext-auth-oidc</artifactId>
<version>2.1.0-SNAPSHOT</version>
</dependency>
```
Transitive: `flash-ext-auth-core`, `nimbus-jose-jwt`, `json-smart`.
Optional: `flash-ext-openapi` — if present, OIDC security schemes are added to the OpenAPI spec automatically.
## Installation
```java
FlashApp.create(8080)
.install(new JacksonExtension())
.install(new OpenApiExtension(...)) // optional — enables Swagger security
.install(new OidcExtension(
OidcConfig.builder(
"https://idp.example.com",
"my-client", "my-secret", "/auth/callback")
.build()
))
.start();
```
Install order is irrelevant. The two-phase extension model guarantees all services
(including `OpenApiSecurityRegistry` from `flash-ext-openapi`) are registered before
any extension's routes phase runs.
### Keycloak shortcut
```java
OidcConfig.keycloak(
"https://keycloak.example.com", // server URL (no realm)
"myrealm", // realm
"my-client", "my-secret", // client credentials
"/auth/callback") // redirect URI (server-relative)
.https() // behind TLS
.build()
```
`keycloak()` pre-sets `rolesClaimPath("realm_access.roles")` and constructs the issuer as
`{serverUrl}/realms/{realm}`.
### Authelia / generic IdP
```java
OidcConfig.builder("https://auth.example.com", "my-client", "secret", "/auth/callback")
.rolesClaimPath("groups")
.build()
```
## OidcConfig reference
### Required fields
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
| `issuer` | Provider base URL — also used for OIDC discovery |
| `clientId` | OAuth2 client ID |
| `clientSecret` | OAuth2 client secret |
| `redirectUri` | Callback URI; server-relative paths (starting with `/`) are resolved at request time |
### Builder options
| Method | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `.scopes("openid profile email")` | `"openid profile email"` | Space-separated requested scopes |
| `.routePrefix("/auth")` | `"/auth"` | Prefix for login/callback/logout routes |
| `.selfScheme("http")` | `"http"` | Scheme used when resolving server-relative redirect URIs |
| `.https()` | — | Shorthand for `.selfScheme("https")` |
| `.rolesClaimPath("realm_access.roles")` | `"realm_access.roles"` | Dot-path to the roles array in JWT claims |
| `.scopeClaimPaths("scope,scp")` | `"scope,scp"` | Comma-separated claim paths used to resolve OAuth scopes |
| `.algorithm("RS256")` | `"RS256"` | JWS algorithm for token validation |
| `.postLogoutRedirectUri("/")` | `"/"` | Where to redirect after logout |
| `.sessionStore(store)` | `InMemorySessionStore` | Custom session store (see below) |
| `.clientAuthMethod(ClientAuthMethod.POST)` | `POST` | `POST` = credentials in body; `BASIC` = `Authorization: Basic` |
| `.insecureTls()` | `false` | Disables TLS certificate verification — **development only** |
| `.schemeName("myscheme")` | derived from issuer | OpenAPI security scheme name |
### Environment variables (`OidcConfig.fromEnv()`)
```
OIDC_ISSUER required
OIDC_CLIENT_ID required
OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET required
OIDC_REDIRECT_URI required e.g. /auth/callback
OIDC_SCOPES default: openid profile email
OIDC_ROUTE_PREFIX default: /auth
OIDC_SELF_SCHEME default: http
OIDC_ROLES_CLAIM default: realm_access.roles
OIDC_SCOPE_CLAIMS default: scope,scp
OIDC_ALGORITHM default: RS256
OIDC_POST_LOGOUT_REDIRECT default: /
OIDC_CLIENT_AUTH_METHOD default: POST
```
## Protecting routes
### Class-based handlers (annotations)
```java
@Route(method = HttpMethod.GET, path = "/me")
@Authenticated
public class MePage extends JacksonHandler {
@Override
public Object handle(Request req, Response res) {
Claims u = ClaimsHolder.current();
return json(res, Map.of("sub", u.sub(), "email", u.email()));
}
}
@Route(method = HttpMethod.GET, path = "/admin")
@RolesAllowed("admin") // OR semantics: "admin" OR "superuser"
// @RolesAllowed({"admin", "superuser"})
public class AdminPage extends JacksonHandler { ... }
@Route(method = HttpMethod.POST, path = "/orders")
@ScopesAllowed("orders:write") // default = ALL semantics
public class CreateOrder extends JacksonHandler { ... }
@Route(method = HttpMethod.POST, path = "/payments")
@ScopesAllowed(value = {"payments:write", "payments:admin"}, match = ScopesAllowed.Match.ANY)
public class PayOrder extends JacksonHandler { ... }
@Route(method = HttpMethod.DELETE, path = "/admin/users/{id}")
@RolesAllowed("admin")
@ScopesAllowed("users:delete") // combined with AND semantics
public class DeleteUser extends JacksonHandler { ... }
```
The middleware is injected automatically by the annotation processor — no manual wiring needed.
Annotation composition rules:
- `@Authenticated` requires auth only
- `@RolesAllowed` implies authentication + role OR-check
- `@ScopesAllowed` implies authentication + scope check (`ALL`/`ANY`)
- combining `@RolesAllowed` + `@ScopesAllowed` uses AND semantics
- `@Authenticated(optional = true)` cannot be combined with role/scope constraints
### Lambda routes (manual middleware)
For lambda routes, pass the middleware as a varargs argument. Retrieve `AuthMiddleware`
from the context inside another extension's `routes()` phase, or after `start()`:
```java
AuthMiddleware auth = app.ctx().require(AuthMiddleware.class);
// Authentication only
app.get("/api/me", (req, res) -> {
Claims u = ClaimsHolder.current(); // never null here
return Map.of("sub", u.sub(), "email", u.email());
}, auth.protect());
// Authentication + role check
app.delete("/api/admin/users/{id}", (req, res) -> {
Claims u = ClaimsHolder.current();
// ...
}, auth.requireRole("admin"));
// Multiple roles (OR): passes if user holds any one of them
app.get("/api/reports", (req, res) -> { ... }, auth.requireRole("admin", "reports-viewer"));
// Require all listed scopes
app.post("/api/orders", (req, res) -> { ... }, auth.requireScopes("orders:write", "payments:write"));
// Require at least one listed scope
app.post("/api/payments", (req, res) -> { ... }, auth.requireAnyScope("payments:write", "payments:admin"));
```
`auth.protect()` / `auth.requireRole(...)` / `auth.requireScopes(...)` return a `Middleware` — a composable
`Handler → Handler` wrapper. Flash applies middleware right-to-left so the authentication check
runs before your handler.
## Accessing the authenticated user
`ClaimsHolder` holds the JWT claims for the current request in a `ThreadLocal`.
It is populated by `AuthMiddleware` — from `flash-ext-auth-core` — once this source has
authenticated the request, and cleared in the `finally` block afterward. Nothing outside that
module can write to it. It is safe with virtual threads (each request gets its
own virtual thread, so `ThreadLocal` values are naturally isolated).
### Claims (preferred)
```java
Claims u = ClaimsHolder.current(); // never null inside a protected handler
String sub = u.sub(); // unique user ID
String email = u.email();
String username = u.username(); // preferred_username
String name = u.name(); // full display name
// Roles — pass the dot-path matching your provider's claim structure
List<String> roles = u.roles("realm_access.roles"); // Keycloak realm roles
List<String> clientRoles = u.roles("resource_access.my-client.roles"); // Keycloak client roles
List<String> groups = u.roles("groups"); // Authelia
boolean isAdmin = u.hasRole("realm_access.roles", "admin");
// Scopes (OIDC/OAuth2 generic): checks "scope" then "scp"
List<String> scopes = u.scopes();
boolean canWrite = u.hasScope("orders:write");
// Custom claim path resolution (for provider-specific payloads)
List<String> customScopes = u.scopes("scope,scp,permissions.scopes");
boolean canApprove = u.hasScope("permissions.scopes", "orders:approve");
// Arbitrary claim
String locale = (String) u.claim("locale");
Long exp = u.claim("exp", Long.class);
// Full raw map (escape hatch)
Map<String, Object> all = u.claims();
```
### Raw access (escape hatch)
```java
Map<String, Object> claims = ClaimsHolder.map();
String email = ClaimsHolder.claim("email");
```
## Performance
The middleware adds negligible overhead on the hot path for authenticated requests:
| Step | Cost |
|---|---|
| `Authorization` header check | `O(1)` map lookup |
| Cookie parse | `O(cookie_length)` single pass scan |
| Session lookup | `O(1)` `ConcurrentHashMap.get()` |
| Token expiry check | `O(1)` `Instant` comparison |
| `ClaimsHolder.set()` | `O(1)` `ThreadLocal.set()` |
No network calls, no cryptography, no JSON parsing on the happy path (valid session).
JWKS key fetching only happens for Bearer token validation and is cached + rate-limited by
Nimbus's `JWKSourceBuilder`. Silent token refresh only triggers when the access token expires.
Role/scope claim paths are compiled once during middleware construction (mount time), not per request.
## Authentication flow details
On each request the middleware resolves credentials in this order:
1. **Bearer token** (`Authorization: Bearer <jwt>`) — validated against JWKS.
2. **Session cookie** (`oidc_session`) — looked up in the session store; transparently
refreshed if the access token is expired (silent refresh via refresh token).
3. **No valid credentials**:
- Browser clients (no `Accept: application/json`) → redirect to `{prefix}/login?redirect={path}`
- API clients → `401 Unauthorized`
### API error semantics (RFC 6750)
For API clients (`Accept: application/json`) the middleware includes `WWW-Authenticate`:
- missing credentials: `Bearer realm="<schemeName>"`
- invalid bearer token: `Bearer realm="<schemeName>", error="invalid_token"`
- insufficient scopes: `Bearer realm="<schemeName>", error="insufficient_scope", scope="<required scopes>"`
This enables interoperable client-side handling and proper OAuth2 challenge semantics.
### Token validation (OIDC Core §3.1.3.7)
| Check | Access token | ID token |
|---|---|---|
| Signature (JWKS) | yes | yes |
| `iss` | yes | yes |
| `aud` = clientId | no (varies by provider) | yes |
| `exp`, `iat`, `sub` | yes | yes |
| `nonce` | — | yes |
JWKS keys are cached, rate-limited, and retried on cache-miss (handles key rotation).
### Claim merge strategy
At callback time the extension merges access token + ID token claims:
- Access token claims first (contains provider-specific data like `realm_access.roles`)
- ID token claims override (contains verified identity: `sub`, `email`, `name`, …)
This is provider-agnostic: authorization claims live in the AT per RFC 9068,
identity claims live in the IT per OIDC Core.
## Standards & compliance notes
This extension is designed to be compliant with the most relevant OIDC/OAuth2 RFCs:
- RFC 8414 (Authorization Server Metadata): discovery via `/.well-known/openid-configuration`
- OpenID Connect Core 1.0: Authorization Code flow + PKCE + `nonce` validation on ID token
- RFC 7636 (PKCE): S256 challenge/verifier flow
- RFC 6750 (Bearer Token Usage): `WWW-Authenticate` challenges with standard error codes
- RFC 9068 (JWT Profile for Access Tokens): JWT bearer access-token validation path
- RFC 7519 / RFC 7517 / RFC 7515 family: JWT/JWK/JWS validation via Nimbus + JWKS caching/rotation
Provider interoperability details:
- scope extraction supports both standard forms: `scope` (space-delimited string) and `scp` (list/string)
- roles remain configurable via `rolesClaimPath` (`realm_access.roles`, `groups`, etc.)
- scope claim fallback chain is configurable via `scopeClaimPaths`
## Testing scopes with Keycloak
Quick path to test `@ScopesAllowed` end-to-end:
1. **Create a client scope**
- Realm -> Client scopes -> Create
- Name: `orders:write` (or any scope name you want to enforce)
2. **Attach it to your client**
- Clients -> `<your-client>` -> Client scopes
- Add the scope as `Default` (always in token) or `Optional` (requested via `scope` param)
3. **Ensure scope mapper reaches the token**
- For most Keycloak setups this is automatic via built-in `microprofile-jwt`/scope mappers
- Verify the access token contains either `scope` string or `scp` list
4. **Request the scope in Flash config**
- Include it in `OidcConfig.scopes(...)`, e.g. `"openid profile email orders:write"`
5. **Protect a handler**
- `@ScopesAllowed("orders:write")` on class-based handlers
- or `auth.requireScopes("orders:write")` for lambda routes
6. **Verify behavior**
- token with scope -> 200
- token without scope -> 403 + `WWW-Authenticate: ... insufficient_scope`
Useful token inspection flow while testing:
- Obtain a token from Keycloak
- Decode payload (`jwt.io` or local tool)
- check `scope` / `scp` claims
- call your protected endpoint and inspect status + `WWW-Authenticate`
## Session store
Sessions live in `flash-ext-auth-core`'s `Session`/`SessionStore`; this extension keeps its
access, id and refresh tokens in `Session.attributes()` under its own keys, so renewal stays here
and core carries no OAuth2 vocabulary. See
[`../flash-ext-auth-core/docs/sessions.md`](../flash-ext-auth-core/docs/sessions.md).
The default `InMemorySessionStore` is sufficient for single-instance deployments.
For clustered deployments, implement `SessionStore`:
```java
public interface SessionStore {
void save(Session session);
Optional<Session> find(String sessionId);
void delete(String sessionId);
}
```
```java
OidcConfig.builder(...)
.sessionStore(new RedisSessionStore(redisClient))
.build()
```
`Session` fields: `id`, `accessToken`, `idToken`, `refreshToken`, `expiresAt` (`Instant`), `claims` (merged map).
## Logout
Add a logout button anywhere in your UI — a `<form>` is sufficient (no JavaScript needed):
```html
<form method="POST" action="/auth/logout">
<button type="submit">Logout</button>
</form>
```
The `POST {prefix}/logout` handler:
1. Reads the `oidc_session` cookie, looks up the session, retrieves the `id_token`.
2. Deletes the local session and clears the cookie (`Max-Age=0`).
3. If the provider has an `end_session_endpoint` (standard IdPs do), redirects there with
`?id_token_hint=<idToken>&post_logout_redirect_uri=<postLogoutRedirectUri>` — this logs
the user out of the IdP as well.
4. Otherwise redirects to `postLogoutRedirectUri` (default: `/`).
## Bearer token (API clients)
For API-to-API or SPA-to-API calls, pass a Bearer access token directly. The middleware
validates the JWT signature against JWKS and extracts the claims — no session involved:
```
Authorization: Bearer <access_token>
```
The token must be a JWT (opaque tokens are not supported). Claims are available via
`ClaimsHolder.current()` as usual.
## Multi-tenant
Multiple OIDC providers on one server — each `OidcExtension` instance is fully independent
(its own PKCE state store, session store, validator, and middleware):
```java
OidcConfig tenantA = OidcConfig.builder("https://idp/realms/a", "clientA", "secretA", "/a/auth/callback")
.routePrefix("/a/auth").schemeName("tenantA").build();
OidcConfig tenantB = OidcConfig.builder("https://idp/realms/b", "clientB", "secretB", "/b/auth/callback")
.routePrefix("/b/auth").schemeName("tenantB").build();
app.install(new OidcExtension(tenantA))
.install(new OidcExtension(tenantB));
```
To reference a specific tenant's middleware on lambda routes, keep the extension instances
and retrieve `AuthMiddleware` from context after `start()`:
```java
OidcExtension extA = new OidcExtension(tenantA);
OidcExtension extB = new OidcExtension(tenantB);
FlashApp app = FlashApp.create(8080)
.install(extA)
.install(extB)
.start()
.join(); // wait for bind
AuthMiddleware mwA = app.ctx().require(AuthMiddleware.class); // last registered = tenantB
```
> **Note:** because both extensions register `AuthMiddleware.class` in the same context,
> only the last one wins under that key. For multi-tenant setups, use distinct context
> keys or provide middleware under a wrapper/alias type, or use lambda routes with explicit
> middleware captured from the extension instance before `install()`.
Class-based handlers annotated with `@Authenticated` / `@RolesAllowed` get the last
registered processor's middleware. For true multi-tenant class-based routing, install
tenant-specific annotation processors with different annotations.
## OpenAPI integration
If `flash-ext-openapi` is on the classpath and installed (order irrelevant),
the extension automatically:
- Adds a `components.securitySchemes` entry for the provider (OAuth2, authorizationCode flow)
- Adds `security` requirements to every operation whose handler carries `@Authenticated`
, `@RolesAllowed`, or `@ScopesAllowed`
No extra code needed. To customize the scheme name:
```java
OidcConfig.builder(...).schemeName("keycloak").build()
```
If `flash-ext-openapi` is absent the integration is silently skipped.
@@ -1,98 +0,0 @@
# flash-ext-auth-oidc
OpenID Connect for Flash: the authorization-code flow with PKCE, JWKS-validated bearer tokens,
server-side sessions with silent refresh, and single logout.
It is a **credential source** for [`flash-ext-auth-core`](../../flash-ext-auth-core/docs/README.md),
which owns everything downstream of "who is this caller" — `@Authenticated`, `@RolesAllowed`,
`@ScopesAllowed`, `ClaimsHolder`. Installing this extension installs that machinery too; you do not
install `flash-ext-auth-core` yourself.
## Quick start
```java
app.install(new OidcExtension(
OidcConfig.builder(
"https://keycloak.example.com/realms/myrealm",
"my-app", "secret", "/auth/callback")
.rolesClaimPath("realm_access.roles")
.https()
.build()));
```
That is the whole integration. Discovery runs at boot and fails fast if the issuer is unreachable,
so a misconfigured provider is a startup crash rather than a 500 on the first login.
`OidcConfig.fromEnv()` reads the same settings from `OIDC_*` environment variables, and
`OidcConfig.keycloak(serverUrl, realm, ...)` builds the issuer URL for you.
## What it registers
| | |
|---|---|
| `GET {prefix}/login` | Builds the authorization URL with PKCE + state and redirects |
| `GET {prefix}/callback` | Validates state and nonce, exchanges the code, creates the session |
| `POST {prefix}/logout` | Ends the session and redirects to the provider's end-session endpoint |
`{prefix}` is `routePrefix` (default `/auth`). Logout is a `POST` on purpose — a `GET` logout is
one `<img>` tag away from being triggered by any page the user visits.
In the context it provides `AuthMiddleware` (from auth-core), `OidcCredentialSource` and
`JwtValidator`.
## How a request is resolved
1. `Authorization: Bearer …` — validated against the issuer's JWKS.
2. `oidc_session` cookie — looked up in the `SessionStore`; if the access token has expired and a
refresh token is present, refreshed transparently and the session replaced.
3. Neither, and the client sent `Accept: application/json``401` with a
`WWW-Authenticate: Bearer` challenge.
4. Neither, and it looks like a browser → redirect to `{prefix}/login?redirect={path}`.
Points 3 and 4 are why the source distinguishes "no credential" from "bad credential": an API
client must not be redirected into an HTML sign-in page, and a browser must not be left staring at
a bare 401.
## Configuration
| Setting | Default | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| `issuer`, `clientId`, `clientSecret`, `redirectUri` | — | required |
| `scopes` | `openid profile email` | |
| `routePrefix` | `/auth` | |
| `selfScheme` | `http` | `https()` behind TLS; only used when no `X-Forwarded-Proto` |
| `rolesClaimPath` | `realm_access.roles` | Keycloak's spelling; `groups` for Authelia |
| `scopeClaimPaths` | `scope,scp` | comma-separated, tried in order |
| `algorithm` | `RS256` | |
| `postLogoutRedirectUri` | `/` | |
| `sessionStore` | `InMemorySessionStore` | swap for Redis/JDBC across instances |
| `clientAuthMethod` | `POST` | token endpoint client authentication |
| `insecureTls()` | off | dev only, skips certificate validation |
| `schemeName` | derived from the issuer | OpenAPI security scheme name |
A relative `redirectUri` (starting with `/`) is resolved per request against the incoming `Host`,
or `X-Forwarded-Host`/`-Proto` when behind a proxy — so one build works in dev and behind TLS
without a second configuration.
## Sessions
A session holds the claims plus the access, id and refresh tokens, the last three in
`Session.attributes()` under this extension's own keys. Core never reads them; renewal happens
here. See [`../../flash-ext-auth-core/docs/sessions.md`](../../flash-ext-auth-core/docs/sessions.md).
## Multiple providers
Two issuers on one server, each with its own route prefix:
```java
app.install(new OidcExtension(tenantAConfig)) // routePrefix("/tenantA/auth")
.install(new OidcExtension(tenantBConfig)); // routePrefix("/tenantB/auth")
```
Both are known at boot. Registering an issuer at runtime — a customer connecting their own IdP from
a settings page — is not supported.
## Interop
See [`interop.md`](interop.md) for how this extension fits with `flash-ext-auth-core`,
`flash-ext-openapi` and `flash-ext-mcp`.
@@ -1,88 +0,0 @@
# Interop
## flash-ext-auth-core
A hard dependency, and the reason this extension is as small as it is. The division:
| Here | `flash-ext-auth-core` |
|---|---|
| Discovery, JWKS, PKCE, token endpoint | `@Authenticated`, `@RolesAllowed`, `@ScopesAllowed` |
| `/login`, `/callback`, `/logout` | `ClaimsHolder`, `Claims` |
| Bearer and cookie resolution, refresh | Role and scope matching |
| RFC 6750 `WWW-Authenticate` challenges | `Session`, `SessionStore` |
`OidcExtension` builds an `OidcCredentialSource`, hands it to `AuthMiddleware.install(...)`, and
that publishes the middleware and registers the annotation processor. Everything a handler
annotation does is core's code running against claims this extension produced.
Consequence worth knowing: `@RolesAllowed` is not OIDC-specific and never was. An app that swaps
this extension for another credential source keeps every annotation it had.
## flash-ext-openapi
Optional, and resolved lazily so this extension runs standalone when openapi is not on the
classpath. When it is, an `OpenApiContributor` is registered that emits an `oauth2` security scheme
with the `authorizationCode` flow, filled in from the discovery document:
```json
"securitySchemes": {
"myrealm": {
"type": "oauth2",
"flows": { "authorizationCode": { "authorizationUrl": "…", "tokenUrl": "…", "scopes": {} } }
}
}
```
Per-operation security comes from the same annotations the middleware reads, so the spec and the
enforcement cannot drift: both call `AuthPolicy.compileFromAnnotations`.
The scheme name is `schemeName`, derived from the last path segment of the issuer (a Keycloak realm
name, usually) unless set explicitly.
## flash-ext-mcp
`McpSecurity` asks whether **this** extension is installed — `ctx.find(OidcCredentialSource.class)`
— and not merely whether something authenticates:
| Policy | this extension installed | absent |
|---|---|---|
| `REQUIRED` | protected | **boot fails** |
| `AUTO` | protected | unprotected, warning logged |
| `NONE` | never protected | unprotected |
That distinction is deliberate. `REQUIRED` means "a real OAuth2 authorization server is protecting
this endpoint", because everything it turns on — RFC 9728 Protected Resource Metadata, RFC 8707
audience binding, `WWW-Authenticate` challenges carrying `resource_metadata` — is meaningless
without an issuer. An app that authenticates some other way must not satisfy it by accident.
When it is installed, `McpOidcIntegration` derives the whole resource-server configuration from the
source with no extra `McpConfig` calls:
- the MCP route is wrapped with `authMw.withSource(source.withResourceMetadata(path)).protect()`
the same validation every other route uses, plus the `resource_metadata` challenge parameter;
- an audience guard runs after it and rejects any token whose `aud` does not include this
endpoint's resource identifier;
- the resource identifier is resolved per request from `X-Forwarded-Host`/`-Proto`, or the `Host`
header and `selfScheme`.
An app that does **not** use OAuth2 can still guard `/mcp`: set `McpSecurity.NONE` and pass its own
guard to `McpConfig.middleware(...)`.
## Migrating from flash-ext-oidc
The module was renamed and its generic half moved. Mechanically:
| Was | Now |
|---|---|
| `flash-ext-oidc` (artifact) | `flash-ext-auth-oidc` |
| `dev.relism.flash.ext.oidc.Authenticated` (and `RolesAllowed`, `ScopesAllowed`) | `dev.relism.flash.ext.auth.…` |
| `OidcMiddleware` | `AuthMiddleware` (`dev.relism.flash.ext.auth`) |
| `ctx.find(OidcMiddleware.class)` | `ctx.find(AuthMiddleware.class)` |
| `OidcUser` | `Claims` |
| `ClaimsHolder.user()` | `ClaimsHolder.current()` |
| `ClaimsHolder.get()` | `ClaimsHolder.map()` |
| `OidcSession`, `OidcSessionStore`, `InMemoryOidcSessionStore` | `Session`, `SessionStore`, `InMemorySessionStore` |
| `session.isAccessTokenExpired()` | `session.isExpired()` |
| `session.idToken()` | `session.attributeAsString(OidcCredentialSource.ID_TOKEN)` |
`OidcConfig`, `OidcExtension` and every setting on them are unchanged.
@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.oidc;
/**
* OAuth2 client authentication method for the token endpoint (RFC 6749 §2.3).
*
* <ul>
* <li>{@link #POST} — credentials sent as {@code client_id} / {@code client_secret}
* form fields (default; most providers).</li>
* <li>{@link #BASIC} — credentials sent as an {@code Authorization: Basic} header;
* body contains only grant-specific parameters.</li>
* </ul>
*/
public enum ClientAuthMethod {
/** {@code client_secret_post} — credentials in the request body. */
POST,
/** {@code client_secret_basic} — credentials in the {@code Authorization} header. */
BASIC
}
@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.oidc;
import net.minidev.json.JSONValue;
import java.net.URI;
import java.net.http.HttpClient;
import java.net.http.HttpRequest;
import java.net.http.HttpResponse;
import java.util.Map;
/**
* Fetches and parses the OIDC provider discovery document at
* {@code {issuer}/.well-known/openid-configuration}.
*/
final class DiscoveryClient {
private DiscoveryClient() {}
static OidcProviderMetadata fetch(String issuer, HttpClient http) throws Exception {
String url = issuer.endsWith("/")
? issuer + ".well-known/openid-configuration"
: issuer + "/.well-known/openid-configuration";
HttpResponse<String> resp = http.send(
HttpRequest.newBuilder().uri(URI.create(url)).GET().build(),
HttpResponse.BodyHandlers.ofString());
if (resp.statusCode() != 200)
throw new IllegalStateException(
"OIDC discovery failed [" + resp.statusCode() + "]: " + url);
@SuppressWarnings("unchecked")
Map<String, Object> doc = (Map<String, Object>) JSONValue.parse(resp.body());
return new OidcProviderMetadata(
require(doc, "authorization_endpoint"),
require(doc, "token_endpoint"),
(String) doc.get("userinfo_endpoint"), // optional
require(doc, "jwks_uri"),
(String) doc.get("end_session_endpoint") // optional
);
}
private static String require(Map<String, Object> doc, String key) {
Object v = doc.get(key);
if (v == null) throw new IllegalStateException(
"Discovery doc missing required field: " + key);
return v.toString();
}
}
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.oidc;
import net.minidev.json.JSONValue;
import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;
import java.util.Base64;
import java.util.Map;
/**
* Low-level JWT payload extraction — no signature or expiry validation.
*
* <p>Use only for tokens received directly from the provider over a trusted TLS
* connection (e.g. {@code id_token} from the token endpoint). Bearer tokens on
* incoming requests must go through {@link JwtValidator#validate(String)} instead.
*/
final class JwtUtils {
private JwtUtils() {}
/**
* Base64URL-decodes the JWT payload and returns the claims as a map.
* Signature, expiry, and issuer are NOT checked.
*/
@SuppressWarnings("unchecked")
static Map<String, Object> parseClaims(String jwt) {
String[] parts = jwt.split("\\.");
if (parts.length < 2) throw new IllegalArgumentException("Malformed JWT: " + jwt);
// Pad to a multiple of 4 for the standard decoder
String padded = parts[1];
switch (padded.length() % 4) {
case 2 -> padded += "==";
case 3 -> padded += "=";
}
byte[] payload = Base64.getUrlDecoder().decode(padded);
return (Map<String, Object>) JSONValue.parse(
new String(payload, StandardCharsets.UTF_8));
}
}
@@ -1,184 +0,0 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.oidc;
import com.nimbusds.jose.JWSAlgorithm;
import com.nimbusds.jose.jwk.source.JWKSource;
import com.nimbusds.jose.jwk.source.JWKSourceBuilder;
import com.nimbusds.jose.proc.JWSKeySelector;
import com.nimbusds.jose.proc.JWSVerificationKeySelector;
import com.nimbusds.jose.proc.SecurityContext;
import com.nimbusds.jose.util.Resource;
import com.nimbusds.jose.util.ResourceRetriever;
import com.nimbusds.jwt.JWTClaimsSet;
import com.nimbusds.jwt.proc.ConfigurableJWTProcessor;
import com.nimbusds.jwt.proc.DefaultJWTClaimsVerifier;
import com.nimbusds.jwt.proc.DefaultJWTProcessor;
import dev.relism.flash.exceptions.HttpException;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.net.URL;
import java.net.http.HttpClient;
import java.net.http.HttpRequest;
import java.net.http.HttpResponse;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.Set;
/**
* Validates JWTs against a remote JWKS endpoint using Nimbus JOSE+JWT.
*
* <p>Two validation modes:
* <ul>
* <li>{@link #validate(String)} — access token bearer validation per request (hot path).
* Checks signature, {@code iss}, {@code exp}, {@code iat}, {@code sub}.
* Throws {@link HttpException} 401 so the middleware can short-circuit.</li>
* <li>{@link #validateIdToken(String, String)} — ID token validation at callback time.
* Checks signature, {@code iss}, {@code aud} == clientId, {@code exp}, {@code iat},
* {@code sub}, and {@code nonce} (if provided).
* Throws {@link OidcValidationException} (not 401 — it is a provider/protocol error).</li>
* </ul>
*
* <p>JWKS handling: the shared {@link JWKSource} uses caching + rate-limiting + automatic
* retry-on-key-miss (key rotation). Both processors share the same source — one JWKS
* fetch serves both token types.
*/
public class JwtValidator {
private final JWKSource<SecurityContext> jwkSource;
private final ConfigurableJWTProcessor<SecurityContext> accessTokenProcessor;
private final ConfigurableJWTProcessor<SecurityContext> idTokenProcessor;
private final String algorithm;
/**
* @param jwksUri JWKS endpoint URI
* @param issuer Expected {@code iss} claim
* @param clientId OAuth2 client ID — used as expected {@code aud} in ID tokens
* @param algorithm JWS algorithm (e.g. {@code "RS256"})
* @param http Shared {@link HttpClient} used for all JWKS fetches — already configured
* with the correct TLS policy (trust-all or default trust store).
*/
public JwtValidator(String jwksUri, String issuer, String clientId,
String algorithm, HttpClient http) {
try {
// Use the caller-supplied HttpClient for JWKS retrieval so that TLS policy
// (insecureTls / custom trust store) is applied consistently everywhere.
this.jwkSource = JWKSourceBuilder
.create(new URL(jwksUri), httpRetriever(http))
.cache(true)
.rateLimited(true)
.retrying(true)
.build();
} catch (Exception e) {
throw new IllegalStateException("Failed to init JWKS source: " + jwksUri, e);
}
this.algorithm = algorithm;
this.accessTokenProcessor = buildAccessTokenProcessor(jwkSource, issuer, algorithm);
this.idTokenProcessor = buildIdTokenProcessor(jwkSource, issuer, clientId, algorithm);
}
// -- Public API -----------------------------------------------------------
/**
* Validates a JWT access token (bearer on incoming request).
* Returns claims on success; throws {@link HttpException} 401 on any failure.
*/
public Map<String, Object> validate(String token) {
if (!isJwt(token)) throw HttpException.unauthorized(); // opaque token — can't validate
try {
return accessTokenProcessor.process(token, null).getClaims();
} catch (Exception e) {
throw HttpException.unauthorized();
}
}
/**
* Validates an ID token received directly from the token endpoint.
*
* <p>Checks: signature (JWKS), {@code iss}, {@code aud} == clientId,
* {@code exp}, {@code iat}, {@code sub}, and {@code nonce} if provided.
*
* @param idToken Raw ID token string
* @param nonce Nonce sent in the authorization request; {@code null} to skip check
* @throws OidcValidationException on any validation failure
*/
public Map<String, Object> validateIdToken(String idToken, String nonce) {
try {
Map<String, Object> claims = idTokenProcessor.process(idToken, null).getClaims();
if (nonce != null && !nonce.equals(claims.get("nonce")))
throw new OidcValidationException("ID token nonce mismatch", null);
return claims;
} catch (OidcValidationException e) {
throw e;
} catch (Exception e) {
throw new OidcValidationException("ID token validation failed: " + e.getMessage(), e);
}
}
/**
* Returns {@code true} if {@code token} is a signed JWT (three dot-separated Base64URL parts).
* Used to detect opaque access tokens before attempting JWKS validation.
*/
public static boolean isJwt(String token) {
if (token == null || token.isBlank()) return false;
int dots = 0;
for (int i = 0; i < token.length(); i++) if (token.charAt(i) == '.') dots++;
return dots == 2;
}
// -- Processors -----------------------------------------------------------
private static ConfigurableJWTProcessor<SecurityContext> buildAccessTokenProcessor(
JWKSource<SecurityContext> src, String issuer, String algorithm) {
ConfigurableJWTProcessor<SecurityContext> p = new DefaultJWTProcessor<>();
p.setJWSKeySelector(keySelector(src, algorithm));
// iss required; aud not enforced on ATs (varies by provider)
if (issuer != null && !issuer.isBlank()) {
p.setJWTClaimsSetVerifier(new DefaultJWTClaimsVerifier<>(
new JWTClaimsSet.Builder().issuer(issuer).build(),
Set.of("sub", "iat", "exp")));
}
return p;
}
private static ConfigurableJWTProcessor<SecurityContext> buildIdTokenProcessor(
JWKSource<SecurityContext> src, String issuer, String clientId, String algorithm) {
ConfigurableJWTProcessor<SecurityContext> p = new DefaultJWTProcessor<>();
p.setJWSKeySelector(keySelector(src, algorithm));
// iss + aud = clientId strictly required (OIDC Core §3.1.3.7)
JWTClaimsSet.Builder required = new JWTClaimsSet.Builder();
if (issuer != null) required.issuer(issuer);
if (clientId != null) required.audience(clientId);
p.setJWTClaimsSetVerifier(new DefaultJWTClaimsVerifier<>(
required.build(), Set.of("sub", "iat", "exp")));
return p;
}
private static JWSKeySelector<SecurityContext> keySelector(
JWKSource<SecurityContext> src, String algorithm) {
return new JWSVerificationKeySelector<>(JWSAlgorithm.parse(algorithm), src);
}
/**
* Wraps a {@link HttpClient} as a Nimbus {@link ResourceRetriever}.
* The client already carries the correct TLS policy (trust-all or default),
* so JWKS fetches honour the same SSL configuration as discovery and token requests.
*/
private static ResourceRetriever httpRetriever(HttpClient http) {
return url -> {
try {
HttpResponse<String> resp = http.send(
HttpRequest.newBuilder().uri(url.toURI()).GET().build(),
HttpResponse.BodyHandlers.ofString());
if (resp.statusCode() != 200)
throw new IOException("JWKS fetch failed [" + resp.statusCode() + "]: " + url);
String contentType = resp.headers()
.firstValue("Content-Type").orElse("application/json");
return new Resource(resp.body(), contentType);
} catch (IOException e) {
throw e;
} catch (Exception e) {
throw new IOException("JWKS retrieval error: " + e.getMessage(), e);
}
};
}
}
@@ -1,264 +0,0 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.oidc;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.auth.InMemorySessionStore;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.auth.SessionStore;
/**
* Full OIDC client configuration. Build via
* {@link #builder(String, String, String, String)} or {@link #fromEnv()}.
*
* <p>Required fields: {@code issuer}, {@code clientId}, {@code clientSecret},
* {@code redirectUri}. Everything else has a sensible default.
*
* <p>If {@code redirectUri} starts with {@code /} it is treated as server-relative:
* the absolute URL is resolved at request time using {@link #selfScheme()} and the
* incoming {@code Host} header. Use {@link Builder#https()} when behind TLS.
*
* <pre>{@code
* // Keycloak
* OidcConfig.builder(
* "https://keycloak.example.com/realms/myrealm",
* "my-app", "secret", "/auth/callback")
* .rolesClaimPath("realm_access.roles") // Keycloak default
* .scopeClaimPaths("scope,scp") // default; supports many IdPs
* .build();
*
* // Authelia
* OidcConfig.builder(
* "https://auth.example.com",
* "my-app", "secret", "/auth/callback")
* .rolesClaimPath("groups")
* .scopeClaimPaths("scope,scp")
* .build();
*
* // Two tenants on one server
* OidcConfig tenantA = OidcConfig.builder("https://idp/realms/a", ..., "/tenantA/auth/callback")
* .routePrefix("/tenantA/auth").build();
* OidcConfig tenantB = OidcConfig.builder("https://idp/realms/b", ..., "/tenantB/auth/callback")
* .routePrefix("/tenantB/auth").build();
* app.install(new OidcExtension(tenantA))
* .install(new OidcExtension(tenantB));
* }</pre>
*/
public final class OidcConfig {
private final String issuer;
private final String clientId;
private final String clientSecret;
private final String redirectUri;
private final String scopes;
private final String routePrefix;
private final String selfScheme;
private final String rolesClaimPath;
private final String scopeClaimPaths;
private final String algorithm;
private final String postLogoutRedirectUri;
private final SessionStore sessionStore;
private final boolean insecureTls;
private final ClientAuthMethod clientAuthMethod;
private final String schemeName;
private OidcConfig(Builder b) {
this.issuer = require(b.issuer, "issuer");
this.clientId = require(b.clientId, "clientId");
this.clientSecret = require(b.clientSecret, "clientSecret");
this.redirectUri = require(b.redirectUri, "redirectUri");
this.scopes = b.scopes;
this.routePrefix = b.routePrefix;
this.selfScheme = b.selfScheme;
this.rolesClaimPath = b.rolesClaimPath;
this.scopeClaimPaths = b.scopeClaimPaths;
this.algorithm = b.algorithm;
this.postLogoutRedirectUri = b.postLogoutRedirectUri;
this.sessionStore = b.sessionStore != null ? b.sessionStore
: new InMemorySessionStore();
this.insecureTls = b.insecureTls;
this.clientAuthMethod = b.clientAuthMethod;
this.schemeName = b.schemeName != null ? b.schemeName : deriveScheme(this.issuer);
}
// -- Getters --------------------------------------------------------------
public String issuer() { return issuer; }
public String clientId() { return clientId; }
public String clientSecret() { return clientSecret; }
public String redirectUri() { return redirectUri; }
public String scopes() { return scopes; }
public String routePrefix() { return routePrefix; }
public String selfScheme() { return selfScheme; }
public String rolesClaimPath() { return rolesClaimPath; }
/** Comma-separated claim paths used to read OAuth2 scopes (default: {@code "scope,scp"}). */
public String scopeClaimPaths() { return scopeClaimPaths; }
public String algorithm() { return algorithm; }
public String postLogoutRedirectUri() { return postLogoutRedirectUri; }
public SessionStore sessionStore() { return sessionStore; }
/** If {@code true}, TLS certificate validation is skipped. <b>Never use in production.</b> */
public boolean insecureTls() { return insecureTls; }
public ClientAuthMethod clientAuthMethod() { return clientAuthMethod; }
/** OpenAPI security scheme name (derived from issuer if not set explicitly). */
public String schemeName() { return schemeName; }
// -- Factory --------------------------------------------------------------
/**
* Reads configuration from environment variables:
* <pre>
* OIDC_ISSUER required
* OIDC_CLIENT_ID required
* OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET required
* OIDC_REDIRECT_URI required (e.g. /auth/callback)
* OIDC_SCOPES default: openid profile email
* OIDC_ROUTE_PREFIX default: /auth
* OIDC_SELF_SCHEME default: http
* OIDC_ROLES_CLAIM default: realm_access.roles
* OIDC_SCOPE_CLAIMS default: scope,scp
* OIDC_ALGORITHM default: RS256
* OIDC_POST_LOGOUT_REDIRECT default: /
* </pre>
*/
public static OidcConfig fromEnv() {
return builder(env("OIDC_ISSUER"), env("OIDC_CLIENT_ID"),
env("OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET"), env("OIDC_REDIRECT_URI"))
.scopes (envOr("OIDC_SCOPES", "openid profile email"))
.routePrefix (envOr("OIDC_ROUTE_PREFIX", "/auth"))
.selfScheme (envOr("OIDC_SELF_SCHEME", "http"))
.rolesClaimPath (envOr("OIDC_ROLES_CLAIM", "realm_access.roles"))
.scopeClaimPaths (envOr("OIDC_SCOPE_CLAIMS", "scope,scp"))
.algorithm (envOr("OIDC_ALGORITHM", "RS256"))
.postLogoutRedirectUri(envOr("OIDC_POST_LOGOUT_REDIRECT", "/"))
.clientAuthMethod(ClientAuthMethod.valueOf(
envOr("OIDC_CLIENT_AUTH_METHOD", "POST").toUpperCase()))
.build();
}
public static Builder builder(String issuer, String clientId,
String clientSecret, String redirectUri) {
return new Builder(issuer, clientId, clientSecret, redirectUri);
}
/**
* Convenience factory for Keycloak: constructs the issuer as
* {@code {serverUrl}/realms/{realm}} automatically.
*
* <pre>{@code
* OidcConfig.keycloak(
* "https://keycloak.example.com", "flashboard",
* "my-app", "secret", "/auth/callback")
* .https()
* .build();
* }</pre>
*/
public static Builder keycloak(String serverUrl, String realm,
String clientId, String clientSecret,
String redirectUri) {
String base = serverUrl.endsWith("/") ? serverUrl.substring(0, serverUrl.length() - 1) : serverUrl;
String issuer = base + "/realms/" + realm;
return new Builder(issuer, clientId, clientSecret, redirectUri)
.rolesClaimPath("realm_access.roles"); // Keycloak default
}
// -- Helpers --------------------------------------------------------------
private static String require(String v, String name) {
if (v == null || v.isBlank())
throw new IllegalArgumentException("OidcConfig: " + name + " is required");
return v;
}
private static String env(String key) {
String v = System.getenv(key);
if (v == null || v.isBlank())
throw new IllegalArgumentException("Missing required env var: " + key);
return v;
}
private static String envOr(String key, String def) {
String v = System.getenv(key);
return (v != null && !v.isBlank()) ? v : def;
}
// -- Builder --------------------------------------------------------------
public static final class Builder {
private final String issuer;
private final String clientId;
private final String clientSecret;
private final String redirectUri;
private String scopes = "openid profile email";
private String routePrefix = "/auth";
private String selfScheme = "http";
private String rolesClaimPath = "realm_access.roles";
private String scopeClaimPaths = "scope,scp";
private String algorithm = "RS256";
private String postLogoutRedirectUri = "/";
private SessionStore sessionStore;
private boolean insecureTls = false;
private ClientAuthMethod clientAuthMethod = ClientAuthMethod.POST;
private String schemeName = null;
private Builder(String issuer, String clientId, String clientSecret, String redirectUri) {
this.issuer = issuer;
this.clientId = clientId;
this.clientSecret = clientSecret;
this.redirectUri = redirectUri;
}
/** Override requested scopes (default: {@code openid profile email}). */
public Builder scopes(String scopes) { this.scopes = scopes; return this; }
/** Route prefix for login/callback/logout (default: {@code /auth}). */
public Builder routePrefix(String prefix) { this.routePrefix = prefix; return this; }
/** Scheme used when resolving self-relative redirect URIs (default: {@code http}). */
public Builder selfScheme(String scheme) { this.selfScheme = scheme; return this; }
/** Shorthand for {@code selfScheme("https")}. */
public Builder https() { return selfScheme("https"); }
/** Dot-separated path to the roles array in JWT claims (default: {@code realm_access.roles}). */
public Builder rolesClaimPath(String path) { this.rolesClaimPath = path; return this; }
/** Comma-separated claim paths used to resolve OAuth2 scopes (default: {@code scope,scp}). */
public Builder scopeClaimPaths(String paths) { this.scopeClaimPaths = paths; return this; }
/** JWS algorithm (default: {@code RS256}). */
public Builder algorithm(String algorithm) { this.algorithm = algorithm; return this; }
/** Where to redirect after logout (default: {@code /}). */
public Builder postLogoutRedirectUri(String uri) { this.postLogoutRedirectUri = uri; return this; }
/** Custom session store (default: {@link InMemorySessionStore}). */
public Builder sessionStore(SessionStore store) { this.sessionStore = store; return this; }
/**
* Disables TLS certificate verification for all HTTP calls made by this extension.
* <b>Only use in development with self-signed certificates — never in production.</b>
*/
public Builder insecureTls() { this.insecureTls = true; return this; }
/** Token endpoint client authentication method (default: {@link ClientAuthMethod#POST}). */
public Builder clientAuthMethod(ClientAuthMethod method) { this.clientAuthMethod = method; return this; }
/** Override the OpenAPI security scheme name (default: derived from the issuer URI). */
public Builder schemeName(String name) { this.schemeName = name; return this; }
public OidcConfig build() { return new OidcConfig(this); }
}
/**
* Derives a short, human-readable scheme name from the issuer URI.
* Takes the last non-empty path segment; falls back to the host.
*
* <p>Examples:
* <ul>
* <li>{@code https://keycloak.dev.home/realms/flashboard} → {@code "flashboard"}</li>
* <li>{@code https://auth.example.com} → {@code "auth.example.com"}</li>
* </ul>
*/
private static String deriveScheme(String issuer) {
try {
java.net.URI uri = new java.net.URI(issuer);
String path = uri.getPath();
if (path != null && !path.isEmpty()) {
String[] parts = path.split("/");
for (int i = parts.length - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
if (!parts[i].isEmpty()) return parts[i];
}
}
return uri.getHost();
} catch (Exception e) {
return "oidc";
}
}
}
@@ -1,333 +0,0 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.oidc;
import dev.relism.flash.exceptions.HttpException;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.auth.CredentialSource;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.auth.Session;
import dev.relism.flash.models.Response;
import dev.relism.flash.models.Request;
import java.net.URLEncoder;
import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;
import java.time.Instant;
import java.util.HashMap;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.Optional;
/**
* The OpenID Connect {@link CredentialSource}: it turns what a request carries into claims, and
* rejects it the way OAuth2 says to when it cannot. Authorization on those claims is
* {@code flash-ext-auth-core}'s job, not this class's.
*
* <p>Resolution order on each request:
* <ol>
* <li>{@code Authorization: Bearer ...} header — validated via JWKS ({@link JwtValidator}).</li>
* <li>{@code oidc_session} cookie — looked up in {@link dev.relism.flash.ext.auth.SessionStore}; transparently
* refreshed if the access token is expired.</li>
* <li>Browser clients (no {@code Accept: application/json}) → redirect to
* {@code {routePrefix}/login?redirect={path}}.</li>
* <li>API clients → 401 with a {@code WWW-Authenticate: Bearer} challenge.</li>
* </ol>
*/
public final class OidcCredentialSource implements CredentialSource {
private static final String BEARER = "Bearer";
/**
* Keys this source stores its OAuth2 tokens under in {@link Session#attributes()}. Core keeps
* the session; the tokens inside it are nobody else's business.
*/
static final String ACCESS_TOKEN = "oidc.access_token";
static final String ID_TOKEN = "oidc.id_token";
static final String REFRESH_TOKEN = "oidc.refresh_token";
/** The one place an OIDC session is built, so its attribute keys stay in one place too. */
static Session newSession(String id, String accessToken, String idToken, String refreshToken,
Instant expiresAt, Map<String, Object> claims) {
Map<String, Object> attributes = new HashMap<>(3);
if (accessToken != null) attributes.put(ACCESS_TOKEN, accessToken);
if (idToken != null) attributes.put(ID_TOKEN, idToken);
if (refreshToken != null) attributes.put(REFRESH_TOKEN, refreshToken);
return new Session(id, claims, expiresAt, attributes);
}
private final JwtValidator validator;
private final OidcConfig config;
private final OidcProviderMetadata meta;
private final TokenClient tokenClient;
private final String resourceMetadataPath;
OidcCredentialSource(JwtValidator validator, OidcConfig config,
OidcProviderMetadata meta, TokenClient tokenClient) {
this(validator, config, meta, tokenClient, null);
}
private OidcCredentialSource(JwtValidator validator, OidcConfig config,
OidcProviderMetadata meta, TokenClient tokenClient,
String resourceMetadataPath) {
this.validator = validator;
this.config = config;
this.meta = meta;
this.tokenClient = tokenClient;
this.resourceMetadataPath = resourceMetadataPath;
}
// -- CredentialSource -----------------------------------------------------
/** OIDC issuer this source validates tokens against — the {@code iss} claim it enforces. */
public String issuer() { return config.issuer(); }
/** Scheme used to build this app's own absolute URLs — see {@link OidcConfig#selfScheme()}. */
public String selfScheme() { return config.selfScheme(); }
/**
* A copy of this source whose 401 challenges also carry {@code resource_metadata}
* (RFC 9728 §5.1), resolved against the request's own scheme and host exactly like
* {@link OidcExtension}'s redirect URIs. {@code path} is absolute, e.g.
* {@code "/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp"}.
*
* <p>Used by {@code flash-ext-mcp} to make its Protected Resource Metadata document
* discoverable straight from the {@code WWW-Authenticate} header, per the MCP Authorization
* spec.
*/
public OidcCredentialSource withResourceMetadata(String path) {
return new OidcCredentialSource(validator, config, meta, tokenClient, path);
}
@Override
public Map<String, Object> authenticate(Request req, Response res) {
return resolve(req, res, resourceMetadataPath);
}
@Override
public Map<String, Object> peek(Request req) {
return resolveQuiet(req);
}
@Override
public String insufficientScopeChallenge(String[] requiredScopes) {
return bearerChallenge() + ", error=\"insufficient_scope\", scope=\""
+ quoted(spaceDelimited(requiredScopes)) + "\"";
}
// -- Internals ------------------------------------------------------------
/**
* Like {@link #resolve} but never redirects or throws — returns {@code null} silently
* when no valid credentials are present. Used by {@link #optional()}.
*/
private Map<String, Object> resolveQuiet(Request req) {
String bearerToken = extractBearerToken(req.header("Authorization"));
if (bearerToken != null) {
try {
return validator.validate(bearerToken);
} catch (Exception ignored) {
return null;
}
}
String sessionId = cookieValue(req, "oidc_session");
if (sessionId != null) {
Optional<Session> found = config.sessionStore().find(sessionId);
if (found.isPresent()) {
Session session = found.get();
if (!session.isExpired())
return session.claims();
if (session.attributeAsString(REFRESH_TOKEN) != null) {
try {
Session refreshed = doRefresh(session);
config.sessionStore().save(refreshed);
return refreshed.claims();
} catch (Exception ignored) { }
}
config.sessionStore().delete(sessionId);
}
}
return null;
}
/**
* Returns claims on success, or {@code null} if a redirect was already written to
* {@code res}. Throws {@link HttpException} 401/403 for API clients.
*/
private Map<String, Object> resolve(Request req, Response res) {
return resolve(req, res, null);
}
private Map<String, Object> resolve(Request req, Response res, String resourceMetadataPath) {
// 1. Bearer token
String bearerToken = extractBearerToken(req.header("Authorization"));
if (bearerToken != null) {
try {
return validator.validate(bearerToken);
} catch (HttpException e) {
res.header("WWW-Authenticate", invalidTokenChallenge(req, resourceMetadataPath));
throw e;
}
}
// 2. Session cookie
String sessionId = cookieValue(req, "oidc_session");
if (sessionId != null) {
Optional<Session> found = config.sessionStore().find(sessionId);
if (found.isPresent()) {
Session session = found.get();
if (!session.isExpired())
return session.claims();
// Access token expired — try silent refresh
if (session.attributeAsString(REFRESH_TOKEN) != null) {
try {
Session refreshed = doRefresh(session);
config.sessionStore().save(refreshed);
return refreshed.claims();
} catch (Exception ignored) {
// Refresh failed — fall through to re-authenticate
}
}
config.sessionStore().delete(sessionId);
}
}
// 3. No valid credentials
String accept = req.header("Accept");
if (accept != null && accept.contains("application/json")) {
res.header("WWW-Authenticate", bearerChallenge(req, resourceMetadataPath));
throw HttpException.unauthorized();
}
// Browser — redirect to login, preserving the original URL in state
String loginUrl = config.routePrefix() + "/login?redirect="
+ URLEncoder.encode(req.path(), StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
res.redirect(loginUrl);
return null;
}
private Session doRefresh(Session old) throws Exception {
OidcTokenResponse tokens = tokenClient.refresh(
meta.tokenEndpoint(), old.attributeAsString(REFRESH_TOKEN));
return newSession(
old.id(),
tokens.accessToken(),
tokens.idToken() != null ? tokens.idToken() : old.attributeAsString(ID_TOKEN),
tokens.refreshToken() != null ? tokens.refreshToken() : old.attributeAsString(REFRESH_TOKEN),
Instant.now().plusSeconds(tokens.expiresIn()),
mergeRefreshedClaims(tokens, old)
);
}
static String extractBearerToken(String authorizationHeader) {
if (authorizationHeader == null) return null;
int len = authorizationHeader.length();
int start = 0;
while (start < len && Character.isWhitespace(authorizationHeader.charAt(start))) start++;
int schemeEnd = start + BEARER.length();
if (schemeEnd > len || !authorizationHeader.regionMatches(true, start, BEARER, 0, BEARER.length())) {
return null;
}
if (schemeEnd == len || !Character.isWhitespace(authorizationHeader.charAt(schemeEnd))) {
return null;
}
int tokenStart = schemeEnd;
while (tokenStart < len && Character.isWhitespace(authorizationHeader.charAt(tokenStart))) tokenStart++;
if (tokenStart >= len) return null;
int tokenEnd = len;
while (tokenEnd > tokenStart && Character.isWhitespace(authorizationHeader.charAt(tokenEnd - 1))) tokenEnd--;
return tokenEnd > tokenStart ? authorizationHeader.substring(tokenStart, tokenEnd) : null;
}
String bearerChallenge() {
return bearerChallenge(null, null);
}
private String bearerChallenge(Request req, String resourceMetadataPath) {
String base = BEARER + " realm=\"" + quoted(config.schemeName()) + "\"";
if (resourceMetadataPath == null) return base;
return base + ", resource_metadata=\"" + quoted(absoluteSelf(req, resourceMetadataPath)) + "\"";
}
String invalidTokenChallenge() {
return invalidTokenChallenge(null, null);
}
private String invalidTokenChallenge(Request req, String resourceMetadataPath) {
return bearerChallenge(req, resourceMetadataPath) + ", error=\"invalid_token\"";
}
private String absoluteSelf(Request req, String path) {
if (!path.startsWith("/")) return path;
return selfOrigin(req, config.selfScheme()) + path;
}
/**
* {@code scheme://host} clients actually reach this app on — the basis for every absolute
* URL it publishes about itself (OAuth2 {@code redirect_uri}, the RFC 9728 resource
* identifier and the {@code resource_metadata} challenge). Behind a reverse proxy the
* request's own {@code Host} is the upstream address the proxy dialled, so
* {@code X-Forwarded-Host}/{@code -Proto} win whenever present: without them the app would
* name an address no client can resolve, and OAuth2 discovery fails with no error anyone
* can trace back to here. Trusted unconditionally — a caller able to reach this app without
* passing the proxy can do worse than spoof a self URL.
*/
public static String selfOrigin(Request req, String fallbackScheme) {
String forwardedHost = req.header("X-Forwarded-Host");
if (forwardedHost == null) return fallbackScheme + "://" + req.header("Host");
String forwardedProto = req.header("X-Forwarded-Proto");
return (forwardedProto != null ? forwardedProto : fallbackScheme) + "://" + forwardedHost;
}
private static String spaceDelimited(String[] values) {
if (values == null || values.length == 0) return "";
StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder();
for (int i = 0; i < values.length; i++) {
if (i > 0) sb.append(' ');
sb.append(values[i]);
}
return sb.toString();
}
private static String quoted(String value) {
StringBuilder out = new StringBuilder(value.length() + 8);
for (int i = 0; i < value.length(); i++) {
char c = value.charAt(i);
if (c == '"' || c == '\\') out.append('\\');
out.append(c);
}
return out.toString();
}
private static Map<String, Object> mergeRefreshedClaims(OidcTokenResponse tokens, Session old) {
Map<String, Object> merged = new HashMap<>();
// Fall back to old claims first, then overlay fresh token claims
merged.putAll(old.claims());
if (tokens.accessToken() != null)
merged.putAll(JwtUtils.parseClaims(tokens.accessToken()));
if (tokens.idToken() != null)
merged.putAll(JwtUtils.parseClaims(tokens.idToken()));
return Map.copyOf(merged);
}
// -- Shared cookie utility (also used by OidcExtension) -------------------
static String cookieValue(Request req, String name) {
String header = req.header("Cookie");
if (header == null || header.isBlank()) return null;
int len = header.length();
int start = 0;
while (start < len) {
int semi = header.indexOf(';', start);
int end = semi < 0 ? len : semi;
int eq = header.indexOf('=', start);
if (eq > start && eq < end) {
int ns = start, ne = eq;
while (ns < ne && header.charAt(ns) == ' ') ns++;
while (ne > ns && header.charAt(ne-1) == ' ') ne--;
if (ne - ns == name.length() && header.regionMatches(ns, name, 0, name.length()))
return header.substring(eq + 1, end).strip();
}
start = end + 1;
}
return null;
}
}
@@ -1,343 +0,0 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.oidc;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.openapi.OpenApiContributor;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.openapi.OpenApiContributorRegistry;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.openapi.OpenApiOperationContribution;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.openapi.OpenApiResponseContribution;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.auth.AuthConfig;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.auth.Session;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.auth.AuthMiddleware;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.auth.AuthPolicy;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.auth.Authenticated;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.auth.RolesAllowed;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.auth.ScopesAllowed;
import dev.relism.flash.extension.FlashContext;
import dev.relism.flash.extension.FlashExtension;
import dev.relism.flash.extension.FlashRegistrar;
import dev.relism.flash.models.Request;
import javax.net.ssl.SSLContext;
import javax.net.ssl.TrustManager;
import javax.net.ssl.X509TrustManager;
import java.net.URLEncoder;
import java.net.http.HttpClient;
import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;
import java.security.SecureRandom;
import java.security.cert.X509Certificate;
import java.time.Instant;
import java.util.*;
/**
* Full OIDC Authorization Code + PKCE flow for Flash.
*
* <p>At {@link #provide}, the extension:
* <ol>
* <li>Fetches the provider discovery document — fail-fast at startup.</li>
* <li>Provides {@link AuthMiddleware}, {@link OidcCredentialSource} and {@link JwtValidator}
* in the context.</li>
* <li>Registers annotation processors for {@link Authenticated}, {@link RolesAllowed}
* and {@link ScopesAllowed}.</li>
* </ol>
*
* <p>At {@link #routes}, three routes are registered:
* <ul>
* <li>{@code GET {prefix}/login} — builds the authorization URL and redirects.</li>
* <li>{@code GET {prefix}/callback} — exchanges the code, creates a session, redirects.</li>
* <li>{@code POST {prefix}/logout} — invalidates the session, redirects to provider
* end-session endpoint (if available) or to {@link OidcConfig#postLogoutRedirectUri()}.</li>
* </ul>
*
* <pre>{@code
* // Keycloak
* app.install(new OidcExtension(
* OidcConfig.builder(
* "https://keycloak.example.com/realms/myrealm",
* "my-app", "secret", "/auth/callback")
* .rolesClaimPath("realm_access.roles")
* .build()));
*
* // Two providers / tenants on one server
* app.install(new OidcExtension(tenantAConfig))
* .install(new OidcExtension(tenantBConfig));
* }</pre>
*/
public class OidcExtension implements FlashExtension {
private final OidcConfig config;
// Initialized in provide(), used in routes() — private to this extension instance.
private OidcProviderMetadata meta;
private OidcStateStore stateStore;
private TokenClient tokenClient;
private JwtValidator validator;
private OidcCredentialSource source;
private AuthMiddleware authMw;
public OidcExtension(OidcConfig config) {
this.config = config;
}
// ── Phase 1: services ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@Override
public void configure(FlashRegistrar<?> app, FlashContext ctx) {
HttpClient http = buildHttpClient(config);
// Discover provider endpoints (blocking; fail fast at startup).
try {
meta = DiscoveryClient.fetch(config.issuer(), http);
} catch (Exception e) {
throw new IllegalStateException("OIDC discovery failed for issuer: " + config.issuer(), e);
}
validator = new JwtValidator(meta.jwksUri(), config.issuer(), config.clientId(), config.algorithm(), http);
stateStore = new OidcStateStore();
tokenClient = new TokenClient(http, config);
source = new OidcCredentialSource(validator, config, meta, tokenClient);
authMw = AuthMiddleware.install(ctx, AuthConfig.builder()
.rolesClaimPath(config.rolesClaimPath())
.scopeClaimPaths(config.scopeClaimPaths())
.build(), source);
ctx.provide(OidcCredentialSource.class, source);
ctx.provide(JwtValidator.class, validator);
ctx.onReady(() -> registerRoutes(app, ctx));
}
private void registerRoutes(FlashRegistrar<?> app, FlashContext ctx) {
String prefix = config.routePrefix();
// ── GET {prefix}/login ────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Builds the provider authorization URL with PKCE + state and redirects.
// Optional query param: ?redirect={relative-url} (default: /)
app.get(prefix + "/login", (req, res) -> {
String verifier = PkceUtils.generateVerifier();
String challenge = PkceUtils.computeChallenge(verifier);
String state = UUID.randomUUID().toString();
String nonce = UUID.randomUUID().toString();
String redirect = req.query("redirect");
if (redirect == null || !redirect.startsWith("/")) redirect = "/";
stateStore.put(state, redirect, verifier, nonce);
String authUrl = meta.authorizationEndpoint()
+ "?response_type=code"
+ "&client_id=" + enc(config.clientId())
+ "&redirect_uri=" + enc(absoluteRedirectUri(req))
+ "&scope=" + enc(config.scopes())
+ "&state=" + state
+ "&nonce=" + enc(nonce)
+ "&code_challenge=" + challenge
+ "&code_challenge_method=S256";
res.redirect(authUrl);
return null;
});
// ── GET {prefix}/callback ─────────────────────────────────────────────
// Validates state, exchanges code for tokens, creates session, redirects.
app.get(prefix + "/callback", (req, res) -> {
String error = req.query("error");
if (error != null) {
res.status(400);
return "Authentication error: " + error
+ (req.query("error_description") != null
? "" + req.query("error_description") : "");
}
String code = req.query("code");
String state = req.query("state");
OidcStateStore.Entry entry = stateStore.consumeAndRemove(state).orElse(null);
if (entry == null) {
res.status(400);
return "Invalid or expired state parameter";
}
OidcTokenResponse tokens = tokenClient.exchangeCode(
meta.tokenEndpoint(), code, absoluteRedirectUri(req), entry.codeVerifier());
// Validate ID token: signature + iss + aud + exp + iat + sub + nonce (OIDC Core §3.1.3.7)
if (tokens.idToken() != null) {
try {
validator.validateIdToken(tokens.idToken(), entry.nonce());
} catch (OidcValidationException e) {
res.status(400);
return "ID token validation failed: " + e.getMessage();
}
}
Map<String, Object> claims = mergeClaims(tokens);
Session session = OidcCredentialSource.newSession(
UUID.randomUUID().toString(),
tokens.accessToken(), tokens.idToken(), tokens.refreshToken(),
Instant.now().plusSeconds(tokens.expiresIn()), claims);
config.sessionStore().save(session);
res.header("Set-Cookie", sessionCookie(session.id()))
.redirect(entry.originalUrl());
return null;
});
// ── POST {prefix}/logout ──────────────────────────────────────────────
// Invalidates the local session and redirects to end_session_endpoint.
app.post(prefix + "/logout", (req, res) -> {
String sessionId = OidcCredentialSource.cookieValue(req, "oidc_session");
String idTokenHint = null;
if (sessionId != null) {
Session session = config.sessionStore().find(sessionId).orElse(null);
if (session != null) idTokenHint = session.attributeAsString(OidcCredentialSource.ID_TOKEN);
config.sessionStore().delete(sessionId);
}
String clearCookie = "oidc_session=; HttpOnly; Path=/; Max-Age=0; SameSite=Lax";
String location;
if (meta.endSessionEndpoint() != null) {
String postLogout = absoluteSelf(req, config.postLogoutRedirectUri());
StringBuilder url = new StringBuilder(meta.endSessionEndpoint())
.append("?post_logout_redirect_uri=").append(enc(postLogout));
if (idTokenHint != null)
url.append("&id_token_hint=").append(enc(idTokenHint));
location = url.toString();
} else {
location = config.postLogoutRedirectUri();
}
res.header("Set-Cookie", clearCookie).redirect(location);
return null;
});
// Register OpenAPI security scheme if flash-ext-openapi is on the classpath.
try {
OpenApiIntegration.register(ctx, config, meta);
} catch (NoClassDefFoundError ignored) {
// flash-ext-openapi not available — OpenAPI integration disabled
}
}
// ── Helpers ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* Merges claims from both the access token and the ID token.
* ID token values win on conflict so that verified identity claims are authoritative.
*/
private static Map<String, Object> mergeClaims(OidcTokenResponse tokens) {
Map<String, Object> merged = new HashMap<>();
if (tokens.accessToken() != null) merged.putAll(JwtUtils.parseClaims(tokens.accessToken()));
if (tokens.idToken() != null) merged.putAll(JwtUtils.parseClaims(tokens.idToken()));
return Map.copyOf(merged);
}
/**
* Builds an {@link HttpClient}. If {@link OidcConfig#insecureTls()} is set,
* installs a trust-all {@link SSLContext} that accepts any certificate.
* <b>Only safe for development with self-signed certificates.</b>
*/
private static HttpClient buildHttpClient(OidcConfig config) {
if (!config.insecureTls()) return HttpClient.newHttpClient();
try {
TrustManager[] trustAll = { new X509TrustManager() {
public X509Certificate[] getAcceptedIssuers() { return new X509Certificate[0]; }
public void checkClientTrusted(X509Certificate[] c, String a) {}
public void checkServerTrusted(X509Certificate[] c, String a) {}
}};
SSLContext sslCtx = SSLContext.getInstance("TLS");
sslCtx.init(null, trustAll, new SecureRandom());
return HttpClient.newBuilder().sslContext(sslCtx).build();
} catch (Exception e) {
throw new IllegalStateException("Failed to create trust-all SSLContext", e);
}
}
private String absoluteRedirectUri(Request req) {
return absoluteSelf(req, config.redirectUri());
}
private String absoluteSelf(Request req, String uri) {
if (!uri.startsWith("/")) return uri;
return OidcCredentialSource.selfOrigin(req, config.selfScheme()) + uri;
}
private static String enc(String v) {
return URLEncoder.encode(v, StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
}
private static String sessionCookie(String id) {
return "oidc_session=" + id + "; HttpOnly; Path=/; SameSite=Lax";
}
/**
* Loaded lazily so that {@code flash-ext-openapi} classes are only resolved at
* runtime when {@link OpenApiContributorRegistry} is actually on the classpath.
*/
private static final class OpenApiIntegration {
static void register(FlashContext ctx,
OidcConfig config, OidcProviderMetadata meta) {
ctx.find(OpenApiContributorRegistry.class)
.ifPresent(registry -> registry.add(new OpenApiContributor() {
@Override
public Map<String, Object> componentContributions() {
Map<String, String> scopesMap = new LinkedHashMap<>();
for (String s : config.scopes().split("\\s+")) {
if (!s.isBlank()) scopesMap.put(s, s);
}
Map<String, Object> flow = new LinkedHashMap<>();
flow.put("authorizationUrl", meta.authorizationEndpoint());
flow.put("tokenUrl", meta.tokenEndpoint());
flow.put("scopes", scopesMap);
Map<String, Object> scheme = new LinkedHashMap<>();
scheme.put("type", "oauth2");
scheme.put("flows", Map.of("authorizationCode", flow));
Map<String, Object> securitySchemes = new LinkedHashMap<>();
securitySchemes.put(config.schemeName(), scheme);
return Map.of("securitySchemes", securitySchemes);
}
@Override
public OpenApiOperationContribution operationFor(Class<?> handlerClass) {
OpenApiOperationContribution.Builder out =
OpenApiOperationContribution.builder();
List<String> operationScopes = AuthPolicy.openApiScopesFor(handlerClass);
if (operationScopes != null) {
out.security(config.schemeName(), operationScopes);
}
AuthPolicy policy = AuthPolicy.compileFromAnnotations(handlerClass);
if (policy == null || policy.optionalAuth()) return out.build();
out.response(401, OpenApiResponseContribution.of("Authentication required"));
String[] roles = policy.requiredRoles();
String[] scopes = policy.requiredScopes();
if (roles.length == 0 && scopes.length == 0) return out.build();
String roleMessage = roles.length == 0 ? null : roleRequiredMessage(roles);
String scopeMessage = scopes.length == 0 ? null : scopeRequiredMessage(scopes);
if (roleMessage != null && scopeMessage != null) {
out.response(403, OpenApiResponseContribution.of(roleMessage + "; " + scopeMessage));
} else
out.response(403, OpenApiResponseContribution.of(Objects.requireNonNullElse(roleMessage, scopeMessage)));
return out.build();
}
}));
}
private static String roleRequiredMessage(String[] roles) {
if (roles.length == 1) return "\"" + roles[0] + "\" role required";
return "Roles \"" + String.join(", ", roles) + "\" are required";
}
private static String scopeRequiredMessage(String[] scopes) {
if (scopes.length == 1) return "\"" + scopes[0] + "\" scope required";
return "Scopes \"" + String.join(", ", scopes) + "\" are required";
}
}
}
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.oidc;
/**
* OIDC provider endpoints discovered from {@code {issuer}/.well-known/openid-configuration}.
*
* <p>{@link #endSessionEndpoint()} may be {@code null} — not all providers expose it
* (e.g. some Authelia configurations omit it).
*/
public record OidcProviderMetadata(
String authorizationEndpoint,
String tokenEndpoint,
String userinfoEndpoint,
String jwksUri,
String endSessionEndpoint // nullable
) {}
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.oidc;
import java.time.Instant;
import java.util.Optional;
import java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentHashMap;
/**
* Short-lived store mapping state nonces → (original URL, PKCE verifier).
*
* <p>Entries expire after {@value #TTL_SECONDS} seconds. Cleanup runs on every
* access to prevent unbounded growth without needing a background thread.
*/
final class OidcStateStore {
static final int TTL_SECONDS = 600; // 10 minutes
record Entry(String originalUrl, String codeVerifier, String nonce, Instant expiresAt) {}
private final ConcurrentHashMap<String, Entry> store = new ConcurrentHashMap<>();
void put(String state, String originalUrl, String codeVerifier, String nonce) {
cleanup();
store.put(state, new Entry(originalUrl, codeVerifier, nonce,
Instant.now().plusSeconds(TTL_SECONDS)));
}
/** Atomically retrieves and removes the entry; returns empty if absent or expired. */
Optional<Entry> consumeAndRemove(String nonce) {
cleanup();
Entry e = store.remove(nonce);
if (e == null || Instant.now().isAfter(e.expiresAt())) return Optional.empty();
return Optional.of(e);
}
private void cleanup() {
Instant now = Instant.now();
store.entrySet().removeIf(kv -> now.isAfter(kv.getValue().expiresAt()));
}
}
@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.oidc;
/** Parsed response from an OAuth2 token endpoint. Package-private — internal use only. */
record OidcTokenResponse(
String accessToken,
String idToken, // may be null on refresh if provider omits it
String refreshToken, // may be null
int expiresIn,
int refreshExpiresIn
) {}
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.oidc;
import dev.relism.flash.exceptions.HttpException;
/**
* Thrown when OIDC token validation fails (signature, claims, nonce, expiry, etc.).
* Distinct from {@link HttpException}: this signals a protocol-level
* failure, not an HTTP response — callers decide the appropriate status code.
*/
public final class OidcValidationException extends RuntimeException {
public OidcValidationException(String message, Throwable cause) {
super(message, cause);
}
}
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.oidc;
import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;
import java.security.MessageDigest;
import java.security.SecureRandom;
import java.util.Base64;
/**
* PKCE (RFC 7636) utilities: code verifier generation and S256 challenge computation.
* Package-private — used exclusively by {@link OidcExtension}.
*/
final class PkceUtils {
private static final SecureRandom RANDOM = new SecureRandom();
private PkceUtils() {}
/**
* Generates a cryptographically random code verifier (43 URL-safe characters,
* per RFC 7636 §4.1 — 32 bytes encoded as unpadded Base64URL).
*/
static String generateVerifier() {
byte[] bytes = new byte[32];
RANDOM.nextBytes(bytes);
return Base64.getUrlEncoder().withoutPadding().encodeToString(bytes);
}
/**
* Computes the S256 code challenge: {@code BASE64URL(SHA-256(ASCII(verifier)))}.
*/
static String computeChallenge(String verifier) throws Exception {
byte[] digest = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256")
.digest(verifier.getBytes(StandardCharsets.US_ASCII));
return Base64.getUrlEncoder().withoutPadding().encodeToString(digest);
}
}
@@ -1,112 +0,0 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.oidc;
import net.minidev.json.JSONValue;
import java.net.URI;
import java.net.URLEncoder;
import java.net.http.HttpClient;
import java.net.http.HttpRequest;
import java.net.http.HttpResponse;
import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;
import java.util.Base64;
import java.util.LinkedHashMap;
import java.util.Map;
/**
* HTTP client for OAuth2 token endpoint operations (pure HTTP, no SDK).
*
* <p>Supports two client authentication methods (RFC 6749 §2.3):
* <ul>
* <li>{@link ClientAuthMethod#POST} — credentials in form body ({@code client_secret_post})</li>
* <li>{@link ClientAuthMethod#BASIC} — credentials in {@code Authorization: Basic} header
* ({@code client_secret_basic})</li>
* </ul>
*/
final class TokenClient {
private final HttpClient http;
private final String clientId;
private final String clientSecret;
private final ClientAuthMethod authMethod;
TokenClient(HttpClient http, OidcConfig config) {
this.http = http;
this.clientId = config.clientId();
this.clientSecret = config.clientSecret();
this.authMethod = config.clientAuthMethod();
}
/** Authorization Code + PKCE exchange. */
OidcTokenResponse exchangeCode(String tokenEndpoint,
String code, String redirectUri,
String codeVerifier) throws Exception {
Map<String, String> params = new LinkedHashMap<>();
params.put("grant_type", "authorization_code");
params.put("code", code);
params.put("redirect_uri", redirectUri);
params.put("code_verifier", codeVerifier);
return post(tokenEndpoint, params);
}
/** Refresh token grant. */
OidcTokenResponse refresh(String tokenEndpoint, String refreshToken) throws Exception {
Map<String, String> params = new LinkedHashMap<>();
params.put("grant_type", "refresh_token");
params.put("refresh_token", refreshToken);
return post(tokenEndpoint, params);
}
// -- Internals ------------------------------------------------------------
private OidcTokenResponse post(String url, Map<String, String> params) throws Exception {
HttpRequest.Builder req = HttpRequest.newBuilder()
.uri(URI.create(url))
.header("Content-Type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded");
if (authMethod == ClientAuthMethod.BASIC) {
String creds = Base64.getEncoder().encodeToString(
(clientId + ":" + clientSecret).getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8));
req.header("Authorization", "Basic " + creds);
} else {
params.put("client_id", clientId);
params.put("client_secret", clientSecret);
}
HttpResponse<String> resp = http.send(
req.POST(HttpRequest.BodyPublishers.ofString(form(params))).build(),
HttpResponse.BodyHandlers.ofString());
if (resp.statusCode() < 200 || resp.statusCode() >= 300)
throw new IllegalStateException(
"Token endpoint [" + resp.statusCode() + "]: " + resp.body());
@SuppressWarnings("unchecked")
Map<String, Object> json = (Map<String, Object>) JSONValue.parse(resp.body());
return new OidcTokenResponse(
(String) json.get("access_token"),
(String) json.get("id_token"),
(String) json.get("refresh_token"),
numInt(json, "expires_in", 300),
numInt(json, "refresh_expires_in", 1800)
);
}
private static String form(Map<String, String> params) {
StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder();
params.forEach((k, v) -> {
if (!sb.isEmpty()) sb.append('&');
sb.append(enc(k)).append('=').append(enc(v));
});
return sb.toString();
}
private static String enc(String v) {
return URLEncoder.encode(v, StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
}
private static int numInt(Map<String, Object> m, String key, int def) {
Object v = m.get(key);
return v instanceof Number n ? n.intValue() : def;
}
}
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.oidc;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertEquals;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertNull;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertTrue;
/**
* What stayed behind when authorization moved to {@code flash-ext-auth-core}: reading a bearer
* token off the wire, and the RFC 6750 challenges this source answers with. The matching of
* claims those credentials produce is {@code ClaimMatchingTest}'s job now.
*/
class OidcCredentialSourceTest {
private static OidcCredentialSource source() {
return new OidcCredentialSource(null, OidcConfig
.builder("https://idp.example.com", "client", "secret", "/auth/callback")
.build(), null, null);
}
@Test
void extractBearerToken_acceptsCaseInsensitiveBearerAndTrimsSpaces() {
assertEquals("abc.def.ghi", OidcCredentialSource.extractBearerToken("Bearer abc.def.ghi"));
assertEquals("abc", OidcCredentialSource.extractBearerToken(" bearer abc "));
assertNull(OidcCredentialSource.extractBearerToken("Basic Zm9vOmJhcg=="));
assertNull(OidcCredentialSource.extractBearerToken("Bearer"));
}
@Test
void bearerChallenge_containsRealmAndRfcErrors() {
OidcCredentialSource src = source();
String basic = src.bearerChallenge();
String invalid = src.invalidTokenChallenge();
String insufficient = src.insufficientScopeChallenge(new String[]{"orders:read", "payments:write"});
assertTrue(basic.startsWith("Bearer realm=\""));
assertTrue(invalid.contains("error=\"invalid_token\""));
assertTrue(insufficient.contains("error=\"insufficient_scope\""));
assertTrue(insufficient.contains("scope=\"orders:read payments:write\""));
}
}
@@ -1,128 +0,0 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.oidc;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.openapi.OpenApiContributorRegistry;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.openapi.OpenApiOperationContribution;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.openapi.OpenApiResponseContribution;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.openapi.OpenApiContributor;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.auth.AuthPolicy;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.auth.Authenticated;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.auth.RolesAllowed;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.auth.ScopesAllowed;
import dev.relism.flash.extension.FlashContext;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import java.lang.reflect.Constructor;
import java.lang.reflect.Method;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Map;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertEquals;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertFalse;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertTrue;
class OidcOpenApiInteropTest {
@Authenticated
static class AuthOnly {}
@Authenticated(optional = true)
static class AuthOptional {}
@RolesAllowed("admin")
static class OneRole {}
@RolesAllowed({"admin", "operator"})
static class MultiRole {}
@ScopesAllowed("orders:write")
static class OneScope {}
@ScopesAllowed({"orders:write", "payments:write"})
static class MultiScope {}
@RolesAllowed("admin")
@ScopesAllowed("orders:write")
static class RoleAndScope {}
@Test
void autoResponses_authOnly() throws Exception {
Map<Integer, String> responses = responses(AuthOnly.class);
assertEquals("Authentication required", responses.get(401));
assertFalse(responses.containsKey(403));
}
@Test
void autoResponses_optionalAuth_addsNothing() throws Exception {
Map<Integer, String> responses = responses(AuthOptional.class);
assertTrue(responses.isEmpty());
}
@Test
void autoResponses_oneRole_formatsSingular() throws Exception {
Map<Integer, String> responses = responses(OneRole.class);
assertEquals("Authentication required", responses.get(401));
assertEquals("\"admin\" role required", responses.get(403));
}
@Test
void autoResponses_multiRoles_formatsPlural() throws Exception {
Map<Integer, String> responses = responses(MultiRole.class);
assertEquals("Roles \"admin, operator\" are required", responses.get(403));
}
@Test
void autoResponses_oneScope_formatsSingular() throws Exception {
Map<Integer, String> responses = responses(OneScope.class);
assertEquals("\"orders:write\" scope required", responses.get(403));
}
@Test
void autoResponses_multiScopes_formatsPlural() throws Exception {
Map<Integer, String> responses = responses(MultiScope.class);
assertEquals("Scopes \"orders:write, payments:write\" are required", responses.get(403));
}
@Test
void autoResponses_roleAndScope_combinesMessages() throws Exception {
Map<Integer, String> responses = responses(RoleAndScope.class);
assertEquals("\"admin\" role required; \"orders:write\" scope required", responses.get(403));
}
@Test
void securityContribution_presentForAuthenticatedHandler() throws Exception {
OpenApiOperationContribution operation = contributor().operationFor(AuthOnly.class);
List<Map<String, List<String>>> security = operation.security();
assertEquals(1, security.size());
assertTrue(security.getFirst().containsKey("issuer"));
}
private static OpenApiContributor contributor() throws Exception {
Class<?> clazz = Class.forName("dev.relism.flash.ext.oidc.OidcExtension$OpenApiIntegration");
Constructor<?> ctor = clazz.getDeclaredConstructor();
ctor.setAccessible(true);
Object instance = ctor.newInstance();
Method m = clazz.getDeclaredMethod("register", FlashContext.class, OidcConfig.class, OidcProviderMetadata.class);
m.setAccessible(true);
FlashContext ctx = new FlashContext();
OpenApiContributorRegistry registry = new OpenApiContributorRegistry();
ctx.provide(OpenApiContributorRegistry.class, registry);
ctx.complete();
OidcConfig config = OidcConfig.builder("https://issuer", "c", "s", "/cb").build();
OidcProviderMetadata meta = new OidcProviderMetadata("a", "t", "u", "j", "e");
m.invoke(instance, ctx, config, meta);
return registry.contributors().getFirst();
}
private static Map<Integer, String> responses(Class<?> cls) throws Exception {
Map<Integer, OpenApiResponseContribution> byCode = contributor().operationFor(cls).responses();
java.util.LinkedHashMap<Integer, String> out = new java.util.LinkedHashMap<>();
for (Map.Entry<Integer, OpenApiResponseContribution> e : byCode.entrySet()) {
out.put(e.getKey(), e.getValue().description());
}
return out;
}
}
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ FlashApp.create(8080)
// With custom resolvers
LimiterConfig conf = new LimiterConfig()
.registerResolver("auth_user", req ->
ClaimsHolder.exists() ? ClaimsHolder.user().sub() : "anonymous");
SecurityIdentity.current() != null ? SecurityIdentity.current().principal().name() : "anonymous");
FlashApp.create(8080)
.install(new LimiterExtension(conf))
@@ -35,11 +35,11 @@ conf.registerResolver("ip", req -> {
LimiterConfig conf = new LimiterConfig();
```
### By authenticated user (OIDC / ClaimsHolder)
### By authenticated user
```java
conf.registerResolver("auth_user", req ->
ClaimsHolder.exists() ? ClaimsHolder.user().sub() : "anonymous");
SecurityIdentity.current() != null ? SecurityIdentity.current().principal().name() : "anonymous");
```
Requests from unauthenticated users share the `"anonymous"` bucket. If you want
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ returns the same key for the same user regardless of endpoint; the limit is set
```java
conf.registerResolver("auth_user", req ->
ClaimsHolder.exists() ? ClaimsHolder.user().sub() : "anon");
SecurityIdentity.current() != null ? SecurityIdentity.current().principal().name() : "anon");
```
```java
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ import dev.relism.flash.models.Request;
*
* <pre>{@code
* conf.registerResolver("ip", req -> req.header("X-Forwarded-For"));
* conf.registerResolver("auth_user", req -> ClaimsHolder.user().sub());
* conf.registerResolver("auth_user", req -> SecurityIdentity.current().principal().name());
* }</pre>
*/
@FunctionalInterface
@@ -21,8 +21,8 @@ import java.util.Map;
* <pre>{@code
* LimiterConfig conf = new LimiterConfig()
* .registerResolver("auth_user", req -> {
* // custom logic — e.g. extract sub from ClaimsHolder
* return ClaimsHolder.exists() ? ClaimsHolder.user().sub() : "anonymous";
* // custom logic — e.g. key by the authenticated caller
* return SecurityIdentity.current() != null ? SecurityIdentity.current().principal().name() : "anonymous";
* });
*
* app.install(new LimiterExtension(conf));
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ import java.util.Map;
* <h3>Lambda routes (via Guard)</h3>
* <pre>{@code
* app.install(new LimiterExtension(
* new LimiterConfig().registerResolver("auth_user", req -> ClaimsHolder.user().sub())));
* new LimiterConfig().registerResolver("auth_user", req -> SecurityIdentity.current().principal().name())));
*
* // inside a FlashContext.onReady(...) callback:
* Guard guard = ctx.require(Guard.class);
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
`flash-ext-mcp` turns a Flash5 app into an [MCP](https://modelcontextprotocol.io) (Model Context
Protocol) server: JSON-RPC 2.0 over the Streamable HTTP transport, tools/resources/prompts
declared as plain classes and discovered at boot, optional OAuth2 protection built on
`flash-ext-auth-oidc`.
`flash-ext-security-core`.
## Quick Start
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ public class GetWeatherTool extends McpTool {
`tools-resources-prompts.md`.
- **Transport**: Streamable HTTP, `POST`-only, stateless in this revision — see `transport.md`
for exactly what that means and why.
- **Security**: optional, policy-driven OAuth2 via `flash-ext-auth-oidc` — see `security.md`.
- **Security**: authenticated by `flash-ext-security-core`, an OAuth2 protected resource when OIDC is installed — see `security.md`.
- **JSON**: this extension owns its JSON handling independently of `flash-ext-jackson` — see
`jackson-interop.md` for why, and how a future opt-in reuse could work.
@@ -53,6 +53,4 @@ public class GetWeatherTool extends McpTool {
- [`tools-resources-prompts.md`](tools-resources-prompts.md) — defining tools, resources, prompts
- [`transport.md`](transport.md) — Streamable HTTP scope, session/SSE limitations, Origin validation
- [`security.md`](security.md) — `McpSecurity` policy, OAuth2 resolution, RFC 9728 / RFC 8707
- [`keycloak.md`](keycloak.md) — Keycloak-specific setup cookbook: Dynamic Client Registration,
the RFC 8707 audience mapper gotcha, and how to verify/debug it
- [`jackson-interop.md`](jackson-interop.md) — why this extension does not depend on `flash-ext-jackson`
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ see `tools-resources-prompts.md` — and the fixed `TextContent`/`TextResourceCo
as a `JsonNode` tree, not as a databound class, for the same reason — a JSON-RPC tool call's
arguments aren't a DTO with getters/setters, they're a dynamic, per-tool-defined bag of values.
This mirrors how `flash-ext-auth-oidc` already handles its own internal JSON needs (`json-smart` for
This mirrors how `flash-ext-security-oidc` handles its own JSON needs (Nimbus's parser for
token-endpoint responses) independently of `flash-ext-jackson` — extensions with protocol-level
JSON needs that are shaped by a spec, not by user code, own that JSON handling themselves rather
than routing it through the app's general-purpose JSON extension.
@@ -44,8 +44,7 @@ Nothing here rules out a later, additive convenience layer: `McpExtension.routes
that shared mapper as the backing for an escape hatch such as `ToolArguments.as(Class<T>)` or
for a tool that wants to `ToolResponse.success(someRecord)` and have it serialized with the
app's own conventions — falling back to a locally-constructed default `ObjectMapper` when
`flash-ext-jackson` isn't installed, the same "prefer shared, degrade to sane default" shape
already used for `McpSecurity.AUTO`. That would be purely additive on top of the
`flash-ext-jackson` isn't installed. That would be purely additive on top of the
`JsonGenerator`-based envelope/content writing described above, not a replacement for it — the
fixed-shape protocol plumbing has no reason to ever go through databinding, regardless of what
convenience layer gets added around it.
@@ -1,107 +0,0 @@
# Keycloak cookbook
`security.md` covers the OAuth2 mechanics `McpOidcIntegration` implements against any
`flash-ext-auth-oidc`-compatible provider. This is the Keycloak-specific setup: the exact Admin
Console configuration for a working MCP OAuth2 flow with open Dynamic Client Registration
(DCR) — no pre-registered clients, any MCP client self-registers on first connect.
## 1. Allow Dynamic Client Registration
MCP clients (Claude Desktop, Claude.ai, MCP Inspector, others) don't share one static OAuth
client — each has its own `redirect_uri` and none know your realm in advance. They self-register
on first connect via `POST {issuer}/clients-registrations/openid-connect` (the
`registration_endpoint` from the AS metadata document, reached via the RFC 9728 Protected
Resource Metadata document `McpExtension` publishes).
**Clients → Client registration**: remove the **Trusted Hosts** policy — it rejects anonymous
registration from hosts not on an explicit allowlist (`403` / `"Host not trusted"`), which
doesn't scale to arbitrary future agents. This does not weaken end-user authentication — DCR
only grants an app a `client_id`; every user still authenticates against Keycloak's real login
screen regardless of which client asked. Lighter hygiene policies (**Max Clients Limit**,
**Consent Required**) can stay, they don't interfere.
## 2. RFC 8707 audience: mapper on `basic`, not a custom scope
`McpOidcIntegration` rejects (403) any token whose `aud` doesn't include the MCP endpoint's
canonical URL. Keycloak doesn't add this by default. The obvious fix — a custom client scope
with an Audience mapper, marked Default, added to Allowed Client Scopes — **does not work**:
clients created via the `openid-connect` DCR endpoint only ever get scopes they explicitly
request, and most MCP clients (including MCP Inspector) don't request anything beyond what a
server tells them to via `scopes_supported` (step 3). Default-scope auto-attachment, which is
how a normal manually-created client would pick up a custom Default scope, doesn't apply to
DCR-created clients at all.
`basic` is the one built-in scope Keycloak attaches to every client unconditionally, regardless
of what it registered with. Put the audience mapper there:
1. **Client scopes → `basic`****Mappers****Add mapper****By configuration**
**Audience**.
2. **Included Custom Audience** = the exact value your server expects — check
`GET {parent-of-rootPath}/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource{rootPath}` on the running
server for the `resource` field it publishes (auto-derived from the request's
forwarded/`Host` headers — see `security.md`). Leave **Included Client Audience** empty (that
targets another Keycloak client, not a resource URL).
3. **Add to access token** = ON.
4. **Save.**
This is unconditional and works regardless of client cooperation — keep it even after step 3
below gets other claims flowing normally, since audience binding is a hard spec requirement
that shouldn't depend on a client bothering to request the right scope.
## 3. Other claims (username, email...): `scopes_supported` + Allowed Client Scopes
`OidcUser.username()`/`.email()`/`.name()` read `preferred_username`/`email`/`name` — normally
from the `profile`/`email` client scopes, which DCR clients don't get either, same root cause.
Unlike audience, this **is** fixable the "normal" way, because it doesn't need to survive a
completely uncooperative client:
`McpConfig.scopesSupported("openid", "profile", "email")` publishes those scopes in the PRM
document. MCP clients that read it (confirmed for MCP Inspector) echo them back in their DCR
registration request — `"scope": "openid profile email offline_access"` (`offline_access` is
Inspector's own addition, for refresh tokens). For that request to actually succeed, **Allowed
Client Scopes** needs, exactly:
- **`openid` listed explicitly.** The one genuinely non-obvious step: `openid` is not covered by
**Allow Default Scopes** (On by default) the way other realm-Default scopes are, even though
every OIDC request includes it. Until it's listed here, registration fails with a generic
`403 insufficient_scope` / `"Not permitted to use specified clientScope"` regardless of
whether everything else is configured correctly.
- **`offline_access` listed explicitly** — it's Optional, not Default, so `ALLOW_DEFAULT_SCOPES`
doesn't cover it either.
- **`profile`/`email` — do not list them here.** Mark them **Default** on the **Client scopes**
page (Assigned Type column) instead, and leave **Allow Default Scopes** = On. Adding an
already-Default scope to this list explicitly gets rejected on save
(`"Client scopes not allowed: [...]"`) — the list is for *additional* Optional scopes only.
With that, a real client's token comes back with `preferred_username`/`email` populated
normally.
### Fallback for anything else
For a claim not covered by `openid profile email` (a custom attribute, a role) — or for a client
that ignores `scopes_supported` entirely — add a **User Property** mapper to `basic` too
(Property `username` → Token Claim Name `preferred_username`, or whatever's needed), same as the
audience mapper in step 2. Unconditional, works regardless of client cooperation, costs one
mapper per claim, once, at the realm level — not per tool.
## Verifying without a full OAuth round-trip
**Clients → (any client) → Client scopes → Evaluate**: pick a user, run it — Default scopes
(including `basic`) apply automatically and won't appear in the "Select scope parameters"
picker, which only lists Optional ones — and check the **Generated Access Token** preview.
Confirms mappers work without a browser + real MCP client round-trip each time.
## If a real client still gets rejected
`McpOidcIntegration.audienceGuard` logs the actual mismatch at `WARN`:
```
[flash-ext-mcp] Rejecting token (RFC 8707): aud=<token's actual aud> does not include expected
resource identifier "<what this server expects>" — ...
```
`aud=null` → the `basic` mapper produced nothing (most common cause: **Included Custom
Audience** left blank — the mapper saves fine and silently does nothing without it). A non-null
`aud` that still doesn't match → compare byte-for-byte — the expected side is derived from the
request's own forwarded/`Host` headers, so scheme/host/trailing-slash mismatches show up here
directly, as does a proxy hop that drops `X-Forwarded-Host`.
+35 -176
View File
@@ -1,188 +1,47 @@
# Security
Provider-specific setup steps (not generic OAuth2 mechanics) live in separate cookbooks —
[`keycloak.md`](keycloak.md) for Keycloak: enabling Dynamic Client Registration, why the RFC 8707
audience mapper needs to go on the built-in `basic` scope instead of a custom one, and the exact
Allowed Client Scopes configuration `scopes_supported` needs to actually work.
The MCP endpoint is secured by [`flash-ext-security-core`](../../flash-ext-security-core/docs/README.md):
whatever mechanisms the application registers — OAuth2 bearer tokens, API keys, custom ones —
authenticate `/mcp` exactly as they authenticate every other route.
## `McpSecurity`
| `McpConfig.security(...)` | |
|---|---|
| `REQUIRED` (default) | every call must be authenticated; boot fails without a `SecurityExtension` |
| `NONE` | a public endpoint; a tool carrying security annotations fails the boot |
`McpConfig.security(...)` controls how the MCP endpoint reacts to `flash-ext-auth-oidc` being
installed (`ctx.find(OidcMiddleware.class)`), resolved once at boot in `McpExtension.routes()`:
## OAuth2 protected resource
| Policy | `flash-ext-auth-oidc` installed | `flash-ext-auth-oidc` absent |
|---|---|---|
| `REQUIRED` | protected | **boot fails** (`IllegalStateException`) |
| `AUTO` (default) | protected | runs unprotected, logs a warning |
| `NONE` | never protected, even if oidc is installed elsewhere in the app | runs unprotected |
When a registered mechanism publishes an OAuth2 issuer — `flash-ext-security-oidc` does — the endpoint
behaves as the MCP authorization spec requires, with nothing to configure:
### Guarding `/mcp` without OAuth2
- `GET /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp` serves RFC 9728 metadata: the `resource` (derived per
request from `X-Forwarded-Proto`/`-Host` or `Host`), every issuer as `authorization_servers`, and
`scopes_supported` when `McpConfig.scopesSupported(...)` is set;
- an anonymous call gets `401` with `WWW-Authenticate: Bearer resource_metadata="…"`;
- a token whose `aud` does not include the resource is `403` (RFC 8707) and logged at `WARN`. Credentials
that are not audience-bound, such as API keys, are unaffected.
`McpSecurity` only ever answers "is `flash-ext-auth-oidc` installed". An app that authenticates
some other way sets `McpSecurity.NONE` and supplies its own guard:
For Keycloak, the audience comes from an *Audience* protocol mapper whose included custom audience is
the resource URL, attached to a client scope every MCP client receives (the built-in `basic` scope is the
one that needs no client cooperation). Clients that register dynamically need Keycloak's anonymous
client registration policies relaxed for the trusted hosts.
`McpConfig.requireTokenAudience(false)` drops that last check for an authorization server that cannot
mint a resource audience at all — Keycloak ignores RFC 8707's `resource` parameter, so a deployment that
cannot add the mapper has no other way in. Every token a registered issuer signs is then accepted on the
endpoint, and the boot logs say so.
## Tool policies
The core annotations work on tools as on handlers, checked per `tools/call` against the caller the route
authenticated:
```java
McpConfig.builder("my-server")
.toolsPackage("com.example.mcp")
.security(McpSecurity.NONE)
.middleware(myAuthMiddleware.protect())
.build();
@Tool(name = "approve", description = "Approves a pending proposal")
@RolesAllowed(value = "REVIEWER", on = {"project", "locale"}) // read from the tool's arguments
public class ApproveTool extends McpTool { }
```
`McpConfig.middleware(...)` runs after the transport guards and after whatever `McpSecurity`
resolved to, so it composes with OAuth2 protection rather than replacing it — the same hook is how
you add rate limiting, audit logging or tracing to the endpoint. It never satisfies `REQUIRED`,
which still asks for a real authorization server.
A denial is a tool result with `isError: true` — the call reached the server, the tool did not run.
Use `REQUIRED` for anything you intend to run in production reachable over the network — it
turns "someone forgot to wire up OAuth2" into a startup crash instead of a silently open
endpoint. `AUTO` is meant for local development, where spinning up a real identity provider is
friction you don't want yet.
## Why `flash-ext-auth-oidc` is an *optional* Maven dependency, concretely
Maven's `<optional>true</optional>` only affects **transitive** propagation: consumers of
`flash-ext-mcp` don't get `flash-ext-auth-oidc` pulled in automatically unless they add it themselves.
Within `flash-ext-mcp` itself, `flash-ext-auth-oidc`'s classes are on the compile/test classpath as
normal — this extension can (and does) reference `OidcMiddleware`/`ClaimsHolder` directly in
source.
That reference is isolated in its own class, `McpOidcIntegration`, invoked only from inside a
`catch (NoClassDefFoundError)` block. A bare class-literal like `OidcMiddleware.class` (which
`ctx.find(OidcMiddleware.class)` needs) forces the JVM to resolve that type the moment it's
evaluated — if `flash-ext-auth-oidc` is not on the *runtime* classpath at all (a genuinely
MCP-only install, no OAuth2 anywhere in the app), the first such reference throws
`NoClassDefFoundError`. Keeping that reference inside a separate, lazily-loaded class means
`McpExtension` itself loads and works fine standalone; only the attempt to actually use OIDC
fails, and only when there's something to fail. This mirrors `OidcExtension`'s own lazy bridge to
`flash-ext-openapi` — same technique, same reason.
## OAuth2 resolution details — zero-config by default
When oidc is available and `security() != NONE`, `McpOidcIntegration` (an isolated,
lazily-loaded bridge — see its javadoc) derives everything an MCP OAuth2 resource server needs
straight from the installed `OidcMiddleware`, with no additional `McpConfig` calls required:
1. The MCP route is wrapped with `flash-ext-auth-oidc`'s own `OidcMiddleware.protect(resourceMetadataPath)`
— the same Bearer-token/JWKS validation path used everywhere else in Flash5, plus a
`resource_metadata` challenge parameter (see below). No JWT parsing or JWKS handling is
reimplemented here.
2. An audience guard always runs after `protect(...)`: it reads the validated claims from
`ClaimsHolder` and rejects (`403`) any token whose `aud` claim does not include the resource
identifier — **RFC 8707 Resource Indicators / audience binding**, enforced unconditionally,
not opt-in. `OidcMiddleware` itself validates `aud` against its own `clientId` for ID
tokens, but deliberately does not enforce audience on access tokens (it varies by provider)
— the MCP extension adds that check on top, scoped to its own resource identifier.
3. The resource identifier is the canonical URI of the MCP endpoint, resolved **per request** by
`OidcMiddleware#selfOrigin` + `rootPath` — the same scheme/host resolution `OidcExtension`
uses for its own redirect URIs: `X-Forwarded-Host`/`X-Forwarded-Proto` when the request came
through a reverse proxy, otherwise `{selfScheme()}://{Host header}`. Behind a proxy the
`Host` alone is the upstream address the proxy dialled, which would publish a resource
identifier no client can reach. `McpConfig.resourceIdentifier(...)` still overrides it
outright for a proxy that forwards neither header.
4. The authorization server issuer is read from `OidcMiddleware#issuer()` unless
`McpConfig.authorizationServerIssuer(...)` overrides it.
## RFC 9728 Protected Resource Metadata
Whenever the endpoint ends up protected, `flash-ext-mcp` publishes a Protected Resource Metadata
document at `/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource{rootPath}` — no explicit `resourceIdentifier`/
`authorizationServerIssuer` configuration required, both are auto-derived as described above:
```json
{ "resource": "https://mcp.example.com/mcp", "authorization_servers": ["https://auth.example.com/realms/myrealm"] }
```
`resource` is computed per request from the incoming request's forwarded/`Host` headers (see
above), so the document is correct without hardcoding the server's own public URL.
### `scopes_supported`
Optional per RFC 9728, omitted from the document entirely unless set via
`McpConfig.scopesSupported("openid", "profile", "email")`:
```json
{ "resource": "...", "authorization_servers": ["..."], "scopes_supported": ["openid", "profile", "email"] }
```
This is pure advertisement — token validation doesn't change based on it — but it matters in
practice: a client that ignores it and requests no scope at all (many do — see `keycloak.md`)
only gets back whatever the authorization server treats as always-included regardless of
request, which for Keycloak is just its built-in `basic` scope. A client that *does* read
`scopes_supported` and echoes it back in its authorization/token requests gets a token with the
claims those scopes actually provide (`profile``preferred_username`/`name`, etc.), without
needing every one of those claims hand-mapped onto `basic`. Set it to whatever scopes your
`McpTool`s actually read off `ClaimsHolder`/`OidcUser` — there's no way to auto-derive this list,
it depends entirely on what your tools do with the claims.
## `WWW-Authenticate: resource_metadata` (RFC 9728 §5.1)
The MCP Authorization spec **requires** a `401` to carry `resource_metadata` in
`WWW-Authenticate`, pointing at the Protected Resource Metadata document above — this is how a
spec-compliant client discovers the authorization server without out-of-band configuration.
`OidcMiddleware.protect(String resourceMetadataPath)` (an overload added specifically for this)
builds that challenge automatically:
```
WWW-Authenticate: Bearer realm="...", resource_metadata="https://mcp.example.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp"
```
The plain `OidcMiddleware.protect()` (no argument), used by every other Flash5 app, is
unaffected — this parameter is additive and MCP-specific.
## Per-tool `@RolesAllowed`/`@ScopesAllowed`
`McpTool` subclasses can carry `flash-ext-auth-oidc`'s `@RolesAllowed`/`@ScopesAllowed`:
```java
@Tool(name = "delete_route", description = "Delete a route")
@RolesAllowed("admin")
public class DeleteRouteTool extends McpTool {
@Override public ToolResponse call(ToolArguments args) { ... }
}
```
This does **not** reuse `flash-ext-auth-oidc`'s per-route middleware mechanism (`ctx.addAnnotationProcessor`,
the thing that makes these annotations work on a `RequestHandler`) — it can't: every tool shares
one HTTP route (`POST {rootPath}`), already wrapped by whatever `McpSecurity` resolved above, so
there is no per-tool route to attach a different middleware chain to. Instead,
`McpOidcIntegration.compileToolPolicy` reads the annotations once at boot (`McpRegistry.scan`)
and compiles them into a closure (`McpAuthPolicy`) that `McpDispatcher` runs *after* the
route-wide auth has already succeeded and *before* invoking the specific tool named in the
`tools/call` request — narrowing what's already-authenticated, not replacing it. A denial is a
normal `isError: true` tool result (see `ToolResponse.error`), not an HTTP-level rejection — the
model sees why, the same as any other tool failure.
Roles are read via `OidcUser#hasRole` against `McpConfig.rolesClaimPath(...)` (default
`"realm_access.roles"`, matching `OidcConfig`'s own default — set this explicitly if the two
diverge; there's no way to read `OidcConfig`'s actual configured value from here). Scopes use
`OidcUser#hasScope`'s built-in default claim paths (`scope`/`scp`), no extra config needed.
`@ScopesAllowed(match = ScopesAllowed.Match.ANY)` and multi-role `@RolesAllowed({"admin",
"editor"})` (OR semantics) both work exactly as they do on a `RequestHandler`.
**`@Authenticated` alone has no effect and fails boot.** Once oidc is active for a server, every
tool call is already authenticated — there's no per-tool public/authenticated split the way
there is for HTTP routes, so a bare `@Authenticated` on a tool can't mean anything and would
silently do nothing if allowed to compile. Boot fails instead, with a message pointing at
`@RolesAllowed`/`@ScopesAllowed` as the actual narrowing mechanism.
**Annotating a tool without active OAuth2 also fails boot**, not silently at request time: if
`@RolesAllowed`/`@ScopesAllowed`/`@Authenticated` shows up on a tool while `McpSecurity` resolved
to unprotected (`NONE`, or `AUTO` with no oidc installed), that's very likely a forgotten
`OidcExtension` install or a `McpSecurity.NONE` left over from local dev — `IllegalStateException`
at `app.start()`.
## The `HttpException` safety net
`flash-ext-auth-oidc`'s middleware throws `HttpException.unauthorized()`/`forbidden()` on auth
failure. Flash5's core does **not** special-case `HttpException` in the default exception
handler — the out-of-the-box `AbstractRouter` default always returns a generic `500`, regardless
of the thrown exception's embedded status code; only an app that explicitly calls
`FlashApp#onException(...)` (or installs something that does) gets `HttpException.status()`
honored.
To keep the MCP endpoint correct regardless of what the rest of the app configures,
`McpTransportGuards.httpExceptionGuard()` wraps the whole route and translates `HttpException`
into the right HTTP status itself, rather than letting it fall through to the app's (possibly
unconfigured) global handler. This is scoped entirely to the MCP route — it does not touch or
override the app's `onException` for any other route.
`McpConfig.middleware(...)` runs after authentication, for rate limiting, auditing or tracing.
+17 -2
View File
@@ -19,8 +19,7 @@
</dependency>
<dependency>
<groupId>dev.relism</groupId>
<artifactId>flash-ext-auth-oidc</artifactId>
<optional>true</optional>
<artifactId>flash-ext-security-core</artifactId>
</dependency>
<dependency>
<groupId>com.fasterxml.jackson.core</groupId>
@@ -43,6 +42,22 @@
<artifactId>flash-testing</artifactId>
<scope>test</scope>
</dependency>
<dependency>
<groupId>dev.relism</groupId>
<artifactId>flash-ext-security-test</artifactId>
</dependency>
<dependency>
<groupId>dev.relism</groupId>
<artifactId>flash-ext-security-oidc</artifactId>
<version>${project.version}</version>
<scope>test</scope>
</dependency>
<dependency>
<groupId>dev.relism</groupId>
<artifactId>flash-ext-security-apikey</artifactId>
<version>${project.version}</version>
<scope>test</scope>
</dependency>
</dependencies>
</project>
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp;
import java.util.function.Supplier;
/**
* Compiled per-tool authorization requirement, built once at boot by {@link McpOidcIntegration}
* from {@code @RolesAllowed}/{@code @ScopesAllowed} on an {@link McpTool} subclass — {@code null}
* on {@link McpRegistry.RegisteredTool} means no restriction beyond whatever {@link McpSecurity}
* already enforces route-wide.
*
* <p>{@code check} is a closure, not a raw role/scope list — this is what lets this record (and
* its only caller, {@link McpDispatcher}) stay free of any compile-time reference to a {@code
* flash-ext-auth-oidc} type, preserving the same classload isolation {@link McpOidcIntegration}'s
* javadoc describes for the rest of the OIDC bridge. Only the plain-JDK {@link Supplier}
* signature crosses the boundary; the closure itself, built once inside {@code
* McpOidcIntegration}, is the only place that ever touches {@code OidcUser}/{@code ClaimsHolder}.
*
* <p>Returns {@code null} from {@link #check()}{@code .get()} when authorized, or a
* human-readable denial reason otherwise — invoked once per {@code tools/call} against an
* annotated tool, never allocated on that path (the closure and its captured role/scope arrays
* are built exactly once, at boot).
*/
record McpAuthPolicy(Supplier<String> check) {}
@@ -26,8 +26,7 @@ public final class McpConfig {
private final String rootPath;
private final String toolsPackage;
private final McpSecurity security;
private final String resourceIdentifier;
private final String authorizationServerIssuer;
private final boolean requireTokenAudience;
private final List<String> allowedOrigins;
private final List<String> scopesSupported;
private final List<Middleware> middleware;
@@ -39,8 +38,7 @@ public final class McpConfig {
this.rootPath = b.rootPath;
this.toolsPackage = b.toolsPackage;
this.security = b.security;
this.resourceIdentifier = b.resourceIdentifier;
this.authorizationServerIssuer = b.authorizationServerIssuer;
this.requireTokenAudience = b.requireTokenAudience;
this.allowedOrigins = List.copyOf(b.allowedOrigins);
this.scopesSupported = List.copyOf(b.scopesSupported);
this.middleware = List.copyOf(b.middleware);
@@ -52,8 +50,7 @@ public final class McpConfig {
String rootPath() { return rootPath; }
String toolsPackage() { return toolsPackage; }
McpSecurity security() { return security; }
String resourceIdentifier() { return resourceIdentifier; }
String authorizationServerIssuer() { return authorizationServerIssuer; }
boolean requireTokenAudience() { return requireTokenAudience; }
List<String> allowedOrigins() { return allowedOrigins; }
List<String> scopesSupported() { return scopesSupported; }
List<Middleware> middleware() { return middleware; }
@@ -66,9 +63,8 @@ public final class McpConfig {
private String instructions;
private String rootPath = "/mcp";
private String toolsPackage;
private McpSecurity security = McpSecurity.AUTO;
private String resourceIdentifier;
private String authorizationServerIssuer;
private McpSecurity security = McpSecurity.REQUIRED;
private boolean requireTokenAudience = true;
private final List<String> allowedOrigins = new ArrayList<>();
private final List<String> scopesSupported = new ArrayList<>();
private final List<Middleware> middleware = new ArrayList<>();
@@ -91,28 +87,16 @@ public final class McpConfig {
/** Package scanned for {@link Tool @Tool}/{@link Resource @Resource}/{@link Prompt @Prompt} classes. Required. */
public Builder toolsPackage(String toolsPackage) { this.toolsPackage = toolsPackage; return this; }
/** OAuth2 requirement policy. Default {@link McpSecurity#AUTO}. */
/** Default {@link McpSecurity#REQUIRED}. */
public Builder security(McpSecurity security) { this.security = security; return this; }
/**
* Canonical URI of this MCP endpoint, used for RFC 8707 audience binding: tokens whose
* {@code aud} claim does not include this value are rejected. Optional — when
* {@code flash-ext-auth-oidc} is installed, this is auto-derived per request from the
* forwarded/{@code Host} headers (same resolution {@code OidcExtension} uses for its own
* redirect URIs) and audience binding is enforced unconditionally. Set this explicitly
* only to override that guess — a reverse proxy that forwards neither
* {@code X-Forwarded-Host} nor {@code X-Forwarded-Proto}.
* Whether a bearer token must name this endpoint in its {@code aud} (RFC 8707), as the MCP
* authorization spec requires. Default {@code true}. Turn it off for an authorization server
* that cannot mint a resource audience — every token a registered issuer signs is then
* accepted on the endpoint, and a warning is logged at boot.
*/
public Builder resourceIdentifier(String resourceIdentifier) { this.resourceIdentifier = resourceIdentifier; return this; }
/**
* Authorization server issuer URL, published in the RFC 9728 Protected Resource
* Metadata document at {@code /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource{rootPath}}. Optional
* — when {@code flash-ext-auth-oidc} is installed, this is auto-derived from its configured
* issuer. Set this explicitly only to override that (e.g. publishing a different issuer
* than the one actually validating tokens).
*/
public Builder authorizationServerIssuer(String issuer) { this.authorizationServerIssuer = issuer; return this; }
public Builder requireTokenAudience(boolean require) { this.requireTokenAudience = require; return this; }
/**
* Origins allowed to call the MCP endpoint (DNS-rebinding protection, per the Streamable
@@ -121,30 +105,10 @@ public final class McpConfig {
*/
public Builder allowedOrigins(String... origins) { this.allowedOrigins.addAll(List.of(origins)); return this; }
/**
* OAuth2 scopes this server expects clients to request, published as {@code
* scopes_supported} in the RFC 9728 Protected Resource Metadata document. Optional per
* the spec — omitted from the document entirely if never set. A spec-compliant client
* reads this to know what to put in its authorization/token requests instead of
* requesting nothing; see {@code docs/keycloak.md}'s "same story for any other claim"
* section for why this matters in practice (a client that requests no scope only gets
* whatever your authorization server treats as always-included, e.g. Keycloak's `basic`).
* Purely advertisement — this server still validates whatever token it actually receives
* the same way regardless of what a client requested.
*/
/** Published as {@code scopes_supported} in the RFC 9728 metadata, so OAuth clients request them. */
public Builder scopesSupported(String... scopes) { this.scopesSupported.addAll(List.of(scopes)); return this; }
/**
* Middleware to run on the MCP route, in the order given, after the transport guards and
* after whatever {@link McpSecurity} resolved to. Rate limiting, audit logging, tracing —
* anything that is routine on every other Flash route and had no way in here.
*
* <p>It runs on an authenticated request when OAuth2 protection is active, and is the only
* thing standing in front of the endpoint when it is not: {@link McpSecurity#NONE} plus a
* middleware of your own is how an app that authenticates some other way guards
* {@code /mcp}. It never satisfies {@link McpSecurity#REQUIRED}, which still asks for a
* real authorization server.
*/
/** Runs on the MCP route after the transport guards and authentication — rate limiting, auditing, tracing. */
public Builder middleware(Middleware... middleware) {
this.middleware.addAll(List.of(middleware));
return this;
@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ package dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp;
import com.fasterxml.jackson.core.JsonGenerator;
import com.fasterxml.jackson.databind.JsonNode;
import dev.relism.flash.http.ContentType;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.security.SecurityIdentity;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.security.SecurityPolicy;
import dev.relism.flash.models.Request;
import dev.relism.flash.models.Response;
@@ -18,10 +20,10 @@ import java.io.IOException;
* tool/resource/prompt name, resource/prompt handler exceptions) is a JSON-RPC error object,
* always returned with HTTP 200: the HTTP request itself succeeded, only the RPC did not. Only
* malformed HTTP-level input (unparsable JSON, not a JSON object) gets HTTP 400. A
* {@code @RolesAllowed}/{@code @ScopesAllowed} denial (see {@link McpAuthPolicy}) is the same
* {@code @RolesAllowed}/{@code @ScopesAllowed} denial (see {@link SecurityPolicy}) is the same
* category — {@code isError: true}, tool never invoked — not a transport-level rejection; the
* route-wide 401/403 for "not authenticated at all" already happened earlier, in the {@code
* OidcMiddleware}/audience-guard middleware chain, before this dispatcher ever runs.
* route-wide 401/403 already happened earlier, in the security middleware, before this
* dispatcher ever runs.
*/
final class McpDispatcher {
@@ -136,12 +138,14 @@ final class McpDispatcher {
if (tool == null)
throw McpProtocolException.invalidParams("Unknown tool: " + name);
ToolArguments args = new ToolArguments(params.path("arguments"));
SecurityPolicy policy = tool.policy();
ToolResponse result;
String denied = tool.policy() != null ? tool.policy().check().get() : null;
if (denied != null) {
result = ToolResponse.error("Tool \"" + name + "\" denied: " + denied);
if (policy != null && !policy.permitsScopes(SecurityIdentity.current())) {
result = ToolResponse.error("Tool \"" + name + "\" denied: missing scope");
} else if (policy != null && !policy.permitsRoles(SecurityIdentity.current(), args::getString)) {
result = ToolResponse.error("Tool \"" + name + "\" denied: missing role");
} else {
ToolArguments args = new ToolArguments(params.path("arguments"));
try {
result = tool.instance().call(args);
} catch (Exception e) {
@@ -1,5 +1,10 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp;
import dev.relism.flash.exceptions.HttpException;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.security.SecurityExtension;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.security.SecurityIdentity;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.security.SecurityPolicy;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.security.SecurityScheme;
import dev.relism.flash.extension.FlashContext;
import dev.relism.flash.extension.FlashExtension;
import dev.relism.flash.extension.FlashRegistrar;
@@ -9,38 +14,25 @@ import lombok.extern.slf4j.Slf4j;
import java.util.ArrayList;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Objects;
/**
* MCP (Model Context Protocol) server extension. Streamable HTTP transport — a single
* {@code POST} JSON-RPC endpoint, stateless in this revision (no session, no SSE stream; see
* {@code docs/transport.md}) — dispatch precompiled at boot from classes annotated with
* {@link Tool @Tool}/{@link Resource @Resource}/{@link Prompt @Prompt} under
* MCP (Model Context Protocol) server extension. Streamable HTTP transport — a single {@code POST}
* JSON-RPC endpoint, stateless in this revision (see {@code docs/transport.md}) — dispatching to
* {@link Tool @Tool}/{@link Resource @Resource}/{@link Prompt @Prompt} classes under
* {@link McpConfig#toolsPackage(String)}.
*
* <pre>{@code
* // Standalone, no OAuth2
* FlashApp.create(8080)
* .install(new McpExtension(McpConfig.builder("my-mcp-server")
* .toolsPackage("com.example.tools")
* .build()))
* .start();
*
* // With flash-ext-auth-oidc as the OAuth2 resource server — zero extra config: issuer, canonical
* // resource identifier, RFC 8707 audience binding and RFC 9728 metadata are all derived from
* // the installed OidcExtension.
* FlashApp.create(8080)
* .install(new OidcExtension(oidcConfig))
* .install(new McpExtension(McpConfig.builder("my-mcp-server")
* .toolsPackage("com.example.tools")
* .security(McpSecurity.REQUIRED)
* .build()))
* .start();
* app.install(new SecurityExtension())
* .install(new OidcExtension(OidcProvider.of("sso", issuer, clientId, secret)))
* .install(new McpExtension(McpConfig.builder("my-server").toolsPackage("com.example.tools").build()));
* }</pre>
*
* <p>One server per {@code McpExtension} instance — install multiple instances (distinct
* {@code rootPath}, distinct {@code toolsPackage}) for multiple MCP servers on one app,
* mirroring the {@code OidcExtension} multi-tenant pattern. See {@code docs/security.md} for
* the full OAuth2 resolution rules.
* <p>Every call is authenticated by the application's security chain — OAuth2 bearer tokens, API
* keys, anything registered. When an OAuth2 issuer is among its schemes, the endpoint is also an
* OAuth2 protected resource: RFC 9728 metadata, a {@code resource_metadata} challenge, and RFC 8707
* audience binding for audience-bound tokens. Tool annotations are enforced per call, with
* {@code @RolesAllowed(on = ...)} reading tool arguments.
*/
@Slf4j
public class McpExtension implements FlashExtension {
@@ -53,69 +45,54 @@ public class McpExtension implements FlashExtension {
@Override
public void configure(FlashRegistrar<?> app, FlashContext ctx) {
ctx.onReady(() -> registerRoutes(app, ctx));
}
ctx.onReady(() -> {
SecurityExtension security = config.security() == McpSecurity.NONE ? null : ctx.find(SecurityExtension.class)
.orElseThrow(() -> new IllegalStateException("MCP server \"" + config.name()
+ "\" requires flash-ext-security-core: install a SecurityExtension, or set McpSecurity.NONE for a public server"));
McpDispatcher dispatcher = new McpDispatcher(McpRegistry.scan(config.toolsPackage(), ctx, security),
config.name(), config.version(), config.instructions());
private void registerRoutes(FlashRegistrar<?> app, FlashContext ctx) {
// Resolved before scanning so McpRegistry knows, per tool, whether @RolesAllowed/
// @ScopesAllowed are backed by real OAuth2 protection or a boot-time misconfiguration
// (see McpOidcIntegration#compileToolPolicy) — must run first, not after.
McpOidcIntegration.Resolved secured = resolveSecurity(ctx);
McpRegistry registry = McpRegistry.scan(config.toolsPackage(), ctx, secured != null,
secured == null ? null : secured.rolesClaimPath());
McpDispatcher dispatcher = new McpDispatcher(registry, config.name(), config.version(), config.instructions());
List<Middleware> chain = new ArrayList<>(3 + config.middleware().size());
chain.add(McpTransportGuards.httpExceptionGuard());
chain.add(McpTransportGuards.originGuard(config.allowedOrigins()));
if (secured != null) chain.add(secured.security());
chain.addAll(config.middleware());
app.post(config.rootPath(), (req, res) -> { dispatcher.handle(req, res); return null; },
chain.toArray(Middleware[]::new));
registerResourceMetadata(app, secured);
}
private McpOidcIntegration.Resolved resolveSecurity(FlashContext ctx) {
if (config.security() == McpSecurity.NONE) return null;
McpOidcIntegration.Resolved resolved;
try {
resolved = McpOidcIntegration.resolve(ctx, config);
} catch (NoClassDefFoundError e) {
resolved = null; // flash-ext-auth-oidc not on the classpath at all
}
if (resolved != null) return resolved;
if (config.security() == McpSecurity.REQUIRED) {
throw new IllegalStateException(
"McpSecurity.REQUIRED but flash-ext-auth-oidc is not installed for MCP server \"" + config.name() +
"\" — install an OidcExtension before this McpExtension, or relax security to " +
"McpSecurity.AUTO/NONE if this server is meant to be public.");
}
log.warn("[flash-ext-mcp] MCP server \"{}\" is running WITHOUT OAuth2 protection — " +
"flash-ext-auth-oidc is not installed and McpSecurity.AUTO degrades to unprotected. " +
"Install flash-ext-auth-oidc or set McpSecurity.REQUIRED to make this a hard failure instead.",
config.name());
return null;
}
/**
* RFC 9728 Protected Resource Metadata, built once security is resolved — no longer
* conditioned on {@code resourceIdentifier}/{@code authorizationServerIssuer} being set
* explicitly, since {@link McpOidcIntegration#resolve} now derives both by default. The
* {@code resource} field is computed per request (it depends on that request's own
* forwarded/{@code Host} headers) via {@link McpOidcIntegration.Resolved#resourceIdentifier()}.
*/
private void registerResourceMetadata(FlashRegistrar<?> app, McpOidcIntegration.Resolved secured) {
if (secured == null) return;
String path = "/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource" + config.rootPath();
app.get(path, (req, res) -> {
res.type(ContentType.JSON);
return McpResourceMetadata.build(
secured.resourceIdentifier().apply(req), secured.issuer(), config.scopesSupported());
List<Middleware> chain = new ArrayList<>(List.of(
McpTransportGuards.httpExceptionGuard(), McpTransportGuards.originGuard(config.allowedOrigins())));
if (security != null) protect(app, security, chain);
chain.addAll(config.middleware());
app.post(config.rootPath(), (req, res) -> {
dispatcher.handle(req, res);
return null;
}, chain.toArray(Middleware[]::new));
});
}
private void protect(FlashRegistrar<?> app, SecurityExtension security, List<Middleware> chain) {
String metadataPath = "/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource" + config.rootPath();
chain.add(security.enforce(SecurityPolicy.AUTHENTICATED, (req, res) -> {
List<String> issuers = issuers(security);
res.header("WWW-Authenticate", issuers.isEmpty()
? String.join(", ", security.schemes().stream().map(SecurityScheme::challenge).toList())
: "Bearer resource_metadata=\"" + req.origin() + metadataPath + "\"");
throw HttpException.unauthorized();
}));
if (config.requireTokenAudience()) {
chain.add(next -> (req, res) -> {
String resource = req.origin() + config.rootPath();
if (!SecurityIdentity.current().principal().hasAudience(resource)) {
log.warn("[flash-ext-mcp] Rejected a token not issued for {} (RFC 8707) — the authorization server must put it in aud", resource);
throw HttpException.forbidden();
}
return next.handle(req, res);
});
} else {
log.warn("[flash-ext-mcp] Token audience validation (RFC 8707) is DISABLED for {} — every token a registered issuer signs is accepted.", config.rootPath());
}
app.get(metadataPath, (req, res) -> {
List<String> issuers = issuers(security);
if (issuers.isEmpty()) throw HttpException.notFound("Protected resource metadata");
res.type(ContentType.JSON);
return McpResourceMetadata.build(req.origin() + config.rootPath(), issuers, config.scopesSupported());
});
}
private static List<String> issuers(SecurityExtension security) {
return security.schemes().stream().map(SecurityScheme::issuer).filter(Objects::nonNull).toList();
}
}
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;
*
* <p>Not wired to {@code flash-ext-jackson} on purpose: the MCP JSON-RPC envelope is internal
* protocol plumbing, not a user-facing serialization concern, so this extension owns its
* mapper independently — same reasoning {@code flash-ext-auth-oidc} applies to its own JSON needs
* mapper independently — the same reasoning any protocol-level extension applies to its own JSON needs
* (see {@code json-smart} there). See {@code docs/jackson-interop.md} for the full rationale
* and how a future opt-in reuse of a shared {@code ObjectMapper} could work.
*/
@@ -1,186 +0,0 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.auth.AuthMiddleware;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.auth.Authenticated;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.auth.Claims;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.auth.ClaimsHolder;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.auth.RolesAllowed;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.auth.ScopesAllowed;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.oidc.OidcCredentialSource;
import dev.relism.flash.exceptions.HttpException;
import dev.relism.flash.extension.FlashContext;
import dev.relism.flash.models.Request;
import dev.relism.flash.routing.Middleware;
import lombok.extern.slf4j.Slf4j;
import java.util.LinkedHashSet;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.Optional;
import java.util.function.Function;
import java.util.function.Supplier;
/**
* Lazy, isolated bridge to {@code flash-ext-auth-oidc} and {@code flash-ext-auth-core}.
*
* <p>References to OIDC types only ever resolve when {@link #resolve}/{@link #compileToolPolicy}
* are actually invoked — never at {@link McpExtension} class-load time — because they live in
* this separate nested class. The caller wraps the invocation in {@code catch
* (NoClassDefFoundError)}, exactly like {@code OidcExtension}'s own lazy bridge to {@code
* flash-ext-openapi}. This is what lets {@code flash-ext-mcp} run standalone (MCP-only, no
* OAuth2) when {@code flash-ext-auth-oidc} is not even on the classpath. {@link Resolved}/{@link
* McpAuthPolicy} carry only oidc-free types back out ({@link Middleware}, {@link String}, a
* {@link Function}, a {@link Supplier}) so no other class in this package ever has to reference
* an OIDC type.
*
* <p>Zero-config by design: when {@code flash-ext-auth-oidc} is installed, everything an MCP OAuth2
* resource server needs — issuer, canonical resource identifier, RFC 8707 audience binding, and
* a spec-compliant {@code WWW-Authenticate} challenge (RFC 9728 §5.1) — is derived straight from
* the installed {@link OidcCredentialSource}, with no additional {@link McpConfig} calls.
* {@link McpConfig#resourceIdentifier(String)}/{@link McpConfig#authorizationServerIssuer(String)}
* remain as explicit overrides for the rare case where that guess is wrong.
*/
@Slf4j
final class McpOidcIntegration {
private static final String[] NO_VALUES = new String[0];
private McpOidcIntegration() {}
/** Everything {@link McpExtension} needs once oidc security is resolved. */
record Resolved(Middleware security, String issuer, String rolesClaimPath,
Function<Request, String> resourceIdentifier) {}
/** Returns the resolved security bundle, or {@code null} if oidc is not installed. */
static Resolved resolve(FlashContext ctx, McpConfig config) {
// Deliberately keyed on the OIDC source and not on AuthMiddleware: McpSecurity means
// "a real OAuth2 authorization server is protecting this endpoint", and an app that
// authenticates some other way must not satisfy REQUIRED by accident.
Optional<OidcCredentialSource> oidc = ctx.find(OidcCredentialSource.class);
Optional<AuthMiddleware> auth = ctx.find(AuthMiddleware.class);
if (oidc.isEmpty() || auth.isEmpty()) return null;
OidcCredentialSource source = oidc.get();
AuthMiddleware authMw = auth.get();
String resourceMetadataPath = "/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource" + config.rootPath();
String issuer = config.authorizationServerIssuer() != null
? config.authorizationServerIssuer() : source.issuer();
Function<Request, String> resourceId = req -> config.resourceIdentifier() != null
? config.resourceIdentifier()
: OidcCredentialSource.selfOrigin(req, source.selfScheme()) + config.rootPath();
Middleware protect = authMw.withSource(source.withResourceMetadata(resourceMetadataPath)).protect();
Middleware secured = Middleware.of(protect, audienceGuard(resourceId));
return new Resolved(secured, issuer, authMw.rolesClaimPath(), resourceId);
}
/**
* RFC 8707 audience binding, unconditionally enforced once oidc is protecting the MCP
* route — no longer opt-in behind an explicit {@code resourceIdentifier(...)} call.
*/
private static Middleware audienceGuard(Function<Request, String> resourceIdentifier) {
return next -> (req, res) -> {
Map<String, Object> claims = ClaimsHolder.map();
String expected = resourceIdentifier.apply(req);
if (claims != null && !audienceMatches(claims.get("aud"), expected)) {
log.warn("[flash-ext-mcp] Rejecting token (RFC 8707): aud={} does not include expected " +
"resource identifier \"{}\" — the authorization server must include this exact " +
"value in the access token's aud claim (e.g. an Audience protocol mapper in " +
"Keycloak) for this MCP server to accept it.", claims.get("aud"), expected);
throw HttpException.forbidden();
}
return next.handle(req, res);
};
}
private static boolean audienceMatches(Object aud, String expected) {
if (aud instanceof String s) return s.equals(expected);
if (aud instanceof Iterable<?> it) {
for (Object o : it) if (expected.equals(String.valueOf(o))) return true;
}
return false;
}
/**
* Compiles {@code @RolesAllowed}/{@code @ScopesAllowed} on a tool class into a {@link
* McpAuthPolicy}, or returns {@code null} if the tool carries none of the three OIDC
* annotations. Called once per tool at boot ({@link McpRegistry#scan}), never on the
* request hot path — the {@link Supplier} it returns is what runs per {@code tools/call},
* closing over the already-normalized role/scope arrays so the hot path itself allocates
* nothing beyond what {@link Claims#hasRole}/{@link Claims#hasScope} already do.
*
* <p>Fails fast at boot, not silently at request time, for the two ways this can be
* misconfigured: the annotation present without OAuth2 actually protecting this MCP server
* ({@code oidcActive == false}), and {@code @Authenticated} — which has no per-tool meaning
* here (see below) — used at all.
*/
static McpAuthPolicy compileToolPolicy(Class<? extends McpTool> toolClass, boolean oidcActive,
String rolesClaimPath) {
Authenticated auth = toolClass.getAnnotation(Authenticated.class);
RolesAllowed roles = toolClass.getAnnotation(RolesAllowed.class);
ScopesAllowed scopes = toolClass.getAnnotation(ScopesAllowed.class);
if (auth == null && roles == null && scopes == null) return null;
if (!oidcActive) {
throw new IllegalStateException(
"MCP tool \"" + toolClass.getSimpleName() + "\" declares @Authenticated/@RolesAllowed/" +
"@ScopesAllowed, but this MCP server has no active OAuth2 protection — flash-ext-auth-oidc " +
"is not installed for it, or McpSecurity is NONE. These annotations require " +
"McpSecurity.AUTO/REQUIRED with an OidcExtension installed; install one, or remove the " +
"annotation from " + toolClass.getSimpleName() + ".");
}
if (auth != null) {
throw new IllegalStateException(
"MCP tool \"" + toolClass.getSimpleName() + "\" is annotated @Authenticated, which has " +
"no effect on an McpTool: the whole MCP endpoint is already all-or-nothing " +
"authenticated once oidc is active (McpSecurity.AUTO/REQUIRED) — unlike a RequestHandler " +
"route, there is no per-tool public/authenticated split to opt into. Remove it, or use " +
"@RolesAllowed/@ScopesAllowed to narrow further.");
}
String[] requiredRoles = roles != null ? normalizeRequired("RolesAllowed", roles.value()) : NO_VALUES;
String[] requiredScopes = scopes != null ? normalizeRequired("ScopesAllowed", scopes.value()) : NO_VALUES;
ScopesAllowed.Match scopeMatch = scopes != null ? scopes.match() : ScopesAllowed.Match.ALL;
Supplier<String> check = () -> {
Claims user = ClaimsHolder.current();
if (user == null) return "not authenticated";
if (requiredRoles.length > 0 && !hasAnyRole(user, rolesClaimPath, requiredRoles))
return "missing required role (any of: " + String.join(", ", requiredRoles) + ")";
if (requiredScopes.length > 0 && !hasScopes(user, requiredScopes, scopeMatch))
return "missing required scope (" + scopeMatch + " of: " + String.join(", ", requiredScopes) + ")";
return null;
};
return new McpAuthPolicy(check);
}
private static boolean hasAnyRole(Claims user, String claimPath, String[] roles) {
for (String role : roles) if (user.hasRole(claimPath, role)) return true;
return false;
}
private static boolean hasScopes(Claims user, String[] scopes, ScopesAllowed.Match match) {
if (match == ScopesAllowed.Match.ALL) {
for (String scope : scopes) if (!user.hasScope(scope)) return false;
return true;
}
for (String scope : scopes) if (user.hasScope(scope)) return true;
return false;
}
/** Mirrors {@code OidcAuthPolicy}'s own normalization — trim, dedupe, require non-blank. */
private static String[] normalizeRequired(String annotationName, String[] values) {
if (values == null || values.length == 0)
throw new IllegalStateException("@" + annotationName + " requires at least one value");
LinkedHashSet<String> normalized = new LinkedHashSet<>(values.length);
for (String raw : values) {
if (raw == null) continue;
String trimmed = raw.trim();
if (!trimmed.isEmpty()) normalized.add(trimmed);
}
if (normalized.isEmpty())
throw new IllegalStateException("@" + annotationName + " requires at least one non-empty value");
return normalized.toArray(String[]::new);
}
}
@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@ package dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp;
import com.fasterxml.jackson.core.JsonGenerator;
import dev.relism.flash.exceptions.InitializationException;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.security.SecurityExtension;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.security.SecurityPolicy;
import dev.relism.flash.extension.FlashContext;
import java.io.IOException;
@@ -25,7 +27,7 @@ final class McpRegistry {
private static final String EMPTY_ARRAY = "[]";
/** {@code policy} is {@code null} unless the tool carries @RolesAllowed/@ScopesAllowed. */
record RegisteredTool(String name, McpTool instance, McpAuthPolicy policy) {}
record RegisteredTool(String name, McpTool instance, SecurityPolicy policy) {}
record RegisteredResource(String uri, McpResource instance) {}
record RegisteredPrompt(String name, McpPrompt instance) {}
@@ -39,15 +41,8 @@ final class McpRegistry {
private McpRegistry() {}
/**
* @param oidcActive whether this MCP server's route is actually OAuth2-protected right
* now (see {@link McpOidcIntegration#resolve}) — gates whether
* {@code @RolesAllowed}/{@code @ScopesAllowed} on a tool are honored or
* rejected at boot as a misconfiguration; see
* {@link McpOidcIntegration#compileToolPolicy}.
* @param rolesClaimPath claim path resolved from the installed OIDC extension.
*/
static McpRegistry scan(String packageName, FlashContext ctx, boolean oidcActive, String rolesClaimPath) {
/** @param security {@code null} for a server running with {@link McpSecurity#NONE} */
static McpRegistry scan(String packageName, FlashContext ctx, SecurityExtension security) {
McpPackageScanner.ScanResult found = McpPackageScanner.scan(packageName);
McpRegistry registry = new McpRegistry();
@@ -55,7 +50,9 @@ final class McpRegistry {
Tool ann = cls.getAnnotation(Tool.class);
McpTool instance = instantiate(cls);
instance.bind(ctx);
McpAuthPolicy policy = compileToolPolicy(cls, oidcActive, rolesClaimPath);
if (security == null && SecurityPolicy.of(cls) != null)
throw new InitializationException("MCP tool \"" + ann.name() + "\" declares security annotations, but the server runs with McpSecurity.NONE");
SecurityPolicy policy = security == null ? null : security.policy(cls);
if (registry.tools.putIfAbsent(ann.name(), new RegisteredTool(ann.name(), instance, policy)) != null)
throw new InitializationException("Duplicate MCP tool name: \"" + ann.name() + "\"");
}
@@ -173,24 +170,6 @@ final class McpRegistry {
gen.writeEndArray();
}
/**
* Isolated the same way {@link McpOidcIntegration#resolve} is — {@code
* NoClassDefFoundError} here means {@code flash-ext-auth-oidc} genuinely isn't on the runtime
* classpath, in which case a tool couldn't have been compiled against
* {@code @RolesAllowed}/{@code @ScopesAllowed} in the first place, so there's nothing to
* check (and nothing lost: {@code oidcActive} is only ever {@code true} once {@link
* McpOidcIntegration#resolve} has already succeeded once this boot, which proves those
* types resolve fine).
*/
private static McpAuthPolicy compileToolPolicy(Class<? extends McpTool> cls, boolean oidcActive,
String rolesClaimPath) {
try {
return McpOidcIntegration.compileToolPolicy(cls, oidcActive, rolesClaimPath);
} catch (NoClassDefFoundError e) {
return null;
}
}
private static <T> T instantiate(Class<T> cls) {
try {
Constructor<T> ctor = cls.getDeclaredConstructor();
@@ -2,18 +2,18 @@ package dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp;
import java.util.List;
/** RFC 9728 OAuth 2.0 Protected Resource Metadata document, built once at boot. */
/** RFC 9728 OAuth 2.0 Protected Resource Metadata. */
final class McpResourceMetadata {
private McpResourceMetadata() {}
/** {@code scopesSupported} is optional per RFC 9728 — omitted from the document if empty. */
static String build(String resourceIdentifier, String authorizationServerIssuer, List<String> scopesSupported) {
/** {@code scopesSupported} is optional — omitted when empty. */
static String build(String resource, List<String> authorizationServers, List<String> scopesSupported) {
return McpJson.buildString(gen -> {
gen.writeStartObject();
gen.writeStringField("resource", resourceIdentifier);
gen.writeStringField("resource", resource);
gen.writeArrayFieldStart("authorization_servers");
gen.writeString(authorizationServerIssuer);
for (String issuer : authorizationServers) gen.writeString(issuer);
gen.writeEndArray();
if (!scopesSupported.isEmpty()) {
gen.writeArrayFieldStart("scopes_supported");
@@ -1,17 +1,11 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp;
/**
* OAuth2 requirement policy for the MCP endpoint, resolved against whether
* {@code flash-ext-auth-oidc} is installed ({@code ctx.find(OidcMiddleware.class)}).
*/
/** Whether the MCP endpoint requires an authenticated caller. */
public enum McpSecurity {
/** Fail fast at boot if {@code flash-ext-auth-oidc} is not installed — never expose an unprotected MCP endpoint. */
/** The default: every call is authenticated by {@code flash-ext-security-core}, which must be installed. */
REQUIRED,
/** Protect the endpoint if {@code flash-ext-auth-oidc} is installed; otherwise run unprotected and log a warning. */
AUTO,
/** Never protect the endpoint, even if {@code flash-ext-auth-oidc} is installed elsewhere in the app. */
/** A public endpoint. Tools declaring security annotations fail the boot. */
NONE
}
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ final class McpTransportGuards {
* allowed through — only a <em>present but disallowed</em> value is rejected.
*
* <p>If {@code allowedOrigins} is empty, validation is skipped and a boot-time warning is
* logged — same graceful-degradation shape as {@link McpSecurity#AUTO}.
* logged.
*/
static Middleware originGuard(List<String> allowedOrigins) {
if (allowedOrigins.isEmpty()) {
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ final class McpTransportGuards {
/**
* Safety net around the whole MCP route: translates {@link HttpException} (thrown by
* {@link #originGuard} or by {@code flash-ext-auth-oidc}'s middleware) into a proper HTTP status
* {@link #originGuard} or by {@code flash-ext-security-core}) into a proper HTTP status
* directly, instead of relying on the app's global exception handler — which defaults to a
* generic 500 for every exception type unless the app owner overrides it (see
* {@code AbstractRouter}'s default {@code exceptionHandler}). Keeps the MCP endpoint
@@ -1,109 +0,0 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp;
import com.nimbusds.jose.JWSAlgorithm;
import com.nimbusds.jose.JWSHeader;
import com.nimbusds.jose.crypto.RSASSASigner;
import com.nimbusds.jose.jwk.JWKSet;
import com.nimbusds.jose.jwk.KeyUse;
import com.nimbusds.jose.jwk.RSAKey;
import com.nimbusds.jwt.JWTClaimsSet;
import com.nimbusds.jwt.SignedJWT;
import com.sun.net.httpserver.HttpServer;
import java.io.OutputStream;
import java.net.InetSocketAddress;
import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;
import java.security.KeyPair;
import java.security.KeyPairGenerator;
import java.security.interfaces.RSAPrivateKey;
import java.security.interfaces.RSAPublicKey;
import java.time.Instant;
import java.util.Date;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.UUID;
/**
* Minimal, self-contained fake OIDC provider for tests: real discovery document, real JWKS
* endpoint, real RS256-signed tokens — no network dependency beyond localhost, no mocking
* framework. Exercises {@code flash-ext-auth-oidc}'s actual discovery + JWKS + JWT validation path.
*/
final class FakeOidcProvider implements AutoCloseable {
private final HttpServer server;
private final String issuer;
private final RSAKey rsaKey;
FakeOidcProvider() throws Exception {
KeyPairGenerator gen = KeyPairGenerator.getInstance("RSA");
gen.initialize(2048);
KeyPair kp = gen.generateKeyPair();
this.rsaKey = new RSAKey.Builder((RSAPublicKey) kp.getPublic())
.privateKey((RSAPrivateKey) kp.getPrivate())
.keyUse(KeyUse.SIGNATURE)
.algorithm(JWSAlgorithm.RS256)
.keyID(UUID.randomUUID().toString())
.build();
this.server = HttpServer.create(new InetSocketAddress("127.0.0.1", 0), 0);
this.issuer = "http://127.0.0.1:" + server.getAddress().getPort();
server.createContext("/.well-known/openid-configuration", ex -> respond(ex, discoveryDocument()));
server.createContext("/jwks", ex -> respond(ex, new JWKSet(rsaKey.toPublicJWK()).toJSONObject().toString()));
server.setExecutor(null);
server.start();
}
String issuer() { return issuer; }
/** Mints a valid RS256 access token — bearer-validation only, no full authorization-code round-trip needed. */
String signToken(String subject, String audience) {
return signToken(subject, audience, null, NO_ROLES);
}
/**
* Same as {@link #signToken(String, String)}, plus a {@code scope} claim (space-delimited,
* matching {@link dev.relism.flash.ext.auth.Claims#hasScope}'s default claim path) and a
* Keycloak-shaped {@code realm_access.roles} claim (matching {@code McpConfig}'s default
* {@code rolesClaimPath}) when {@code roles} is non-empty.
*/
String signToken(String subject, String audience, String scope, String... roles) {
try {
JWTClaimsSet.Builder builder = new JWTClaimsSet.Builder()
.issuer(issuer)
.subject(subject)
.audience(audience)
.issueTime(Date.from(Instant.now()))
.expirationTime(Date.from(Instant.now().plusSeconds(300)));
if (scope != null) builder.claim("scope", scope);
if (roles.length > 0) builder.claim("realm_access", Map.of("roles", List.of(roles)));
SignedJWT jwt = new SignedJWT(
new JWSHeader.Builder(JWSAlgorithm.RS256).keyID(rsaKey.getKeyID()).build(), builder.build());
jwt.sign(new RSASSASigner(rsaKey));
return jwt.serialize();
} catch (Exception e) {
throw new IllegalStateException(e);
}
}
private static final String[] NO_ROLES = new String[0];
private String discoveryDocument() {
return "{"
+ "\"issuer\":\"" + issuer + "\","
+ "\"authorization_endpoint\":\"" + issuer + "/auth\","
+ "\"token_endpoint\":\"" + issuer + "/token\","
+ "\"jwks_uri\":\"" + issuer + "/jwks\""
+ "}";
}
private static void respond(com.sun.net.httpserver.HttpExchange ex, String body) throws java.io.IOException {
byte[] bytes = body.getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
ex.getResponseHeaders().add("Content-Type", "application/json");
ex.sendResponseHeaders(200, bytes.length);
try (OutputStream os = ex.getResponseBody()) { os.write(bytes); }
}
@Override
public void close() { server.stop(0); }
}
@@ -1,141 +0,0 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.oidc.OidcConfig;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.oidc.OidcExtension;
import dev.relism.flash.extension.FlashApp;
import dev.relism.flash.extension.FlashConfiguration;
import dev.relism.flash.testing.FlashResponse;
import dev.relism.flash.testing.FlashTest;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.AfterAll;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.AfterEach;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.extension.RegisterExtension;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertThrows;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertTrue;
/**
* {@code @RolesAllowed}/{@code @ScopesAllowed} on an {@link McpTool} — see
* {@link McpOidcIntegration#compileToolPolicy}. Same real-discovery/real-JWKS/real-RS256-token
* approach as {@link McpExtensionSecurityTest}, against {@code fixtures.secured}'s tools.
*/
class McpAuthPolicyTest {
private static final String SECURED_TOOLS = "dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.authfixtures.secured";
private static final String AUTHENTICATED_ONLY_TOOLS = "dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.authfixtures.authenticatedonly";
private static final FakeOidcProvider provider = newProvider();
@RegisterExtension
static FlashTest secured = FlashTest.of(app -> {
app.install(new OidcExtension(OidcConfig.builder(
provider.issuer(), "mcp-client", "secret", "/auth/callback").build()));
app.install(new McpExtension(McpConfig.builder("secure-server")
.toolsPackage(SECURED_TOOLS)
.security(McpSecurity.REQUIRED)
.build()));
});
/** Tokens are audience-bound to this server, so the port has to be read back after boot. */
private static String resourceId() {
return "http://127.0.0.1:" + secured.port() + "/mcp";
}
@AfterAll
static void closeProvider() {
provider.close();
}
// ── Tool policy ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@Test
void rolesAllowed_deniesWithoutRole_allowsWithRole() throws Exception {
callTool("admin_only", provider.signToken("user-1", resourceId(), null))
.expectStatus(200)
.expectBodyContains("\"isError\":true")
.expectBodyContains("missing required role");
callTool("admin_only", provider.signToken("user-1", resourceId(), null, "admin"))
.expectStatus(200)
.expectBodyContains("\"isError\":false")
.expectBodyContains("ok");
}
@Test
void scopesAllowed_deniesWithoutScope_allowsWithScope() throws Exception {
callTool("write_only", provider.signToken("user-1", resourceId(), "read"))
.expectStatus(200)
.expectBodyContains("\"isError\":true")
.expectBodyContains("missing required scope");
callTool("write_only", provider.signToken("user-1", resourceId(), "read write"))
.expectStatus(200)
.expectBodyContains("\"isError\":false")
.expectBodyContains("written");
}
@Test
void unannotatedTool_unaffectedByOtherToolsPolicies() throws Exception {
callTool("open", provider.signToken("user-1", resourceId(), null))
.expectStatus(200)
.expectBodyContains("\"isError\":false")
.expectBodyContains("open");
}
private static FlashResponse callTool(String toolName, String token) {
return secured.request()
.header("Accept", "application/json")
.header("Authorization", "Bearer " + token)
.json("{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":1,\"method\":\"tools/call\",\"params\":{\"name\":\""
+ toolName + "\"}}")
.post("/mcp");
}
// ── Boot-time rejection ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
// These assert that start() throws, so they build the app directly rather than through
// FlashTest — a harness whose job is to boot an app is the wrong tool for asserting that
// booting fails. Port 0 still removes the old free-port dance.
private FlashApp bootFailure;
@AfterEach
void releaseBootFailureListener() {
if (bootFailure != null) bootFailure.stop().join();
}
@Test
void toolAnnotated_butSecurityNone_failsAtBoot() {
bootFailure = mcpApp(SECURED_TOOLS, McpSecurity.NONE);
IllegalStateException error = assertThrows(IllegalStateException.class, bootFailure::start);
assertTrue(error.getMessage().contains("no active OAuth2 protection"), error.getMessage());
}
@Test
void bareAuthenticated_hasNoEffect_failsAtBoot() {
bootFailure = mcpApp(AUTHENTICATED_ONLY_TOOLS, McpSecurity.REQUIRED);
IllegalStateException error = assertThrows(IllegalStateException.class, bootFailure::start);
assertTrue(error.getMessage().contains("no effect"), error.getMessage());
}
private static FlashApp mcpApp(String toolsPackage, McpSecurity security) {
FlashApp app = FlashApp.create(FlashConfiguration.builder()
.port(0).host("127.0.0.1").shutdownDrainTimeoutMs(250).build());
app.install(new OidcExtension(OidcConfig.builder(
provider.issuer(), "mcp-client", "secret", "/auth/callback").build()));
app.install(new McpExtension(McpConfig.builder("secure-server")
.toolsPackage(toolsPackage)
.security(security)
.build()));
return app;
}
private static FakeOidcProvider newProvider() {
try {
return new FakeOidcProvider();
} catch (Exception failure) {
throw new IllegalStateException("Could not start the fake OIDC provider", failure);
}
}
}
@@ -1,179 +0,0 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.oidc.OidcConfig;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.oidc.OidcExtension;
import dev.relism.flash.extension.FlashApp;
import dev.relism.flash.extension.FlashApplication;
import dev.relism.flash.extension.FlashConfiguration;
import dev.relism.flash.testing.FlashRequest;
import dev.relism.flash.testing.FlashResponse;
import dev.relism.flash.testing.FlashTest;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.AfterAll;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.extension.RegisterExtension;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertThrows;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertTrue;
/**
* Exercises the actual OAuth2 resolution rules against a real {@code flash-ext-auth-oidc}
* installation backed by {@link FakeOidcProvider} — real discovery, real JWKS, real RS256
* tokens — plus the fail-fast/degrade behavior when oidc is absent.
*
* <p>Four server configurations differ only in how MCP security is declared, so each gets its
* own {@link FlashTest} and they share one provider.
*/
class McpExtensionSecurityTest {
private static final String TOOLS_PACKAGE = "dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.fixtures";
private static final String EXPLICIT_RESOURCE_ID = "https://mcp.example.com/mcp";
private static final FakeOidcProvider provider = newProvider();
/** MCP asked for AUTO security with no oidc installed — should degrade to public. */
@RegisterExtension
static FlashTest degraded = FlashTest.of(app -> app.install(new McpExtension(
McpConfig.builder("auto-server")
.toolsPackage(TOOLS_PACKAGE)
.security(McpSecurity.AUTO)
.build())));
/** REQUIRED with oidc, resource identifier derived from the request. */
@RegisterExtension
static FlashTest secured = FlashTest.of(securedApp(null, null));
/** REQUIRED with oidc and an explicitly declared resource identifier. */
@RegisterExtension
static FlashTest securedWithResourceId = FlashTest.of(securedApp(EXPLICIT_RESOURCE_ID, null));
/** REQUIRED with oidc and advertised scopes. */
@RegisterExtension
static FlashTest securedWithScopes =
FlashTest.of(securedApp(null, new String[] {"openid", "profile", "email"}));
@AfterAll
static void closeProvider() {
provider.close();
}
// ── No oidc installed ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@Test
void required_withoutOidc_throwsAtBoot() {
// Asserting that boot fails, so this one builds its app directly rather than through
// the harness; port(0) still removes the old free-port dance.
FlashApp app = FlashApp.create(FlashConfiguration.builder()
.port(0).host("127.0.0.1").shutdownDrainTimeoutMs(250).build());
app.install(new McpExtension(McpConfig.builder("secure-server")
.toolsPackage(TOOLS_PACKAGE)
.security(McpSecurity.REQUIRED)
.build()));
try {
assertThrows(IllegalStateException.class, app::start);
} finally {
app.stop().join();
}
}
@Test
void auto_withoutOidc_degradesToPublic() {
post(degraded, initializeBody(), null).expectStatus(200);
}
// ── REQUIRED with oidc ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
@Test
void required_withOidc_rejectsMissingToken() {
post(secured, initializeBody(), null).expectStatus(401);
}
@Test
void required_withOidc_rejectsWrongAudience() throws Exception {
String token = provider.signToken("user-1", "https://someone-else.example.com/resource");
post(securedWithResourceId, initializeBody(), token).expectStatus(403);
}
@Test
void required_withOidc_acceptsValidAudience() throws Exception {
String token = provider.signToken("user-1", EXPLICIT_RESOURCE_ID);
post(securedWithResourceId, initializeBody(), token)
.expectStatus(200)
.expectBodyContains("\"protocolVersion\"");
}
@Test
void required_withOidc_noExplicitResourceIdentifier_derivesFromRequestAndEnforcesAudience() throws Exception {
String derivedResourceId = "http://127.0.0.1:" + secured.port() + "/mcp";
post(secured, initializeBody(), provider.signToken("user-1", derivedResourceId))
.expectStatus(200);
post(secured, initializeBody(), provider.signToken("user-1", "https://someone-else.example.com/resource"))
.expectStatus(403);
}
@Test
void required_withOidc_missingToken_challengeIncludesResourceMetadata() {
FlashResponse response = post(secured, initializeBody(), null).expectStatus(401);
String challenge = response.header("WWW-Authenticate");
assertTrue(challenge != null && challenge.contains("resource_metadata=\"http://127.0.0.1:"
+ secured.port() + "/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp\""),
"WWW-Authenticate: " + challenge);
}
// ── Protected resource metadata ──────────────────────────────────────────
@Test
void required_withOidc_noExplicitConfig_publishesProtectedResourceMetadata() {
FlashResponse response = secured.get("/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp")
.expectStatus(200)
.expectBodyContains("\"resource\":\"http://127.0.0.1:" + secured.port() + "/mcp\"")
.expectBodyContains("\"authorization_servers\":[\"" + provider.issuer() + "\"]");
assertTrue(!response.body().contains("scopes_supported"),
"scopes_supported must be omitted when unset: " + response.body());
}
@Test
void scopesSupported_published_inProtectedResourceMetadata() {
securedWithScopes.get("/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp")
.expectStatus(200)
.expectBodyContains("\"scopes_supported\":[\"openid\",\"profile\",\"email\"]");
}
// ── Helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
private static FlashApplication securedApp(String resourceIdentifier, String[] scopesSupported) {
return app -> {
app.install(new OidcExtension(OidcConfig.builder(
provider.issuer(), "mcp-client", "secret", "/auth/callback").build()));
McpConfig.Builder mcp = McpConfig.builder("secure-server")
.toolsPackage(TOOLS_PACKAGE)
.security(McpSecurity.REQUIRED);
if (resourceIdentifier != null) mcp.resourceIdentifier(resourceIdentifier);
if (scopesSupported != null) mcp.scopesSupported(scopesSupported);
app.install(new McpExtension(mcp.build()));
};
}
private static FlashResponse post(FlashTest server, String body, String bearerToken) {
FlashRequest request = server.request().header("Accept", "application/json").json(body);
if (bearerToken != null) request.header("Authorization", "Bearer " + bearerToken);
return request.post("/mcp");
}
private static String initializeBody() {
return "{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":1,\"method\":\"initialize\",\"params\":{}}";
}
private static FakeOidcProvider newProvider() {
try {
return new FakeOidcProvider();
} catch (Exception failure) {
throw new IllegalStateException("Could not start the fake OIDC provider", failure);
}
}
}
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ class McpRegistryTest {
@Test
void scan_findsAndPrecompilesToolsResourcesPrompts() throws Exception {
McpRegistry registry = McpRegistry.scan("dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.fixtures", new FlashContext(), false, "realm_access.roles");
McpRegistry registry = McpRegistry.scan("dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.fixtures", new FlashContext(), null);
assertTrue(registry.hasTools());
assertTrue(registry.hasResources());
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ class McpRegistryTest {
@Test
void scan_emptyPackage_throwsInitializationException() {
assertThrows(InitializationException.class,
() -> McpRegistry.scan("dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.doesnotexist", new FlashContext(), false, "realm_access.roles"));
() -> McpRegistry.scan("dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.doesnotexist", new FlashContext(), null));
}
private static JsonNode findByField(JsonNode array, String field, String value) {
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.security.SecurityExtension;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.security.apikey.ApiKey;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.security.apikey.ApiKeyExtension;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.security.apikey.GeneratedApiKey;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.security.oidc.OidcExtension;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.security.oidc.OidcProvider;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.security.test.FakeOidcProvider;
import dev.relism.flash.testing.FlashRequest;
import dev.relism.flash.testing.FlashResponse;
import dev.relism.flash.testing.FlashTest;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.extension.RegisterExtension;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.function.Consumer;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertThrows;
class McpSecurityTest {
static final FakeOidcProvider provider = start();
static final GeneratedApiKey KEY = new ApiKeyExtension<String>("mk", id -> null).generate();
static final ApiKeyExtension<String> apiKeys = new ApiKeyExtension<>("mk", id -> id.equals(KEY.id()) ? new ApiKey<>(KEY.id(), KEY.secretHash(), "agent", null, null) : null);
@RegisterExtension
static final FlashTest app = FlashTest.of(flash -> flash
.install(new SecurityExtension().roles((identity, role, on) -> identity.principal().name().equals(role + "@" + on.get("project"))))
.install(new OidcExtension(OidcProvider.of("fake", provider.issuer(), "app", "secret")))
.install(apiKeys)
.install(new McpExtension(McpConfig.builder("secure").toolsPackage("dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.authfixtures.secured")
.scopesSupported("openid", "email").build())));
/** The same chain with the RFC 8707 check turned off, for an authorization server that cannot mint a resource audience. */
@RegisterExtension
static final FlashTest relaxed = FlashTest.of(flash -> flash
.install(new SecurityExtension().roles((identity, role, on) -> false))
.install(new OidcExtension(OidcProvider.of("fake", provider.issuer(), "app", "secret")))
.install(new McpExtension(McpConfig.builder("relaxed").toolsPackage("dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.authfixtures.secured")
.requireTokenAudience(false).build())));
static FakeOidcProvider start() {
try {
return new FakeOidcProvider();
} catch (Exception e) {
throw new IllegalStateException(e);
}
}
static String resource() {
return "http://127.0.0.1:" + app.port() + "/mcp";
}
static FlashResponse call(Consumer<FlashRequest> credential, String method, String params) {
return app.request().with(credential).header("Accept", "application/json")
.json("{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":1,\"method\":\"" + method + "\",\"params\":" + params + "}")
.post("/mcp");
}
@Test
void anAnonymousCallIsChallengedWithTheResourceMetadata() {
call(request -> {}, "initialize", "{}").expectStatus(401)
.expectHeader("WWW-Authenticate", "Bearer resource_metadata=\"http://127.0.0.1:" + app.port() + "/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp\"");
}
@Test
void theProtectedResourceMetadataNamesTheIssuer() {
app.get("/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp").expectStatus(200)
.expectBody("{\"resource\":\"" + resource() + "\",\"authorization_servers\":[\"" + provider.issuer() + "\"],\"scopes_supported\":[\"openid\",\"email\"]}");
}
@Test
void aTokenIsAcceptedOnlyForThisResource() {
call(provider.bearer("u", Map.of("aud", resource())), "initialize", "{}").expectStatus(200).expectBodyContains("protocolVersion");
call(provider.bearer("u", Map.of("aud", "https://elsewhere.example/mcp")), "initialize", "{}").expectStatus(403);
}
@Test
void aTokenWithoutTheResourceAudienceIsAcceptedWhenTheCheckIsOff() {
relaxed.request().with(provider.bearer("u", Map.of("aud", "https://elsewhere.example/mcp"))).header("Accept", "application/json")
.json("{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":1,\"method\":\"initialize\",\"params\":{}}")
.post("/mcp").expectStatus(200).expectBodyContains("protocolVersion");
}
/** An API key is not audience-bound: the same chain authenticates agents that never saw an authorization server. */
@Test
void anApiKeyIsAcceptedBesideOAuth() {
call(request -> request.header("Authorization", "Bearer " + KEY.token()), "initialize", "{}").expectStatus(200);
}
@Test
void toolPoliciesReadTheirTargetFromTheArguments() {
Consumer<FlashRequest> admin = provider.bearer("admin@42", Map.of("aud", resource()));
call(admin, "tools/call", "{\"name\":\"admin_only\",\"arguments\":{\"project\":\"42\"}}").expectBodyContains("\"isError\":false");
call(admin, "tools/call", "{\"name\":\"admin_only\",\"arguments\":{\"project\":\"7\"}}").expectBodyContains("denied: missing role");
call(provider.bearer("u", Map.of("aud", resource(), "scope", "write")), "tools/call", "{\"name\":\"write_only\"}").expectBodyContains("written");
call(provider.bearer("u", Map.of("aud", resource())), "tools/call", "{\"name\":\"write_only\"}").expectBodyContains("denied: missing scope");
}
@Test
void securityIsRequiredUnlessDeclaredOff() {
FlashTest unsecured = FlashTest.of(flash -> flash.install(new McpExtension(McpConfig.builder("x").toolsPackage("dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.fixtures").build())));
assertThrows(Exception.class, () -> unsecured.get("/mcp"));
FlashTest contradictory = FlashTest.of(flash -> flash.install(new McpExtension(McpConfig.builder("x")
.toolsPackage("dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.authfixtures.secured").security(McpSecurity.NONE).build())));
assertThrows(Exception.class, () -> contradictory.get("/mcp"));
}
}
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.authfixtures.authenticatedonly;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.McpTool;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.TextContent;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.Tool;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.ToolArguments;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.ToolResponse;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.auth.Authenticated;
/** Deliberately misconfigured fixture: bare @Authenticated has no effect on an McpTool — see
* McpOidcIntegration#compileToolPolicy. Boot must fail with a clear message, not silently no-op. */
@Tool(name = "pointless", description = "Exists only to prove @Authenticated alone fails boot")
@Authenticated
public class PointlessAuthTool extends McpTool {
@Override
public ToolResponse call(ToolArguments args) {
return ToolResponse.success(new TextContent("unreachable"));
}
}
@@ -5,10 +5,10 @@ import dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.TextContent;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.Tool;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.ToolArguments;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.ToolResponse;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.auth.RolesAllowed;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.security.RolesAllowed;
@Tool(name = "admin_only", description = "Only callable with the admin role")
@RolesAllowed("admin")
@RolesAllowed(value = "admin", on = "project")
public class AdminOnlyTool extends McpTool {
@Override
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.TextContent;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.Tool;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.ToolArguments;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.mcp.ToolResponse;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.auth.ScopesAllowed;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.security.ScopesAllowed;
@Tool(name = "write_only", description = "Only callable with the write scope")
@ScopesAllowed("write")
+4 -8
View File
@@ -121,15 +121,11 @@ Merge policy:
- contributor collisions use **last-wins**
- manual `@APIResponse` description always wins over contributors for the same status
## OIDC interop
## Security interop
When `flash-ext-auth-oidc` is installed, OpenAPI integrates automatically:
- security scheme under `components.securitySchemes`
- per-operation `security`
- auto responses (class-based handlers):
- `401 Authentication required`
- `403` role/scope required messages when applicable
With `flash-ext-security-core` installed, every registered mechanism's scheme lands under
`components.securitySchemes`, and every operation carrying a security annotation lists them as
`security` alternatives with automatic `401` and — for roles or scopes — `403` responses.
Manual `@APIResponse` for the same status code always wins.
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ public record RouteRecord(
/**
* Strips the synthetic lambda suffix ({@code $$Lambda/0x...}) from class names
* so that {@code OidcMiddleware$$Lambda/0x0000019c381f} becomes {@code OidcMiddleware}.
* so that {@code SecurityExtension$$Lambda/0x0000019c381f} becomes {@code SecurityExtension}.
*/
private static List<String> buildMiddlewareNames(List<Class<? extends Middleware>> chain) {
List<String> names = new ArrayList<>(chain.size());
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
# flash-ext-security-apikey
API keys for [`flash-ext-security-core`](../../flash-ext-security-core/docs/README.md), sent as
`Authorization: Bearer <prefix>_<id>.<secret>`.
```java
ApiKeyExtension<Grant> apiKeys = new ApiKeyExtension<>("gk", id -> rows.find(id)); // ApiKeyStore<Grant>
app.install(new SecurityExtension().roles(...)).install(apiKeys);
GeneratedApiKey key = apiKeys.generate(); // show key.token() once
rows.save(key.id(), key.secretHash(), grant); // never the token
```
The store returns `ApiKey<G>(id, secretHash, grant, expiresAt, revokedAt)`; `G` is whatever the
application authorizes on. An authenticated caller is an `ApiKeyPrincipal<G>` carrying that grant —
read it in a `RoleResolver` with `identity.principal(ApiKeyPrincipal.class)`.
A bearer token without this prefix is left to other mechanisms; one with it that fails — unknown id,
wrong secret, expired, revoked — is a `401 invalid_token`. Only a SHA-256 of the secret is stored: the
secret is 192 random bits, so a slow KDF would protect nothing and cost every request.
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<project xmlns="http://maven.apache.org/POM/4.0.0"
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xsi:schemaLocation="http://maven.apache.org/POM/4.0.0 http://maven.apache.org/xsd/maven-4.0.0.xsd">
<modelVersion>4.0.0</modelVersion>
<parent>
<groupId>dev.relism</groupId>
<artifactId>flash-extensions</artifactId>
<version>2.1.0-SNAPSHOT</version>
</parent>
<artifactId>flash-ext-security-apikey</artifactId>
<dependencies>
<dependency>
<groupId>dev.relism</groupId>
<artifactId>flash-ext-security-core</artifactId>
</dependency>
<dependency>
<groupId>org.junit.jupiter</groupId>
<artifactId>junit-jupiter</artifactId>
</dependency>
<dependency>
<groupId>dev.relism</groupId>
<artifactId>flash-testing</artifactId>
<scope>test</scope>
</dependency>
</dependencies>
</project>
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.security.apikey;
import java.time.Instant;
/**
* An API key as the application stores it: never the secret, only its hash, and the grant it was
* issued with — whatever the application authorizes on.
*
* @param expiresAt {@code null} for a key that does not expire
* @param revokedAt {@code null} for a key that has not been revoked
*/
public record ApiKey<G>(String id, String secretHash, G grant, Instant expiresAt, Instant revokedAt) {
boolean isActive() {
return revokedAt == null && (expiresAt == null || expiresAt.toEpochMilli() > System.currentTimeMillis());
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.security.apikey;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.security.AuthenticationFailedException;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.security.AuthenticationMechanism;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.security.Principal;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.security.SecurityExtension;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.security.SecurityScheme;
import dev.relism.flash.extension.FlashContext;
import dev.relism.flash.extension.FlashExtension;
import dev.relism.flash.extension.FlashRegistrar;
import dev.relism.flash.models.Request;
import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;
import java.security.MessageDigest;
import java.security.NoSuchAlgorithmException;
import java.security.SecureRandom;
import java.util.Base64;
/**
* API keys sent as {@code Authorization: Bearer <prefix>_<id>.<secret>}. The prefix makes a key
* recognisable at a glance and to secret scanners; the id is what the store is queried by; only a
* SHA-256 of the secret is ever stored — a KDF would add nothing to 192 random bits.
*
* <pre>{@code
* app.install(new SecurityExtension())
* .install(new ApiKeyExtension<>("gk", keys::find));
* }</pre>
*/
public final class ApiKeyExtension<G> implements FlashExtension, AuthenticationMechanism {
private static final AuthenticationFailedException INVALID = new AuthenticationFailedException("Bearer error=\"invalid_token\"");
private static final SecureRandom RANDOM = new SecureRandom();
private static final Base64.Encoder BASE64URL = Base64.getUrlEncoder().withoutPadding();
private final String prefix;
private final String bearer;
private final ApiKeyStore<G> store;
/** @param prefix identifies this application's keys; letters and digits only */
public ApiKeyExtension(String prefix, ApiKeyStore<G> store) {
if (!prefix.matches("[A-Za-z0-9]+")) throw new IllegalArgumentException("API key prefix must be alphanumeric: " + prefix);
this.prefix = prefix;
this.bearer = "Bearer " + prefix + "_";
this.store = store;
}
/** A new key: 72 bits of id, 192 bits of secret. */
public GeneratedApiKey generate() {
String id = random(9);
String secret = random(24);
return new GeneratedApiKey(id, prefix + "_" + id + "." + secret, hash(secret));
}
@Override
public Principal authenticate(Request req) {
String header = req.header("Authorization");
if (header == null || !header.startsWith(bearer)) return null;
int dot = header.indexOf('.', bearer.length());
if (dot < 0) throw INVALID;
ApiKey<G> key = store.find(header.substring(bearer.length(), dot));
if (key == null || !matches(header.substring(dot + 1), key.secretHash()) || !key.isActive()) throw INVALID;
return new ApiKeyPrincipal<>(key.id(), key.grant());
}
@Override
public SecurityScheme scheme() {
return SecurityScheme.bearer("apiKey", prefix + "_<id>.<secret>");
}
@Override
public void configure(FlashRegistrar<?> app, FlashContext ctx) {
ctx.provide(ApiKeyExtension.class, this);
ctx.onReady(() -> ctx.require(SecurityExtension.class).mechanism(this));
}
private static boolean matches(String secret, String secretHash) {
return MessageDigest.isEqual(digest(secret), Base64.getUrlDecoder().decode(secretHash));
}
private static String hash(String secret) {
return BASE64URL.encodeToString(digest(secret));
}
private static byte[] digest(String secret) {
try {
return MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256").digest(secret.getBytes(StandardCharsets.US_ASCII));
} catch (NoSuchAlgorithmException impossible) {
throw new IllegalStateException(impossible);
}
}
private static String random(int bytes) {
byte[] value = new byte[bytes];
RANDOM.nextBytes(value);
return BASE64URL.encodeToString(value);
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.security.apikey;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.security.Principal;
/** A caller authenticated by an API key, carrying the grant the key was issued with. */
public record ApiKeyPrincipal<G>(String name, G grant) implements Principal {}
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.security.apikey;
/** Where the application keeps its API keys. */
@FunctionalInterface
public interface ApiKeyStore<G> {
/** The key with this id, or {@code null}. */
ApiKey<G> find(String id);
}
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.security.apikey;
/**
* A freshly generated key. {@code token} goes to the caller exactly once; the application stores
* {@code id} and {@code secretHash}, never the token.
*/
public record GeneratedApiKey(String id, String token, String secretHash) {}
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.security.apikey;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.security.SecurityExtension;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.security.SecurityIdentity;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.security.SecurityPolicy;
import dev.relism.flash.testing.FlashTest;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.extension.RegisterExtension;
import java.time.Instant;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentHashMap;
class ApiKeyExtensionTest {
static final Map<String, ApiKey<String>> KEYS = new ConcurrentHashMap<>();
static final SecurityExtension security = new SecurityExtension();
static final ApiKeyExtension<String> apiKeys = new ApiKeyExtension<>("fk", KEYS::get);
@RegisterExtension
static final FlashTest app = FlashTest.of(flash -> flash
.install(security)
.install(apiKeys)
.get("/grant", (req, res) -> SecurityIdentity.current().principal(ApiKeyPrincipal.class).grant(),
security.enforce(SecurityPolicy.AUTHENTICATED)));
static String issue(String grant, Instant expiresAt, Instant revokedAt) {
GeneratedApiKey key = apiKeys.generate();
KEYS.put(key.id(), new ApiKey<>(key.id(), key.secretHash(), grant, expiresAt, revokedAt));
return "Bearer " + key.token();
}
@Test
void anIssuedKeyAuthenticatesWithItsGrant() {
app.request().header("Authorization", issue("project-42", null, null)).get("/grant").expectStatus(200).expectBody("project-42");
}
@Test
void aWrongSecretAnExpiredKeyAndARevokedKeyAreRejectedAsInvalid() {
String valid = issue("x", null, null);
for (String token : new String[]{
valid.substring(0, valid.length() - 1) + (valid.endsWith("A") ? "B" : "A"),
issue("x", Instant.now().minusSeconds(1), null),
issue("x", null, Instant.now()),
"Bearer fk_no-secret-here"}) {
app.request().header("Authorization", token).get("/grant")
.expectStatus(401).expectHeader("WWW-Authenticate", "Bearer error=\"invalid_token\"");
}
}
/** Another application's bearer token is not a key of ours: it is left to other mechanisms, not rejected. */
@Test
void aForeignBearerTokenIsNotThisMechanisms() {
app.request().header("Authorization", "Bearer eyJhbGciOi.payload.signature").get("/grant")
.expectStatus(401).expectHeader("WWW-Authenticate", "Bearer realm=\"apiKey\"");
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
# flash-ext-security-core
Authentication and authorization for Flash, independent of any credential. Mechanisms —
[`-oidc`](../../flash-ext-security-oidc/docs/README.md), [`-apikey`](../../flash-ext-security-apikey/docs/README.md),
[`-form`](../../flash-ext-security-form/docs/README.md), or your own — register into one chain;
this module owns everything downstream of "who is the caller".
```java
app.install(new SecurityExtension()
.users(principal -> users.findOrProvision(principal)) // optional: principal → your user
.roles((identity, role, on) -> members.has(identity.user(User.class), role, on.get("project"))))
.install(new OidcExtension(OidcProvider.of("sso", issuer, clientId, secret)));
```
## The model
| Type | Role |
|---|---|
| `AuthenticationMechanism` | reads one kind of credential: returns a `Principal`, `null` (not mine), or throws `AuthenticationFailedException` (mine, invalid) |
| `Principal` | who the mechanism proved the caller to be — typed per mechanism (`OidcPrincipal`, `ApiKeyPrincipal`, …) |
| `SecurityIdentity` | the current caller: `principal(OidcPrincipal.class)`, `user(User.class)`, `hasRole`, `hasScope` |
| `UserResolver` | principal → application user, resolved lazily, once per request |
| `RoleResolver` | whether a caller holds a role, optionally on a resource |
| `AuthenticationEntryPoint` | the answer to a request that needs a caller and carries no credential |
Mechanisms never write the response. That is what keeps the one mistake that matters impossible to
make: a credential that was presented and rejected is always a 401, never a redirect into a sign-in
page an API client cannot parse.
## Annotations
On a handler or an MCP tool class:
| | |
|---|---|
| `@Authenticated` | any authenticated caller |
| `@PermitAll` | anyone; a caller who authenticates is still identified, one who fails is anonymous |
| `@RolesAllowed(value, on)` | any of the roles; `on` names the path/query parameters (tool arguments on MCP) identifying the resource |
| `@ScopesAllowed(value)` | every one of the credential's scopes |
`@RolesAllowed(value = "MANAGER", on = "project")` on `/projects/{project}/keys` asks the
`RoleResolver` whether the caller is a manager *of that project*. A handler declaring roles with no
`RoleResolver` configured fails the boot. Policies compile once; checking one allocates nothing.
## The chain
Mechanisms are tried in registration order, then the session cookie. The first to return a
principal wins. When none does:
- a browser (`Accept: text/html`) is redirected to the only login method, or to `loginPage` when there are several;
- anything else gets `401` with every mechanism's challenge in `WWW-Authenticate`.
`entryPoint(...)` replaces that, e.g. to pick an identity provider from the user's email domain.
## Sessions
`signIn(req, res, principal[, expiresAt])` stores the principal under a `flash_session` cookie;
`POST /auth/logout` ends it and follows `Principal.logoutUrl()`. An expired session is handed to the
`SessionRefresher` registered for its principal type, or ended. `InMemorySessionStore` is the
default; `sessions(...)` swaps it for one that survives a restart or spans instances.
`GET /auth/methods` lists every registered `LoginMethod` for a client to render.
## OpenAPI
With `flash-ext-openapi` present, every registered mechanism's `SecurityScheme` is published, and
every protected operation lists them as alternatives, with its 401 and — for roles or scopes — its
403 and what it requires. Nothing to write per mechanism.
## Writing a mechanism
```java
security.mechanism(new AuthenticationMechanism() {
public Principal authenticate(Request req) {
String key = req.header("X-Key");
if (key == null) return null; // not mine
Principal p = keys.get(key);
if (p == null) throw new AuthenticationFailedException(null); // mine, and invalid
return p;
}
public SecurityScheme scheme() { return SecurityScheme.bearer("key", "opaque"); }
});
```
## Testing
[`flash-ext-security-test`](../../flash-ext-security-test/docs/README.md) authenticates requests as
any principal without an identity provider.
@@ -10,13 +10,9 @@
<version>2.1.0-SNAPSHOT</version>
</parent>
<artifactId>flash-ext-auth-oidc</artifactId>
<artifactId>flash-ext-security-core</artifactId>
<dependencies>
<dependency>
<groupId>dev.relism</groupId>
<artifactId>flash-ext-auth-core</artifactId>
</dependency>
<dependency>
<groupId>dev.relism</groupId>
<artifactId>flash</artifactId>
@@ -26,22 +22,14 @@
<artifactId>flash-ext-openapi</artifactId>
<optional>true</optional>
</dependency>
<dependency>
<groupId>com.nimbusds</groupId>
<artifactId>nimbus-jose-jwt</artifactId>
</dependency>
<dependency>
<groupId>net.minidev</groupId>
<artifactId>json-smart</artifactId>
</dependency>
<dependency>
<groupId>org.projectlombok</groupId>
<artifactId>lombok</artifactId>
</dependency>
<dependency>
<groupId>org.junit.jupiter</groupId>
<artifactId>junit-jupiter</artifactId>
</dependency>
<dependency>
<groupId>dev.relism</groupId>
<artifactId>flash-testing</artifactId>
<scope>test</scope>
</dependency>
</dependencies>
</project>
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.security;
import java.lang.annotation.Documented;
import java.lang.annotation.ElementType;
import java.lang.annotation.Retention;
import java.lang.annotation.RetentionPolicy;
/** The handler or MCP tool requires an authenticated caller. */
@Documented
@Retention(RetentionPolicy.RUNTIME)
@java.lang.annotation.Target(ElementType.TYPE)
public @interface Authenticated {}
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.security;
import dev.relism.flash.models.Request;
import dev.relism.flash.models.Response;
/** Answers a request that needs a caller and carries no credential at all. */
@FunctionalInterface
public interface AuthenticationEntryPoint {
Object commence(Request req, Response res) throws Exception;
}
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.security;
import dev.relism.flash.exceptions.HttpException;
/** A credential was presented and rejected. Stackless: turning away forged tokens stays cheap. */
public final class AuthenticationFailedException extends HttpException {
private final String challenge;
/** @param challenge the {@code WWW-Authenticate} value to answer with, or {@code null} */
public AuthenticationFailedException(String challenge) {
super(401, "Unauthorized");
this.challenge = challenge;
}
public String challenge() {
return challenge;
}
@Override
public synchronized Throwable fillInStackTrace() {
return this;
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.security;
import dev.relism.flash.models.Request;
/**
* Reads one kind of credential off a request. A mechanism never writes the response: an anonymous
* request is answered by the {@link AuthenticationEntryPoint}, a rejected one by the 401 its
* {@link AuthenticationFailedException} carries.
*/
public interface AuthenticationMechanism {
/**
* The caller, or {@code null} when the request carries no credential of this kind.
*
* @throws AuthenticationFailedException the request carries one, and it is invalid
*/
Principal authenticate(Request req);
/** How OpenAPI documents the credential and a 401 challenges for it; {@code null} for neither. */
default SecurityScheme scheme() { return null; }
}
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.security;
import java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentHashMap;
/** One instance's sessions, lost on restart. Expired ones are swept whenever a session is saved. */
public final class InMemorySessionStore implements SessionStore {
private final ConcurrentHashMap<String, Session> sessions = new ConcurrentHashMap<>();
@Override
public void save(Session session) {
long now = System.currentTimeMillis();
sessions.values().removeIf(s -> s.expiresAt().toEpochMilli() <= now);
sessions.put(session.id(), session);
}
@Override
public Session find(String id) {
return sessions.get(id);
}
@Override
public void delete(String id) {
sessions.remove(id);
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.security;
/** A way to sign in, listed at {@code GET /auth/methods} for a client to offer. */
public record LoginMethod(String id, String name, String url, Kind kind) {
public enum Kind {
/** A browser navigates to {@code url} and comes back signed in — OpenID Connect, for instance. */
REDIRECT,
/** A client posts {@code username} and {@code password} to {@code url}. */
FORM
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.security;
import java.lang.annotation.Documented;
import java.lang.annotation.ElementType;
import java.lang.annotation.Retention;
import java.lang.annotation.RetentionPolicy;
/**
* Anyone may call the handler. A caller who authenticates is still identified; one whose credential
* is rejected is treated as anonymous rather than refused.
*/
@Documented
@Retention(RetentionPolicy.RUNTIME)
@java.lang.annotation.Target(ElementType.TYPE)
public @interface PermitAll {}
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.security;
/**
* Who an {@link AuthenticationMechanism} proved the caller to be. Each mechanism has its own type;
* {@link SecurityIdentity#principal(Class)} reads it back.
*/
public interface Principal {
/** Unique within the mechanism that produced it. */
String name();
/** Whether the credential grants {@code scope}. One that carries no scopes grants every scope. */
default boolean hasScope(String scope) { return true; }
/** Whether the credential was issued for {@code audience} (RFC 8707). One bound to no audience was. */
default boolean hasAudience(String audience) { return true; }
/** Where signing out sends the browser; {@code null} for the application root. */
default String logoutUrl() { return null; }
}
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.security;
/**
* Whether a caller holds a role — read from a token, a database, anywhere. {@code on} identifies
* the resource for roles held per resource rather than globally.
*/
@FunctionalInterface
public interface RoleResolver {
boolean hasRole(SecurityIdentity identity, String role, Target on);
}
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.security;
import java.lang.annotation.Documented;
import java.lang.annotation.ElementType;
import java.lang.annotation.Retention;
import java.lang.annotation.RetentionPolicy;
/**
* The caller must hold at least one of these roles, as decided by the configured
* {@link RoleResolver}. Implies {@link Authenticated}.
*/
@Documented
@Retention(RetentionPolicy.RUNTIME)
@java.lang.annotation.Target(ElementType.TYPE)
public @interface RolesAllowed {
String[] value();
/**
* Names of the path or query parameters (tool arguments on MCP) that identify the resource the
* role is held on — {@code on = "project"} checks the role on {@code /projects/{project}}.
*/
String[] on() default {};
}
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.security;
import java.lang.annotation.Documented;
import java.lang.annotation.ElementType;
import java.lang.annotation.Retention;
import java.lang.annotation.RetentionPolicy;
/** The caller's credential must grant every one of these scopes. Implies {@link Authenticated}. */
@Documented
@Retention(RetentionPolicy.RUNTIME)
@java.lang.annotation.Target(ElementType.TYPE)
public @interface ScopesAllowed {
String[] value();
}
@@ -0,0 +1,321 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.security;
import dev.relism.flash.exceptions.HttpException;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.openapi.OpenApiContributor;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.openapi.OpenApiContributorRegistry;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.openapi.OpenApiOperationContribution;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.openapi.OpenApiResponseContribution;
import dev.relism.flash.extension.FlashContext;
import dev.relism.flash.extension.FlashExtension;
import dev.relism.flash.extension.FlashRegistrar;
import dev.relism.flash.http.ContentType;
import dev.relism.flash.models.Request;
import dev.relism.flash.models.Response;
import dev.relism.flash.routing.Middleware;
import dev.relism.flash.routing.MiddlewareKey;
import dev.relism.flash.routing.MiddlewareNode;
import dev.relism.fpr.core.ByteView;
import java.net.URLEncoder;
import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;
import java.security.SecureRandom;
import java.time.Duration;
import java.time.Instant;
import java.util.Arrays;
import java.util.Base64;
import java.util.LinkedHashMap;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.concurrent.ConcurrentHashMap;
/**
* Flash security: the authentication chain, the policies security annotations declare, sessions,
* and the {@code /auth/logout} and {@code /auth/methods} routes. Mechanisms register through
* {@link #mechanism}, directly or from their own extensions, and are tried in registration order
* before the session cookie.
*
* <pre>{@code
* app.install(new SecurityExtension().users(users).roles(roles))
* .install(new OidcExtension(OidcProvider.of("sso", issuer, clientId, secret)));
* }</pre>
*/
public class SecurityExtension implements FlashExtension {
/** The node security annotations mount under, for middleware that must run before or after it. */
public static final MiddlewareKey POLICY = MiddlewareKey.of("flash.security.policy");
private static final String WWW_AUTHENTICATE = "WWW-Authenticate";
private static final String COOKIE = "flash_session";
private static final SecureRandom RANDOM = new SecureRandom();
private final Map<Class<?>, SessionRefresher> refreshers = new ConcurrentHashMap<>();
private volatile AuthenticationMechanism[] mechanisms = {};
private volatile SecurityScheme[] schemes = {};
private volatile LoginMethod[] loginMethods = {};
private volatile String challenges;
private volatile String methodsJson = "[]";
UserResolver<?> users = principal -> principal;
RoleResolver roles;
private AuthenticationEntryPoint entryPoint = this::commence;
private SessionStore sessions = new InMemorySessionStore();
private Duration sessionTimeout = Duration.ofHours(12);
private String loginPage = "/login";
// -- Configuration --------------------------------------------------------
/** Resolves {@link SecurityIdentity#user} — default: the principal itself. */
public SecurityExtension users(UserResolver<?> users) {
this.users = users;
return this;
}
/** Required by {@link RolesAllowed}; a handler that declares roles without one fails the boot. */
public SecurityExtension roles(RoleResolver roles) {
this.roles = roles;
return this;
}
/** Replaces the default: a browser is redirected to sign in, anything else gets 401 with every challenge. */
public SecurityExtension entryPoint(AuthenticationEntryPoint entryPoint) {
this.entryPoint = entryPoint;
return this;
}
public SecurityExtension sessions(SessionStore sessions) {
this.sessions = sessions;
return this;
}
public SecurityExtension sessionTimeout(Duration sessionTimeout) {
this.sessionTimeout = sessionTimeout;
return this;
}
/** Where a browser signs in, unless the only {@link LoginMethod} is a redirect it can follow directly. */
public SecurityExtension loginPage(String loginPage) {
this.loginPage = loginPage;
return this;
}
// -- Registration (boot time) ---------------------------------------------
public synchronized SecurityExtension mechanism(AuthenticationMechanism mechanism) {
mechanisms = append(mechanisms, mechanism);
return mechanism.scheme() == null ? this : scheme(mechanism.scheme());
}
/** Documents and challenges for a credential beyond the one {@link AuthenticationMechanism#scheme()} names. */
public synchronized SecurityExtension scheme(SecurityScheme scheme) {
schemes = append(schemes, scheme);
challenges = challenges == null ? scheme.challenge() : challenges + ", " + scheme.challenge();
return this;
}
public synchronized SecurityExtension loginMethod(LoginMethod method) {
loginMethods = append(loginMethods, method);
StringBuilder json = new StringBuilder("[");
for (LoginMethod m : loginMethods) {
if (json.length() > 1) json.append(',');
json.append("{\"id\":\"").append(m.id()).append("\",\"name\":\"").append(m.name())
.append("\",\"url\":\"").append(m.url()).append("\",\"kind\":\"").append(m.kind().name().toLowerCase()).append("\"}");
}
methodsJson = json.append(']').toString();
return this;
}
public SecurityExtension refresher(Class<? extends Principal> type, SessionRefresher refresher) {
refreshers.put(type, refresher);
return this;
}
/** The schemes of every registered mechanism, in registration order. */
public List<SecurityScheme> schemes() {
return List.of(schemes);
}
// -- Runtime --------------------------------------------------------------
/**
* The caller, or {@code null} when no mechanism recognises a credential.
*
* @throws AuthenticationFailedException a mechanism recognised one and rejected it
*/
public SecurityIdentity authenticate(Request req) {
for (AuthenticationMechanism mechanism : mechanisms) {
Principal principal = mechanism.authenticate(req);
if (principal != null) return new SecurityIdentity(principal, this, req);
}
Principal principal = sessionPrincipal(req);
return principal == null ? null : new SecurityIdentity(principal, this, req);
}
/**
* The policy {@code type}'s annotations declare, checked against this configuration — declaring
* roles without a {@link RoleResolver} fails here, at boot. {@code null} for no annotations.
*/
public SecurityPolicy policy(Class<?> type) {
SecurityPolicy policy = SecurityPolicy.of(type);
if (policy != null && policy.requiresRoles() && roles == null) {
throw new IllegalStateException(type.getName() + " declares @RolesAllowed, but no RoleResolver is configured — SecurityExtension.roles(...)");
}
return policy;
}
public Middleware enforce(SecurityPolicy policy) {
return enforce(policy, entryPoint);
}
/** {@code anonymous} answers a caller without credentials on this route instead of the configured entry point. */
public Middleware enforce(SecurityPolicy policy, AuthenticationEntryPoint anonymous) {
return next -> (req, res) -> {
SecurityIdentity identity;
try {
identity = authenticate(req);
} catch (AuthenticationFailedException rejected) {
if (policy.required) {
if (rejected.challenge() != null) res.header(WWW_AUTHENTICATE, rejected.challenge());
throw rejected;
}
identity = null;
}
if (identity == null) {
if (policy.required) return anonymous.commence(req, res);
} else if (!policy.permitsScopes(identity)) {
res.header(WWW_AUTHENTICATE, policy.scopeChallenge);
throw HttpException.forbidden();
} else if (!policy.permitsRoles(identity, policy.on.length == 0 ? Target.NONE : name -> {
String value = req.param(name);
return value != null ? value : req.query(name);
})) {
throw HttpException.forbidden();
}
SecurityIdentity.CURRENT.set(identity);
try {
return next.handle(req, res);
} finally {
SecurityIdentity.CURRENT.remove();
}
};
}
/** Starts a session for {@code principal} lasting the configured timeout. */
public void signIn(Request req, Response res, Principal principal) {
signIn(req, res, principal, Instant.now().plus(sessionTimeout));
}
public void signIn(Request req, Response res, Principal principal, Instant expiresAt) {
byte[] id = new byte[24];
RANDOM.nextBytes(id);
Session session = new Session(Base64.getUrlEncoder().withoutPadding().encodeToString(id), principal, expiresAt);
sessions.save(session);
res.header("Set-Cookie", COOKIE + "=" + session.id() + "; Path=/; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax" + (req.origin().startsWith("https") ? "; Secure" : ""));
}
/** Ends the caller's session and returns where the browser goes next. */
public String signOut(Request req, Response res) {
String id = req.cookie(COOKIE);
Session session = id == null ? null : sessions.find(id);
if (session != null) sessions.delete(id);
res.header("Set-Cookie", COOKIE + "=; Path=/; Max-Age=0; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax");
String next = session == null ? null : session.principal().logoutUrl();
return next == null ? "/" : next;
}
// -- Extension ------------------------------------------------------------
@Override
public void configure(FlashRegistrar<?> app, FlashContext ctx) {
ctx.provide(SecurityExtension.class, this);
ctx.addAnnotationProcessor(handler -> {
SecurityPolicy policy = policy(handler);
return policy == null ? List.of() : List.of(MiddlewareNode.of(POLICY, enforce(policy)));
});
app.post("/auth/logout", (req, res) -> {
res.status(303).header("Location", signOut(req, res));
return null;
});
app.get("/auth/methods", (req, res) -> {
res.type(ContentType.JSON);
return methodsJson;
});
ctx.onReady(() -> {
try {
OpenApi.register(ctx, this);
} catch (NoClassDefFoundError absent) {
// flash-ext-openapi is not on the classpath
}
});
}
private Object commence(Request req, Response res) {
LoginMethod[] methods = loginMethods;
String accept = req.header("Accept");
if (methods.length > 0 && accept != null && accept.contains("text/html")) {
String login = methods.length == 1 && methods[0].kind() == LoginMethod.Kind.REDIRECT ? methods[0].url() : loginPage;
ByteView query = req.getRequestLine().getQuery();
byte[] raw = new byte[query == null ? 0 : query.length()];
for (int i = 0; i < raw.length; i++) raw[i] = query.byteAt(i);
String target = raw.length == 0 ? req.path() : req.path() + "?" + new String(raw, StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
res.redirect(login + "?redirect=" + URLEncoder.encode(target, StandardCharsets.UTF_8));
return null;
}
if (challenges != null) res.header(WWW_AUTHENTICATE, challenges);
throw HttpException.unauthorized();
}
private Principal sessionPrincipal(Request req) {
String id = req.cookie(COOKIE);
Session session = id == null ? null : sessions.find(id);
if (session == null) return null;
if (session.expiresAt().toEpochMilli() > System.currentTimeMillis()) return session.principal();
SessionRefresher refresher = refreshers.get(session.principal().getClass());
Session renewed = refresher == null ? null : refresher.refresh(session);
if (renewed == null) {
sessions.delete(id);
return null;
}
sessions.save(renewed);
return renewed.principal();
}
private static <T> T[] append(T[] array, T element) {
T[] grown = Arrays.copyOf(array, array.length + 1);
grown[array.length] = element;
return grown;
}
/** Isolated so this extension loads without flash-ext-openapi on the classpath. */
private static final class OpenApi {
static void register(FlashContext ctx, SecurityExtension security) {
ctx.find(OpenApiContributorRegistry.class).ifPresent(registry -> registry.add(new OpenApiContributor() {
@Override
public Map<String, Object> componentContributions() {
Map<String, Object> definitions = new LinkedHashMap<>();
for (SecurityScheme scheme : security.schemes) definitions.put(scheme.name(), scheme.definition());
return definitions.isEmpty() ? Map.of() : Map.of("securitySchemes", definitions);
}
@Override
public OpenApiOperationContribution operationFor(Class<?> handler) {
SecurityPolicy policy = SecurityPolicy.of(handler);
if (policy == null || !policy.required) return OpenApiOperationContribution.empty();
OpenApiOperationContribution.Builder operation = OpenApiOperationContribution.builder();
for (SecurityScheme scheme : security.schemes) {
operation.security(scheme.name(), scheme.issuer() != null ? List.of(policy.scopes) : List.of());
}
operation.response(401, OpenApiResponseContribution.of("Authentication required"));
String roles = policy.roles.length == 0 ? null : "Requires role " + String.join(" or ", policy.roles)
+ (policy.on.length == 0 ? "" : " on " + String.join(", ", policy.on));
String scopes = policy.scopes.length == 0 ? null : "Requires scopes " + String.join(" ", policy.scopes);
if (roles != null || scopes != null) {
operation.response(403, OpenApiResponseContribution.of(
roles == null ? scopes : scopes == null ? roles : roles + "; " + scopes));
}
return operation.build();
}
}));
}
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.security;
import dev.relism.flash.models.Request;
/**
* The authenticated caller of the current request: the {@link Principal} a mechanism produced, the
* application user it resolves to, and the roles and scopes it holds.
*/
public final class SecurityIdentity {
static final ThreadLocal<SecurityIdentity> CURRENT = new ThreadLocal<>();
private final Principal principal;
private final SecurityExtension security;
private final Request request;
private Object user;
SecurityIdentity(Principal principal, SecurityExtension security, Request request) {
this.principal = principal;
this.security = security;
this.request = request;
}
/** The caller of the request this thread is handling; {@code null} when it is anonymous. */
public static SecurityIdentity current() {
return CURRENT.get();
}
public Principal principal() {
return principal;
}
/**
* The request being authorized. {@link Target} carries what {@link RolesAllowed#on()} names, read
* from path and query parameters; a {@link RoleResolver} whose scope is somewhere else — a tenant
* header, say — reads it from here.
*/
public Request request() {
return request;
}
/** The principal as {@code type}, or {@code null} when another mechanism authenticated the caller. */
public <P extends Principal> P principal(Class<P> type) {
return type.isInstance(principal) ? type.cast(principal) : null;
}
/** The application user, resolved once per request by the configured {@link UserResolver}. */
public <U> U user(Class<U> type) {
if (user == null) user = security.users.resolve(principal);
return type.cast(user);
}
public boolean hasScope(String scope) {
return principal.hasScope(scope);
}
public boolean hasRole(String role) {
return hasRole(role, Target.NONE);
}
public boolean hasRole(String role, Target on) {
if (security.roles == null) throw new IllegalStateException("No RoleResolver configured — SecurityExtension.roles(...)");
return security.roles.hasRole(this, role, on);
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.security;
/** What a handler's or tool's security annotations require, compiled once at boot. Checks allocate nothing. */
public final class SecurityPolicy {
/** Any authenticated caller. */
public static final SecurityPolicy AUTHENTICATED = new SecurityPolicy(true, new String[0], new String[0], new String[0]);
final boolean required;
final String[] roles;
final String[] on;
final String[] scopes;
final String scopeChallenge;
private SecurityPolicy(boolean required, String[] roles, String[] on, String[] scopes) {
this.required = required;
this.roles = roles;
this.on = on;
this.scopes = scopes;
this.scopeChallenge = "Bearer error=\"insufficient_scope\", scope=\"" + String.join(" ", scopes) + "\"";
}
/** The policy {@code type} declares, or {@code null} when it carries no security annotation. */
public static SecurityPolicy of(Class<?> type) {
boolean permitAll = type.isAnnotationPresent(PermitAll.class);
boolean authenticated = type.isAnnotationPresent(Authenticated.class);
RolesAllowed roles = type.getAnnotation(RolesAllowed.class);
ScopesAllowed scopes = type.getAnnotation(ScopesAllowed.class);
if (!permitAll && !authenticated && roles == null && scopes == null) return null;
if (permitAll && (authenticated || roles != null || scopes != null)) {
throw new IllegalStateException("@PermitAll contradicts the other security annotations on " + type.getName());
}
return new SecurityPolicy(!permitAll,
roles == null ? AUTHENTICATED.roles : values(roles.value(), "@RolesAllowed", type),
roles == null ? AUTHENTICATED.on : roles.on(),
scopes == null ? AUTHENTICATED.scopes : values(scopes.value(), "@ScopesAllowed", type));
}
/** False only for {@link PermitAll}. */
public boolean required() {
return required;
}
public boolean requiresRoles() {
return roles.length > 0;
}
public boolean permitsScopes(SecurityIdentity identity) {
for (String scope : scopes) if (!identity.hasScope(scope)) return false;
return true;
}
public boolean permitsRoles(SecurityIdentity identity, Target target) {
if (roles.length == 0) return true;
for (String role : roles) if (identity.hasRole(role, target)) return true;
return false;
}
private static String[] values(String[] values, String annotation, Class<?> type) {
if (values.length == 0) throw new IllegalStateException(annotation + " on " + type.getName() + " names nothing");
return values;
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.security;
import java.util.Map;
/**
* A credential as OpenAPI names and defines it, the {@code WWW-Authenticate} challenge an anonymous
* API call receives for it, and — for OAuth — the issuer that grants it.
*
* @param definition the OpenAPI Security Scheme Object, verbatim
* @param issuer the authorization server's issuer identifier, {@code null} for anything else
*/
public record SecurityScheme(String name, Map<String, Object> definition, String challenge, String issuer) {
public static SecurityScheme bearer(String name, String bearerFormat) {
return new SecurityScheme(name, Map.of("type", "http", "scheme", "bearer", "bearerFormat", bearerFormat),
"Bearer realm=\"" + name + "\"", null);
}
public static SecurityScheme openIdConnect(String name, String issuer) {
return new SecurityScheme(name,
Map.of("type", "openIdConnect", "openIdConnectUrl", issuer + (issuer.endsWith("/") ? "" : "/") + ".well-known/openid-configuration"),
"Bearer realm=\"" + name + "\"", issuer);
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.security;
import java.time.Instant;
/** A signed-in principal, kept server-side under the id its cookie carries. */
public record Session(String id, Principal principal, Instant expiresAt) {}
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.security;
/** Renews an expired session — with a refresh token, typically. {@code null} ends it instead. */
@FunctionalInterface
public interface SessionRefresher {
Session refresh(Session expired);
}
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.security;
/** Where sessions live. {@link InMemorySessionStore} unless one that survives restarts is configured. */
public interface SessionStore {
void save(Session session);
/** The session, or {@code null}. */
Session find(String id);
void delete(String id);
}
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.security;
/**
* The resource a role is checked on: the values {@link RolesAllowed#on()} names, read from path
* and query parameters on HTTP and from tool arguments on MCP.
*/
@FunctionalInterface
public interface Target {
/** A role checked on nothing in particular. */
Target NONE = name -> null;
/** The value called {@code name}, or {@code null} when the call does not carry one. */
String get(String name);
}
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.security;
/** The application user a verified principal belongs to — typically found, or provisioned, by issuer and subject. */
@FunctionalInterface
public interface UserResolver<U> {
U resolve(Principal principal);
}
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
package dev.relism.flash.ext.security;
import dev.relism.flash.ext.openapi.OpenApiExtension;
import dev.relism.flash.models.Request;
import dev.relism.flash.testing.FlashTest;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.Test;
import org.junit.jupiter.api.extension.RegisterExtension;
import java.time.Instant;
import java.util.Set;
import static org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertThrows;
class SecurityExtensionTest {
/** {@code Authorization: Key <name>[ <scope>...]}; {@code Key !} is a presented, invalid credential. */
record KeyPrincipal(String name, Set<String> scopes) implements Principal {
@Override public boolean hasScope(String scope) { return scopes.contains(scope); }
}
static final AuthenticationMechanism KEY = new AuthenticationMechanism() {
@Override
public Principal authenticate(Request req) {
String header = req.header("Authorization");
if (header == null || !header.startsWith("Key ")) return null;
String[] parts = header.substring(4).split(" ");
if (parts[0].equals("!")) throw new AuthenticationFailedException("Key error=\"invalid_token\"");
return new KeyPrincipal(parts[0], Set.of(java.util.Arrays.copyOfRange(parts, 1, parts.length)));
}
@Override
public SecurityScheme scheme() {
return SecurityScheme.bearer("key", "opaque");
}
};
static final SecurityExtension security = new SecurityExtension()
.roles((identity, role, on) -> identity.principal().name().equals(role + "@" + on.get("project")))
.mechanism(KEY)
.loginMethod(new LoginMethod("key", "Key", "/auth/key/login", LoginMethod.Kind.REDIRECT))
.refresher(KeyPrincipal.class, expired -> new Session(expired.id(), expired.principal(), Instant.now().plusSeconds(60)));
@RegisterExtension
static final FlashTest app = FlashTest.of(flash -> flash
.install(security)
.install(new OpenApiExtension("/openapi", "test", "1"))
.get("/me", (req, res) -> SecurityIdentity.current().principal().name(), security.enforce(SecurityPolicy.AUTHENTICATED))
.post("/login", (req, res) -> {
security.signIn(req, res, new KeyPrincipal("carol", Set.of()), Instant.now().minusSeconds(1));
return "signed in";
})
.scan("dev.relism.flash.ext.security.fixtures"));
@Test
void aValidCredentialIdentifiesTheCaller() {
app.request().header("Authorization", "Key alice").get("/me").expectStatus(200).expectBody("alice");
}
/** Rejected is never anonymous: a browser presenting a bad credential must not be sent to sign in. */
@Test
void aRejectedCredentialIs401WithItsOwnChallengeEvenForABrowser() {
app.request().header("Authorization", "Key !").header("Accept", "text/html").get("/me")
.expectStatus(401)
.expectHeader("WWW-Authenticate", "Key error=\"invalid_token\"");
}
@Test
void anApiCallWithoutCredentialsIsChallengedForEveryMechanism() {
app.get("/me").expectStatus(401).expectHeader("WWW-Authenticate", "Bearer realm=\"key\"");
}
@Test
void aBrowserWithoutCredentialsGoesStraightToTheOnlyLoginMethod() {
app.request().header("Accept", "text/html").get("/me?tab=keys")
.expectStatus(302)
.expectHeader("Location", "/auth/key/login?redirect=%2Fme%3Ftab%3Dkeys");
}
@Test
void permitAllIdentifiesWhoeverAuthenticatesAndToleratesEveryoneElse() {
app.request().header("Authorization", "Key bob").get("/open").expectBody("bob");
app.request().header("Authorization", "Key !").get("/open").expectStatus(200).expectBody("anonymous");
app.get("/open").expectBody("anonymous");
}
@Test
void rolesAreCheckedOnTheResourceThePathNames() {
app.request().header("Authorization", "Key MANAGER@42").get("/projects/42").expectStatus(200);
app.request().header("Authorization", "Key MANAGER@42").get("/projects/7").expectStatus(403);
}
@Test
void aMissingScopeIs403WithAnInsufficientScopeChallenge() {
app.request().header("Authorization", "Key dave write").post("/write").expectStatus(200);
app.request().header("Authorization", "Key dave").post("/write")
.expectStatus(403)
.expectHeader("WWW-Authenticate", "Bearer error=\"insufficient_scope\", scope=\"write\"");
}
/** The session is signed in already expired, so reaching /me proves the refresher ran. */
@Test
void aSessionIsRefreshedWhenExpiredAndEndedBySigningOut() {
String cookie = app.request().post("/login").expectStatus(200).header("Set-Cookie");
String session = cookie.substring(0, cookie.indexOf(';'));
app.request().header("Cookie", session).get("/me").expectStatus(200).expectBody("carol");
app.request().header("Cookie", session).post("/auth/logout").expectStatus(303).expectHeader("Location", "/");
app.request().header("Cookie", session).get("/me").expectStatus(401);
}
@Test
void loginMethodsAreListed() {
app.get("/auth/methods").expectStatus(200).expectBody("[{\"id\":\"key\",\"name\":\"Key\",\"url\":\"/auth/key/login\",\"kind\":\"redirect\"}]");
}
@Test
void openApiDocumentsEachSchemeAndWhatEachOperationRequires() {
app.get("/openapi.json").expectStatus(200)
.expectBodyContains("\"securitySchemes\"")
.expectBodyContains("\"bearerFormat\":\"opaque\"")
.expectBodyContains("Requires role MANAGER on project")
.expectBodyContains("Requires scopes write");
}
@Test
void declaringRolesWithoutAResolverFailsTheBoot() {
FlashTest broken = FlashTest.of(flash -> flash
.install(new SecurityExtension())
.scan("dev.relism.flash.ext.security.fixtures"));
assertThrows(Exception.class, () -> broken.get("/open"));
}
}

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